In agreement with my colleagues that summary judgment was properly granted, I write separately to more fully address respondents’ claim that, in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the proper standard to be applied in determining whether the evidence will support an inference of concerted action in a Cartwright Act case ought to be that prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio (1986) 475 U.S. 574 [89 L.Ed.2d 538, 106 S.Ct. 1348] (Matsushita).
Relying upon Matsushita, respondent banks vigorously contend that “it is not enough for plaintiffs to point to evidence that is as consistent with lawful independent action as with unlawful concerted action.” According to the banks, “[s]uch evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish an unlawful antitrust conspiracy and hence cannot give rise to a triable issue of material fact.” These “Matsushita principles” apply to proof of price fixing conspiracies under the Cartwright Act, the banks maintain, because the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal cases interpret*1436ing section 1 of the Sherman Act are persuasive in cases filed in state court under the Cartwright Act.
It is, of course, true that “[i]n interpreting the Cartwright Act, we properly look to the Sherman Act and cases construing it: ‘the Cartwright Act is patterned after the Sherman Act and both statutes have their roots in the common law.’ ” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 320 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58], quoting Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 925 [130 Cal.Rptr. 1, 549 P.2d 833].) This familiar principle does not mean, however, that interpretations of the federal rule pertaining to summary judgment (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 56, 28 U.S.C.) controls application of the California summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) in Cartwright Act cases. Matsushita cannot be reconciled with the California statute and case law pertaining to summary judgment and therefore cannot be followed by the courts of this State.
I.
Matsushita is among a trio of cases interpreting rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all decided in 1986 by sharply divided courts, that collectively mark a major change in the United States Supreme Court’s attitude about summary judgment. (Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court (1987) 116 F.R.D. 183.) Though Matsushita involves application of the Sherman Act it is primarily significant for what it has to say about the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion in connection with summary judgment motions. Because it is so inextricably a part of a new federal judicial view of summary judgment, Matsushita is best understood in the context of the two other summary judgment cases decided the same term: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317 [91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548], and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) All U.S. 242 [91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505],
Celotex was an asbestos products liability suit in which the defendant sought summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence connecting the decedent with its asbestos and that the plaintiff had failed to identify any witness who could establish such a connection. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, declaring that rule 56 imposed upon the defendant movant the “burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” (Catrett v. Johns Manville Sales Corp. (D.C. Cir. 1985) 756 F.2d 181, 184 [244 App.D.C. 160], fn. omitted.) Summary judgment should have been denied, the Court of Appeals reasoned, because the defendant had offered no evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a defendant seeking summary judgment, who does not bear the ultimate burden of proof, may rely *1437on the record to show the absence of a genuine dispute about a material fact. “In our view, the plain language of rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial.” (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, All U.S. at p. 322 [91 L.Ed.2d at p.. 273].)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. 242, decided the same day as Celotex, was a libel suit against the publisher and editor of a magazine. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that the essential element of “actual malice” was absent as a matter of law. In support of the motion the author of the article submitted an affidavit specifying his sources, describing the extent of his considerable research and stating his belief that the article was truthful and accurate. Concluding that the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that, as in the case of a motion for directed verdict, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment “must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.” (Id., at p. 255 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 216].) In determining whether a dispute is “genuine” within the meaning of rule 56, the trial judge must inquire whether a “reasonable” jury could find for the nonmoving party. A “genuine” dispute is one that is not “one-sided” and one which could reasonably be resolved by a “fair-minded” jury in favor of either party. (Id., at pp. 251-252 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 213-214].)1
As will be seen, Matsushita is of a piece with Celotex and Anderson in that it permits a defendant seeking summary judgment in federal court to shift a greater evidentiary burden to the nonmoving plaintiff than is permitted under the California summary judgment statute.
*1438Matsushita was a highly unusual antitrust case.2 The plaintiffs, a group of American electronics manufacturers, claimed that the 21 defendants, Japanese television manufacturers and their affiliated trading companies, conspired to fix artificially high prices in Japan and artificially low prices in the United States. By boosting the prices of Japanese goods in Japan the defendants allegedly subsidized the artificially low priced sales of their products in the United States. By minimizing competition in the United States between Japanese manufacturers, it was claimed, the defendants facilitated predation against their American competitors.
The Supreme Court clearly believed this scenario preposterous. “[P]redatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” (Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 589 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 554].) Moreover, a scheme involving 21 conspirators “is incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous plan executed by a single predator.” (Id. at p. 590 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 554].) “Finally,” the court observed, “if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally unlikely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess profits what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices.” (Id., at pp. 590-591 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 555].) Data in the record strongly suggested that the goals of the alleged scheme had not been achieved. The two largest shares of the retail market in television sets was held by American, not Japanese manufacturers. Moreover, those shares did not decline appreciably during the two decades after the conspiracy were alleged to have commenced. (475 U.S. at p. 591 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 555].) After further analysis the court concluded that “petitioners had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses for petitioners with no corresponding gains.” (Id., at p. 595 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 558], italics in original.)
*1439After establishing the implausibility of the plaintiffs’ claim, and inquiring whether the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, the court had little trouble concluding that there was no “genuine issue for trial” within the meaning of rule 56(e).) (475 U.S. at p. 598 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 559].) To survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a Sherman Act case, the court declared, a plaintiff “must present evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.” (Id., at p. 588 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 553].) This “tends to exclude” standard requires a plaintiff to produce considerably more evidence of agreement than does the reasonableness standard that was previously applied.3 “While it does not technically require a specific determination by the judge that the existence of an agreement is more probable than not, as a practical matter it amounts to the same thing.” (Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through an Extension of Colgate: The Matsushita Case (1988) 55 Tenn.L.Rev. 261, 298-299.)
One of the most notable aspects of Matsushita is its adoption of the rationale of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 U.S. 752 [79 L.Ed.2d 775, 785-786, 104 S.Ct. 1464], In a footnote, the Matsushita court stated that “[w]e do not imply that, if petitioners had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., . . . establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.” (Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 597, fn. 21 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 559].) Unlike Matsushita, Monsanto was a vertical case. Before Matsushita it was generally understood that the evidentiary standard for inferring an agreement was much higher in the vertical context than the horizontal.4 Monsanto, which reinforced the early decision in United States *1440v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U.S. 300 [63 L.Ed. 992, 39 S.Ct. 465, 7 A.L.R. 443], was taken by the lower federal courts to mean that they should apply a “lesser standard” for plaintiffs to meet in establishing a horizontal combination than a vertical agreement. (See, e.g., Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. (9th Cir. 1983) 709 F.2d 1257, 1266.) Moreover, the Monsanto principles were originally fashioned for use in vertical cases after trial on the merits, not in connection with summary proceedings prior to trial.
By using Monsanto to redefine the substantive law, Matsushita alters the procedural rules and the evidentiary standard applicable in connection with motions for summary judgment in antitrust cases. Matsushita is in this respect analogous to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra, All U.S. 242; both decisions mean that a plaintiff cannot at the summary judgment stage rely on undisputed evidence where under the applicable substantive law his right to a jury verdict would turn on a mixed question of fact and law. Whereas summary judgment was previously denied whenever competing inferences could reasonably be drawn, it is in the federal courts now proper to grant the motion in such circumstances. Moreover, once the moving defendant has shown that competing inferences may reasonably be drawn, which may not prove difficult, the nonmoving plaintiff must satisfy a much more daunting evidentiary requirement. This evidentiary requirement also vests the judge with powers that federal courts previously reserved to the jury. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent in Matsushita, which was joined by three of his colleagues, the majority’s reference to Monsanto “suggests that a judge hearing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. [The cases relied upon, Monsanto and First Nat. Bank v. Cities Service (1968) 391 U.S. 253 (20 L.Ed.2d 569, 88 S.Ct. 1575)], do not stand for any such proposition. Each of those cases simply held that a particular piece of evidence standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending a case *1441to the jury. These holdings in no way undermine the doctrine that all evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 600-601 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 561], dis. opn. of White, J., fn. omitted.)
As a result of Matsushita, Anderson and Celotex the Supreme Court “has shifted its focus away from legal cognizability and more to actual disposition of factual issues. The result is that summary judgment can be less of a pretrial dismissal motion and more of a kind of trial itself, a bench trial on paper.” (Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, supra, 116 F.R.D. at p. 184, italics in original.)5
II.
The new federal view of summary judgment has not been adopted by the courts of this state. For one thing, the California summary judgment statute is in certain important respects different from rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The first sentence of the statute provides that a party may move for summary judgment only when “it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense thereto” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)), a provision that has no counterpart in the federal rule. Our statute also specifically provides, as federal rule 56 does not, that summary judgment “shall not be granted . . . based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raises a triable issue as to any material fact.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) As a result of these provisions, the rule has evolved that “[w]here, as here, the moving party is a defendant he must either negate a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case or state a complete defense. [Citation.]” (Parsons Manufacturing Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1157 [203 Cal.Rptr. 419], italics added, citing LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741, 744-745 [176 Cal.Rptr. 224]; accord Pultz v. Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1115 [229 Cal.Rptr. 531]; Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331, 338 [138 Cal.Rptr. 670]; *1442Smith v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 728, 733 [35 Cal.Rptr. 575]; Security First Nat. Bank v. Ross (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 424, 432 [29 Cal.Rptr. 538].)
Under the California case law it is difficult for a defendant moving for summary judgment to shift the burden of proof or of persuasion to the plaintiff. “The statute requires the trial court to consider all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence; hence, the fact that [plaintiffs’] attorney did not urge the trial court at the original hearing on the motion to draw certain specific inferences of negligence does not relieve the trial court or this [appellate] court from a duty to take those inferences into account.” (Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 185 [163 Cal.Rptr. 912]; accord Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [150 Cal.Rptr. 408].)
Though the Supreme Court was more explicit on the point in Celotex and Anderson, Matsushita also suggests that the burdens of coming forward and of persuasion may justifiably be shifted to a plaintiff resisting summary judgment because the latter must ultimately bear those burdens at trial. As pointed out by the trial judge and in the lead opinion, such a rationale is incompatible with California law on the subject. In California, “[t]he placement of the burden of proof at trial does not affect the showing required for a summary judgment. (Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Associated Motor Sales (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 171, 179 . . . .) ‘There is nothing in the [summary judgment] statute which lessens the burden of the moving party simply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the issuefs] on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. In such a case, on the motion for summary judgment, the moving party must generally [negate] the matters which the resisting party would have to prove at the trial.’ (Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 123, 127 . . . .)” (Lee v. Electric Motor Division (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 375, 382 [215 Cal.Rptr. 195].) Stated differently, the burdens substantive antitrust law imposes upon a plaintiff at trial do not in state court serve to diminish the burdens on a defendant moving for summary judgment. The similarities between the state and federal antitrust statutes cannot be permitted to obscure the significant differences between state and federal summary judgment practices, which on the state side is governed by statute.
The reluctance of California courts to ease the burdens on parties seeking summary judgment is pronounced in cases involving the existence of an agreement. (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Proceedings Without Trial, § 308, p. 601.) Often, the surrounding circumstances are thought to give meaning to the terms of an understanding, thus presenting a question of fact. (See, e.g., Mason v. Superior Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 989, 999 *1443[210 Cal.Rptr. 63].) This judicial attitude is particularly evident in antitrust cases. As stated in Sherman v. Mertz Enterprises (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 769 [117 Cal.Rptr. 188], “[s]ummary judgment, by its nature, should be sparingly granted in cases alleging antitrust activities by defendant. The plaintiff in such a case finds himself outside a door of information that can be opened only by obtaining the key from the defendants. Unless plaintiff is allowed to probe into the secrecy of defendants, he would forever be foreclosed from finding facts to support his contention.” (Id., at p. 774.)
The California Supreme Court has adopted this view. In Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 842 [94 Cal.Rptr. 785, 484 P.2d 95] the court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a Cartwright Act case primarily on the basis of several “well-established rules” governing the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (id., at p. 851), such as the rule that the affidavits in support of the moving party must in and of themselves be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor (ibid.), and the rule that “the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.” (Id., at pp. 851-852.) Rules such as these, the court indicated, are necessary to insure that the “drastic” remedy of summary judgment is “ ‘used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for the open trial method of determining facts.’ ” (Id., at p. 852, quoting Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785].)
The Corwin court also relied on language in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting (1962) 368 U.S. 464 [7 L.Ed.2d 458, 82 S.Ct. 486], that reflects a judicial sensibility hard to square with the theme of Celotex, Anderson and, particularly Matsushita: “We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of ‘even handed justice.’ ” (Poller, supra, 368 U.S. at p. 473 [7 L.Ed.2d at p. 464]; quoted in Corwin, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 852.)
III.
The trial judge in this case, who understood the difference between summary judgment procedures in federal and state courts, observed on the record that “the California courts have not yet adopted Celotex standards *1444for ruling on motions for summary judgment.” For this reason, he concluded, defendant banks and trade associations, the moving parties, “have got the burden of coming forward with evidence that is fully competent to negate the allegations made against them in the complaint.” It was only because he believed the defendants sustained the burden of presenting sufficient evidence negating the allegations of the complaint that the trial judge shifted to the nonmoving plaintiff the burden of establishing the existence of a triable issue of material fact.6 The rationale of the trial judge’s refusal to utilize “Celotex standards” applies with equal force to the Matsushita standards, which the judge never indicated he was even considering. As has been shown, the Matsushita standards are closely related to those set forth in Celotex and are just as difficult to reconcile with the California summary judgment statue. As has also been shown, the Matsushita standards represent a policy inconsistent with that adhered to by the courts of this state.
Finally, there remains some doubt whether even the federal courts would apply the Matsushita standard to the present case. First of all, the Cartwright Act claim in this case is not as facially implausible as the Sherman Act claims in Matsushita and Monsanto because there is an economic incentive to engage in the conduct charged and the alleged conspiracy is not practically infeasible. Nor would denial of summary judgment in this case “deter pro-competitive conduct,” as the Matsushita and Monsanto courts both feared due to circumstances not present in this case.7 (Matsushita, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 593 [89 L.Ed.ld at 556]; Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 762-764 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 784-785].) Moreover, the omission in the Matsushita opinion of any reference to the Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, supra, 368 U.S. 454, which emphasizes very different policy considerations, suggests the possibility that Poller continues to apply in cases such as this one, in which the defendant’s motive is a central issue or element of the claim. (See First Natl. Bank v. Cities Service, supra, 391 U.S. 253, 285 [20 L.Ed.2d 569, 590]; White Motor Co. v. United States (1963) 372 U.S. 253, 259 [9 L.Ed.2d 738, 744, 83 S.Ct. 696]; see also 2 Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law (1978) § 316(b).)
*1445In any event, because Matsushita is predicated on rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and conflicts with the California summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) and cases interpreting that statute, the opinion in that case is not binding on California courts.
The petition of all appellants for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 27, 1990.
In his dissent in Anderson, Justice Brennan contended that the majority, “while instructing the trial judge to ‘consider’ heightened evidentiary standards, fails to explain what that means. In other words, how does a judge assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a ‘fair-minded’jury could ‘reasonably’ decide?” (Id., at p. 265 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 222].) Because the majority opinion “could surely be understood as an invitation—if not an instruction—to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would” (id., at p. 266 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 223]), Justice Brennan feared it “may erode the constitutionally enshrined role of the jury.” (Id., at p. 268 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 224].) Justice Rehnquist who in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger also dissented in Anderson, claimed that the “substantive standard” which the majority decided must be applied by trial courts in deciding a motion for summary judgment “is actually a procedural requirement engrafted onto Rule 56.” (Id., at pp. 268-269 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 225].) “The Court’s decision to engraft the standard of proof applicable to a factfinder onto the law governing the procedural motion for a summary judgment (a motion that has always been regarded as raising a question of law rather than a question of fact [citation]), will do great mischief with little corresponding benefit.” (Id., at p. 272 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 227].)
“Matsushita was the quintessential overblown antitrust case. The published opinions of the trial court ‘would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. ’ By the time the court granted summary judgment for defendants in 1981, the record had ballooned so that the ‘essence of the evidence’ filled forty volumes. Judge Becker, who ruled much of the evidence inadmissible and granted summary judgment, said the ‘enormous record . . . may be the largest summary judgment record ever developed.’ To manage this record he required plaintiffs to file a ‘final pretrial statement’ detailing every fact they hoped to prove at trial, and all evidence that would be offered to prove these facts. The final pretrial statement was to have preclusive effect: except for good cause, no other facts or evidence could be offered at trial. Plaintiffs’ final pretrial statement totaled 11,500 pages, not counting a 6,000 page appendix that cross-referenced 250,000 pages of documents.’’ (Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System (1986) 74 Geo.L.J. 1065, 1123.)
It is true that in the very next sentence after the one in which the court articulates the “tends to exclude" standard the court states as follows: “Respondents . . . , in other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents.” (475 U.S. at p. 588 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 553].). Taken at face value, this sentence creates an ambiguity, because it is inconsistent with the preceding statement that the plaintiff must present “evidence ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.” However, other language in Matsushita makes it very clear that “tends to exclude” standard prevails; particularly the statement that “conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.” (Id., at p. 597, fn. 21 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 559].)
The Monsanto court emphasized that distributor termination are different from horizontal cases in several ways. “For example, the fact that a manufacturer and its distributors are in constant communication about prices and market strategy does not alone show that the distributors are not making independent pricing decisions.” (Id., at p. 762 [79 L.Ed.2d at p. 784] .) Moreover, complaints from rival distributors are natural and unavoidable and “ ‘do not indicate illegal concerted action.’ ” (Monsanto, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 763 [79 L.Ed.2d at p. 785] , quoting Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp. (8th Cir. 1982) 671 F.2d 1168, 1172.) Thus, it *1440is precisely because “[a] manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange information about the prices and the reception of their products in the market” (id., at p. 762 [79 L.Ed.2d at p. 784]), that the inference of concerted action cannot be drawn in vertical price-fixing conspiracy cases only from proof of termination following competitor complaints. Because of the “important distinctions” that are at the center of distributor-termination cases, the plaintiff" must provide additional evidence “that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the manufacturer and distributor.” (Id., at p. 768 [79 L.Ed.2d at p. 788].) Thus, the innocence in distributor termination cases of facts that in other antitrust contexts might appear incriminating—e.g., the sharing of information and complaints from rival distributors—in effect renders a claim in such a vertical case “implausible” if it is not supported by additional evidence.
Because Monsanto relates to concerns peculiar to vertical cases never thought to be relevant to horizontal cases, it has been said that Matsushita’s reliance on Monsanto is “unfair.” (Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, supra, 74 Geo.L.J. at p. 1125 and fn. 456.)
It has been suggested that this new attitude is more related to a desire of overburdened courts to increase the quantity of dispositions than the quality of adjudications. (See, e.g., Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony in Summary Judgment (1988) 22 U.C. Davis L.Rev 93, 94 [“Today’s courts, facing more complex cases and an increasing caseload, are simply more receptive to docket clearing devices such as summary judgment”]; Miner, Federal Courts at the Crossroads (1987) 4 Const. Commentary 251, 255 [“courts are beginning to relax the standards for summary judgment, and I do not believe that this development is unrelated to the caseload crunch”], and Comment, Federal Summary Judgment: The “New” Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal System (1987) 20 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 955, 978 [“Considering the high litigation costs and crowded dockets in federal courts today, the future of summary judgment seems secure”].)
The standard applied by the trial court in this case was precisely that adopted by the Court of Appeals in Celotex and rejected by the Supreme Court. As stated in the Supreme Court opinion, the majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that “Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this Court’s decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970), establish that ‘the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the burden of responding only after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.’ 244 U.S.App.D.C., at 163, 756 F.2d, at 184 (italics in original; footnote omitted).” (Celotex, supra, All U.S. at pp. 321-322 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 272-273], fn. omitted.)
Conducting trade association meetings does not constitute “procompetitive behavior” within the meaning of Matsushita and Monsanto.