I dissent. In my opinion the statement in the affidavit that “It. has been Customs experience and my personal experience in a number of similar investigations in which I have participated that additional types and quantities of narcotics, narcotics paraphenalia [jzc] and correspondence are often found in or on the premises where controlled deliveries of smuggled marihuana or narcotics have been made” does not supply any facts or circumstances to the magistrate upon which he can issue a search warrant. Such a statement is purely conclusionary, opinionative, and based on suspicion.
A search warrant may not properly be issued by a magistrate “unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation.” (Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 [78 L.Ed. 159, 162, 54 S.Ct. 11]; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 727, 84 S.Ct. 1509].) If the affidavit in support of the search warrant fails as a matter of law to set forth sufficient, competent evidence supportive of the magistrate’s finding of probable cause it will be upset. (Skelton v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 144, 150 [81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485]; Dunn v. Municipal Court, 220 Cal.App.2d 858, 869 [34 Cal.Rptr. 251].) There must, therefore, be a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that contraband was probably present in order to sustain his judicial determination that there is probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. (Skelton v. Superior Court, supra; see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 [4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707-708, 80 S.Ct. 725]; Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at p. 111 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 726].)
In order to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant the supporting affidavit must contain an affirmative allegation that the affiant speaks with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein or it must set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made. (Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1509, 78 S.Ct. 1245]; Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 113 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 728].) Where the affidavit is based on hearsay information “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed [citation], was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’ ” (Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at p. 114 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 729].)
Although it is true that the credibility of the affiant is a matter for the magistrate (Skelton v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 144, 153-154, fn. 7 at p. 154), a magistrate is not justified in giving any weight to an asser*420tion based on mere suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting facts (Nathanson v. United States, supra, 290 U.S. 41, 46-47 [78 L.Ed. 159, 161]1), or any assertion that is merely the conclusion of the affiant, without any statement of adequate supporting facts. (Giordenello v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. 480, 486.2) Accordingly, mere assertions of suspicion and belief or assertions that are merely conclusions of the affiant do not suffice to establish probable cause. (Nathanson v. United States, supra; Giordenello v. United States, supra.)
Adverting to the affidavit in the instant case, we apprehend that Deatrick’s statement that he had reason to believe that the mail parcel and its contents was about to be located on the described premises was based on adequate supporting facts. His statements concerning the mail parcel and its contents were based either on his own personal knowledge or upon reliable and credible information supplied by United States Customs officers and employees acting in the course and scope of their official employment. Accordingly, these statements formed a substantial basis- for -the magistrate to conclude that the contraband described as being in the mail parcel was probably present at the described premises and sufficed for the issuance of a search warrant for its search and seizure.
However, when our inquiry is directed to whether there was a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that the other objects of the search were “probably present” in the described premises we find that such determination stands or falls on the affiant’s statement here in question. That statement is nothing more than a mere conclusion on the part of the affiant based on an assertion of suspicion and belief. When he states that “It has been Customs- experience . . .” he gives none of the underlying circumstances upon which it could be determined what that experience was. At best it appears to be based on hearsay information without the benefit of the underlying circumstances that the law requires. Insofar as Deatrick’s personal experience is concerned, he merely asserts that because he had “often” found narcotics other than those which were the subject of “controlled deliveries” in a “number” of similar previous investigations, such other narcotics would be found in the premises involved in the instant investigation. This is merely speculation on his part.
We perceive that the affidavit does not purport to delineate Deatrick’s *421experience. It does not set out the number of previous investigations upon which his past experience may be evaluated, nor does it disclose whether the “number” of previous investigations was large or small in respect to the total number. The gist of the subject statement is that because an officer has sometimes found contraband in a particular type of investigation contraband will more likely be found in similar investigations than not. To hold that such a statement suffices to support the issuance of a search warrant is to invite a proliferation of search warrants whose only justification for issuance will be an officer’s naked statement of past experience. Such a holding erodes the constitutional mandate that requires, subject to a few specifically delineated exceptions, not only that searches must be made with warrants, but also that such warrants must be based on affidavits containing adequate supporting facts. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-576, 91 S.Ct. 2022].)
It must be pointed out that in the present case there is no evidence that real party was engaged in the narcotic traffic, that he was a narcotic user, or that he had on other occasions received marijuana through the mails. Yet the affiant presumed to say that if such a person is the addressee of a parcel containing marijuana he has more marijuana and other narcotics in his possession. This is a “lifting up by the bootstraps” argument.
I perceive, further, that there is nothing in the affidavit indicating that Deatrick is an expert upon the matters he presumed to set out in his affidavit. I do not believe that such expertise can be predicated upon an affiant’s bare statement that he is a customs agent who, on some previous occasions, has found additional narcotics in a “controlled delivery” situation. Nor do I perceive him to be an expert on the “modus operandi” of those who receive contraband through the mails. No underlying circumstances are asserted that would indicate that such a recipient always works or operates in a given manner so as to qualify the affiant as an expert. Deatrick does not presume to say in his affidavit that he is an expert because, in his experience, persons in real party’s category act in a certain manner, but only that because some persons in such a category have so acted on a previous occasion others are so acting. This is not a matter within the province of expertise.
The vice of the instant situation, as I view it, is that the inferences to be drawn from Deatrick’s statement are those which he himself draws. The proper inferences must be drawn, however, by the magistrate acting in a “detached and neutral” capacity. (Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-14 [92 L.Ed. 436, 439-440, 68 S.Ct. 367]; Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. 108, 111.) Here the inferences that the additional contraband *422was present are drawn by Deatrick on the basis of past experience and the magistrate was asked to accept without question Deatrick’s suspicion, belief and conclusion. In sum we have in the present case a species of the “procedure by presumption” condemned in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 [31 L.Ed.2d 551, 562, 92 S.Ct. 1208], a procedure whereby the affiant seeks the issuance of a search warrant based on. his presumption without a statement of adequate supporting facts.
It is significant to note that the search warrant speaks in futuro in that it states that all of the property to be seized “will be” at the described premises. The basis for this statement is the factual affirmation underlying the search for the mail parcel and its contents. The parcel would have been delivered to the described premises at the time the warrant was to be executed in view of the affirmation as to the “controlled delivery” of the parcel. This circumstance accentuates the speculative nature of Deatrick’s statement based on past experience. It would seem, that if he had any knowledge or a sufficient basis for believing that the additional contraband was at the premises he would have spoken in the present tense.
I, therefore, conclude that the subject affidavit sufficed only to warrant the issuance of a search warrant for the mail parcel and its marijuana contents. It should not have been issued for a search of “other hashish, marihuana, narcotics or narcotic paraphenalia [sic] . . . Correspondence relating of smuggling hashish, marihuana or narcotics. ... Or the means and instruments used in violation of 21 USC 952” because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause for the search of these objeEts.
This conclusion does not render the warrant invalid as a whole. The invalid portions of a warrant are severable from the valid portions. (Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 789, 797 [13 Cal.Rptr. 415, 362 P.2d 47].) The warrant was therefore valid as to the authorization relating to the mail parcel and its contents. Accordingly, item 2 was properly seized. As pointed out in the majority opinion, no attack was made in the court below upon the validity of the warrant insofar as item 1 (the piece of broken Buddha) and item 3 (9 letters) are concerned. We, therefore, need not determine the validity of the search as to these items.
It is the general rule that when a search is made pursuant to a warrant the search and seizure are limited by the terms of the warrant and only the property described in the warrant may be seized. (Skelton v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 144, 155; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 [72 L.Ed. 231, 237, 48 S.Ct. 74].) “[N]othing is left to the discretion *423of the officer executing the warrant.” (Marron v. United States, supra, at p. 196.) There are exceptions to this rule but they are not applicable here. The search following petitioner’s arrest in which items 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 were seized may not be justified as a search and seizure of articles in plain view. (See Skelton v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 157.) In the instant case it is obvious that since a search for these items took place the plain view rule cannot be made applicable here. Nor can the search for these items be justified as a warrantless search incident to arrest. Within the ambit of the rule established in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 696-697, 89 S.Ct. 2034], the search went beyond real party’s person and the area from which he could obtain either a weapon or evidentiary material. The subject items were discovered after real party had been arrested and removed to another room in the house. The record is clear that the other items of contraband (items 5, 6, and 7) were discovered only as a result of the search of a wooden box. As to item 4 (the money order receipts and one shipping receipt) and item 8 (money), the record is unclear as to where these items were discovered in the bedroom, but it is apparent that they were discovered as a result of a search and not because they were in plain view.
I perceive, moreover, that if items 4 and 8 were subject to search and seizure at all they had to be seized pursuant to the authority in the warrant for the search and seizure of “the means and instruments used in violation of 21 USC 952.” This is a broad general category which does not meet the requirement of reasonable particularity of description required by the constitutional mandate of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, and the statutory mandate of Penal Code section 1525. (See Aday v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.2d 789, 795-796; People v. Tenney, 25 Cal.App.3d 16, 22 [101 Cal.Rptr. 419].)
Since the motion to suppress was properly granted as to items 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, I would discharge the alternative writ of mandate and deny the petition for a peremptory writ of mandate.
The petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 18, 1972. Peters, J., and Sullivan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
In Nathanson the affidavit merely stated that the affiant “has cause to suspect and does believe” that certain merchandise was at a specified location. (290 U.S. at p. 44 [78 L.Ed. at p. 160].)
In Giordenello the affiant swore that the petitioner “ ‘did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, . . . with knowledge of unlawful importation; . -. ” (357 U.S. at p. 481 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 1507].)