I respectfully dissent. Stevens had two periods of employment with Stivers, May 1975 to August 1977 and November 1986 to January 1987. Both times she was an at will employee. She called two witnesses who had worked with her at Stivers' office during her first period of employment. These witnesses testified favorably concerning Stevens' job performance. Stivers was prevented from presenting the testimony of Francis Feeney, Jr. Feeney employed Stevens approximately eight months after her discharge from Stivers' employ. Stivers preserved Feeney's proposed testimony through an offer to prove. Feeney would have testified that he fired Stevens for poor job performance. The decision to withhold this testimony from the jury was error. Stivers was entitled to rebut the inference raised by Stevens that her job performance was always satisfactory. Stevens' employment with Feeney occurred eight months after her discharge by Stiv-ers. Her previous employment with Stiv-ers was nine years earlier. Her job performance while employed by Feeney, due to the proximity in time, was of greater relevance than her job performance with Stivers eight years earlier and as such should have been admitted.
Feeney would have further testified that after he fired Stevens for poor job performance, she filed a workman's compensation action and a retaliatory discharge action against him. It was also error to exclude this testimony. This case boiled down to a question of credibility. Stevens maintained she was fired in anticipation of her filing a workman's compensation claim. Stivers maintained that he was unaware of any health problems afflicting Stevens and that she was discharged for unsatisfactory job performance. Certainly relevant to her credibility on this issue is a pattern of filing claims against employers upon discharge for unsatisfactory job performance. Feeney's testimony went directly to the issue of Stevens' credibility and should have been permitted. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.