I perceive the majority opinion as an overzealous adherence to the result achieved in People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361]. Hitch established that intentional suppression of material evidence (in that case a blood ampule sample in a drunk driving prosecution) favorable to a defendant who has requested it constitutes a violation of due process; the decision did recognize a good-faith exception to that rule. The provisions of Health and Safety Code section 114791 and the People’s good-faith attempt to comply with those provisions would compel affirmance in my view. I view the majority opinion as flawed in several respects. Hitch is truly not applicable in this instance inasmuch as it is factually only facially apposite. In Hitch where the test ampule was destroyed, nothing remained available for defense examination; in this instance, “a representative sample” was preserved for evidentiary purposes. (§ 11479.) Following a decision by the county sheriff and undersheriff relative to the difficult task of storage to utilize the provisions of section 11479, subdivision (d), a large quantity, over 2,900 pounds, of marijuana gathered from 16 locations, including that of defendants, was destroyed. The statement in the majority opinion that “the chief of the law enforcement agency did not determine it was not reasonably possible to remove and store the plants and (3) the gross weight of the suspected controlled substance of defendants was not determined either by actually weighing it or by estimating its weight after dimensional measurements were taken” [see above] is simply a misstatement or ignorance of record fact. The sheriff and undersheriff did make the determination required and ordered destruction, and the officers involved in the seizure did in fact estimate the weight of the pickup load of marijuana taken from defendants prior to its transfer to the larger truck. Concededly, the photographs taken were not as *572contemplated by the statute as they did not depict the individual pickup load seized from the defendant but rather the total quantity taken from the total 16 locations, one of which produced defendants’ 85 harvested marijuana plants. That photograph may be considered a flaw in literally meeting the provisions of section 11479. The two erroneous assumptions in the predicate of the majority opinion reveal its flaw.
The opinion continues “[h]ad the officers, however, complied with Health and Safety Code section 11479, the defendants may have been able to impeach the officer’s testimony both as to quantity and quality of the marijuana.” [P. 570, ante. ] That quoted statement ignores the factual context and the statutory underpinning of this case. The defendants had available one of the harvested plants with which to attempt to impeach the officer’s testimony as to the quantity. Quality is not involved in the charge of possession of marijuana for sale. The quality and character of the preserved plant was established to be high quality marijuana by the prosecution; that plant as evidence was available to defendants for examination; they also had available the officer’s estimate of weight; the photograph of the entire 2,900 pounds could have been used in an attempt to impeach the officer’s testimony equating 85 plants to the amount gathered. The quoted statements are simply polemics; they first ignore the good-faith exception articulated in Hitch that sanctions shall not be imposed if “the governmental agencies involved have established, enforced and attempted in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve [evidence].” (12 Cal.3d at pp. 652-653.) When the facts of this case are viewed in the light of the provisions of section 11479, the prosecution has met the standard contemplated in Hitch. A representative sample was preserved (§ 11479, subd. (c)); the gross weight was estimated from dimensional measurements (§ 11479, subd. (c)); the chief law enforcement officer did make the required determination prior to ordering destruction (§ 11479, subd. (d)); the photograph of the entire load of contraband did not literally meet the photographic standard contemplated by the legislative enactment but such omission does not, in my view, take this case out of the purview of the good-faith compliance contemplated by Hitch. This is particularly true in light of the legislative intent behind section 11479 and the difficulties recognized by the enactment of that section. Moreover, the statement by the majority that with the entire crop of 85 plants, the “defendants may have been able to impeach the officer’s testimony both as to quantity and quality of the marijuana” ignores the provisions of section 11479 which were substantially followed; at best the statement is pure speculation. It is not remotely likely that the preservation of 5 samples and 10 pounds (not required in the case of harvested plants) would have achieved impeachment of the officer’s testimony any more than preservation of all 85 plants. Defendants had a representative sample available to analyze for quality and to equate for quantity in light of the testimony establishing the weight and number (85) of the confiscated harvested marijuana *573plants from the defendants’ possession. I would conclude a contrary result was not remotely possible if all plants had been preserved and the provisions of 11479 not invoked. I would further conclude on the record presented, as did the trial court, that the destruction was accomplished in good faith; as a consequence, substantial compliance with section 11479 in this factual context was sufficient.
I would affirm the judgment.
All further code references will be to the Health and Safety Code.