Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:I respectfully dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion of the Compensation Board that “[wjhether or not a physical touching occurred in this case is of no significance.” If the claimant’s version of the incident is accepted, he was the victim of a physical, as well as verbal, assault.
Bussone testified that the foreman led him into an isolated garage on the defendant’s property, locked the door, and threatened and swore at him for a period of several minutes. The foreman was a younger and more vigorous man than the claimant, as well as four inches taller and twenty pounds heavier. At one point, he seized Bussone by the arm and spun him around, shouting, “God damn you, I’m going to get you if it’s the last thing I do, and when I do get you, I’m going to get you right.” Shortly thereafter, the claimant slumped to the ground, sustaining a totally disabling myocardial infarction.
Claimant, defendant, and the Commonwealth all agree that the tension, fear and extreme anxiety at*448tending this confrontation precipitated claimant’s heart attack. Because his disability was caused by emotional turmoil, however, and not by the physical trauma associated with the incident, the Board held that he had not suffered a compensable accident.1 In my view, the Board has thus misconstrued the case law, and reached a result which is both unjust and inequitable.
It is true that our Court has often stated: "Emotional excitement is not such a fortuitous, untoward, or unexpected happening as to constitute an accident." Ante, p. 612. Everitt v. Baker Refrigerator Company, 197 Pa. Superior Ct. 611, 180 A. 2d 114 (1962); Hoffman v. Rhoads Construction Company, 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 55, 172 A. 33 (1934). In none of those cases, however, did the claimant suffer an incidental physical trauma, such as occurred here.
For example, in Hoffman v. Rhoads Construction Company, supra, relied on heavily by the Compensation Board, the Court was careful to note: "No assault was made upon [the claimant] by the foreman. No blow was struck by either of them." (p. 56). The Court stated its holding with some precision: "One's purely subjective emotions, the result of anger, grief, joy, or other mental feeling, if unaccompanied by physical force or exertion, cannot be made the basis of a compensable accident under our Workmen's Compensation Law." Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
This doctrine derives from the so-called "impact rule" in the law of torts. See, e.g., Ewing v. Pittsb. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905). The basis of the rule is clearly spelled out in the Huston case. Absent at least a technical assault upon the person of the plaintiff, the probability of *449fraud is thought to be too great to permit recovery. The impact affords the desired guarantee that the subjective emotional disturbance is genuine. Cf. Prosser, Torts, p. 351 (3rd ed., 1964).
Whatever the wisdom of the "impact" requirement,2 it has never been the law that disability caused by "mere fright" is not compensable. It is only necessary that some physical trauma accompany the mental suffering which results in disability. Cf. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A. 2d 100 (1955).
If we ignore the reason for the "impact" requirement, as the majority has done in this case, we become enmeshed in a web of utterly artificial distinctions among causes which are "ultimate," "immediate," or "precipitating." I do not think this sort of reasoning adequately explains why the present case is not governed by Hunter v. St. Mary's Natural Gas Company, 122 Pa. Superior Ct. 300, 186 A. 325 (1936). There, the claimant, who was morbidly afraid of dogs, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage, caused by fright, after a dog had leapt upon his back. Declaring this a compensable accident, the Court stated: "The amount of physical force is not determinative of the question. If it was physical force to any degree or extent, and if supported by medical testimony, it was sufficient to establish the death resulted from an accident in the course of the employment." See also Yunker v. West Leechburg Steel Company, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 220, 167 A. 443 (1933).
In light of these cases, it is my view that any injury induced by fright is compensable if it is accompanied by a physical trauma, however slight.
*450The Compensation statute, after all, is social legislation, meant to be liberally construed. If we must abide by the common law “impact rule” in these cases, at least we need not compound its harshness by approving the sort of artificial and unrealistic distinctions the Board has made here.
I would remand the record in this case to the Compensation Board for the sole purpose of determining whether or not a physical touching occurred.3 If there was such a touching, I would hold claimant entitled to compensation as a matter of law.
Montgomery, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.In its opinion, the Board states: “The canse of the infarction was the emotion raised by the argument, not the physical activity involved. . . .”
The rationale of this rule seems to me highly questionable. I note that several jurisdictions have abandoned it entirely in negligence cases. See, e.g., Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wise. 2d 594, 85 N.W. 2d 345 (1957).
The Board’s opinion is hopelessly ambiguous on this point, referring, e.g., to “. . . the physical activity involved, if any.”