with whom GALLAGHER and MACK, Associate Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
After a full hearing as to an assessment for fiscal year 1973, the trial court reduced the Board of Equalization and Review’s equalized assessment of appellee’s property and provided in its order that “the aforesaid reduced assessment . . . shall constitute the full and lawful assessment . for District of Columbia fiscal year 1973, and pursuant to District of Columbia Code 1973, § 47-709,1 for all succeeding years until another valuation is made according to law.” The decision as to fiscal year 1973 has full support in the evidence and I agree it should be affirmed. Even before this evidentiary hearing, however, another valuation of appellee’s property had been made according to law for fiscal year 1974 which, under the statutory scheme in effect at the time,2 had become final some months before the court’s decision. Review of that valuation had thus been foreclosed six months in advance of the court’s ruling because of appellee’s failure to follow the mandatory statutory procedures to contest the 1974 assessment, or even to file a simple amendment to its petition pending in the Tax Division of Superior Court to include a refund request for fiscal year 1974.3
The statutory scheme for relief from allegedly inaccurate fiscal year assessments is found in D.C.Code 1973, §§ 47-709, -2403, and -2404, and the administrative remedies outlined there must be exhausted before a taxpayer may pursue court action. Sections 47-709 and -2403 provide that where the assessment for the following fiscal year is received before March 1, dr after March 1. but without an increase in valuation, a complaint must be made to the Board of Equalization and Review which sits from January 1 through April 1 for that particular purpose (D.C.Code 1973, § 47-708). If such complaint is made and adversely decided the taxpayer may, after all taxes for the entire fiscal year are paid, appeal to the Superior Court after October 1 and for the six months following. Where, however, there is an increase in valuation and notice in writing is received after March 1, a complaint to the Board is unnecessary. An appeal can then be taken to the Superior Court, after all taxes for the fiscal year have been paid, beginning October 1 and for sixth months following.
In the instant case, notice of the fiscal year 1974 assessment of $2,332,400.00 was received by appellee sometime after March 27,1973, and was identical in amount to the Board’s equalized assessment for fiscal year 1973.
The statutory scheme does not require by its terms that real property be revalued each year, but it does require a designation of value for the tax rolls and notification of that value to the taxpayer.
*1059A majority of the én banc court, at the urging of appellee, concludes without basis that because the fiscal 1974 assessment of appellee’s property was the same as the equalized figure for fiscal 1973, no subsequent valuation of the property was made according to law.4 There is, of course, no testimony of record from which such a conclusion could be drawn. Moreover, it is incorrect to say, as does the majority, that the trial court found the fiscal 1974 assessment figure “erroneous, arbitrary and unlawful.” It would be error if it had in view of the lack of any testimony with respect to that year.
The majority also turns to the “traditional and inherent powers of a court” to bolster its holding in this case. That phrase, without so stating, is of course an obvious reference to a court’s traditional and inherent power to grant equitable relief. The fact is, however, that appellee is pursuing a statutory remedy and seeks no relief in equity if, indeed, any such relief is available. Additionally, the statute which spoke to the scope of judicial review in Hamilton National Bank v. District of Columbia, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 156 F.2d 843 (1946), upon which the majority relies, differed in one significant aspect from that under which this suit is brought. In Hamilton National Bank v. District of Columbia, supra at 204, 156 F.2d at 847, the court said:
Our power to review its [Board of Tax Appeals] decisions is “as under the equity practice in which the whole case, both facts and law, is open for consideration”, —“the scope of a review of an equity court.” . . . [Footnote omitted.]
In an earlier case the Supreme Court spoke with some wonder of the statute, saying, in District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U.S. 698, 701, 64 S.Ct. 406, 407-408, 88 L.Ed. 408 (1944):
The provisions for review of Board of Tax Appeals decisions present complexities almost as baffling as the test of taxability itself. Section 4(a) of the Act creating the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia provides that its decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals and that upon such review the court “shall have the power to affirm, or if the decision of the board is not in accordance with law, to modify or reverse the decision of the board, with or without remanding the case for hearing, as justice may require.” 52 Stat. 371, D.C.Code 1940, § 47-2404(a). Had this been all, a strong case would be made for applying the rule of finality applicable to the Federal Board of Tax Appeals, now the Tax Court of the United States. Dobson v. Commissioner, 64 S.Ct. 239, decided December 20, 1943. However, the same organic act contains another and qualifying provision that is not to be found in the acts creating the Tax Court: “The findings of fact by the board shall have the same effect as a finding of fact by an equity court or a verdict of a jury.” 52 Stat. 371, D.C.Code 1940, § 47-2404(a). Since findings of fact by an equity court and the verdict of a jury have from time immemorial been subject to different rules of finality it is puzzling to know what the draftsmen of this section meant by including both in the one rule for reviewing Board of Tax Appeals findings.
Since D.C.Code 1973, § 42-2404(a) had no such provisional language when this case arose, the Hamilton case is inapposite.
In District of Columbia v. Green, D.C. App., 310 A.2d 848, 852-53 (1973), we stated that in “exceptional and extraordinary” circumstances (deliberate discrimination between members of one class of property owners), equitable relief could be sought to enjoin the assessment of a tax. However, the facts of this case are such that resort to equitable relief is inappropriate. Appellee had an adequate remedy at law to contest his 1974 assessment but failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. See also District of Columbia v. Keyes, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 729 (1976).
*1060The time sequence here, while it may be unusual, did not preclude appellee from complaining of the 1974 assessment to the Board of Equalization and Review and, had it been unsuccessful, paying the tax and appealing to Superior Court. Appellee’s failure to meet the jurisdictional requirement is, in my judgment, decisive to the invalidity of the court’s order with regard to fiscal year 1974.5 District of Columbia v. Keyes, supra; George Hyman Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 175 (1974); District of Columbia v. Berenter, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 466 F.2d 367 (1972).
I would affirm the trial court’s decision relating to fiscal year 1973, and reverse as to fiscal year 1974.
.D.C.Code 1973, § 47-709, provides:
The valuation of the real property made and equalized as aforesaid shall be completed not later than the first Monday of May annually. The valuation of said real property made and equalized as aforesaid shall be approved by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia not later than July 1, annually, and when approved by the Commissioner shall constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding year and until another valuation is made according to law ....
. The timetable for establishment, notice, and appeal of real estate assessments was substantially revised by the District of Columbia Real Property Tax Revision Act of 1974, P.L. 93-407, §§ 401-29, 88 Stat. 1036 (effective July 1, 1975).
. Since the pleadings were not amended, no testimony was taken on the 1974 assessment.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 47-705, provides:
Said Board of Assistant Assessors shall, from actual view and from the best sources of information in its reach, determine the value of each separate tract or lot of real property
. Rule 54(c) hardly permits the trial court to grant relief precluded by statute.