dissenting.
I find that I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. While I am in accord with all that the majority has said with regard to matters relating to due process and the manner in which various hearings were conducted, I cannot agree with the majority that the evidence establishes a violation of rule 13.12.14 of the Nebraska State Personnel System rules, which specifically provides that one of the grounds for discharge is “other acts, based on competent evidence, which bring discredit upon the state, including but not limited to acts listed above.” While I am in complete accord with the majority that the actions of the appellant in this case were reprehensible and indeed brought discredit upon the appellant, I do not find any evidence to indicate that the state was somehow discredited. That is where I think the difficulty occurs. As noted by the majority, the termination in this case was based solely upon rule 13.12.14 of the State Personnel System rules, and was not based upon the finding made by the district court to the effect that the acts of the appellant constituted a felony which involved moral turpitude and which therefore would compromise the security of the institution. The pandering was conducted outside of the institution and while the appellant was off duty. I think it would be a relatively easy matter for the personnel code to succinctly *296provide that one of the grounds for discharge is the commission of an act by a state employee which constitutes a felony, whether prosecuted or not. By making such provision employees would be adequately forewarned that their actions outside of their employment may nevertheless result in their being discharged. In this case I do not believe the evidence was sufficient to establish any discredit on the state that may result by permitting Buhrmann to remain employed, but that is a matter which should be resolved by amending the personnel rules and not by a leap of faith.