concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion but disagree with the majority's finding that Madlem's claim was time barred. The majority states that the rule in Shideler v. Dwyer (1981), 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281, is that "[a] cause of action for professional negligence accrues for limitation of action purposes when liability for that negligence attaches whether or not the complainant knows or should know of the resulting damage." At 1298. This conclusion overlooks the fact that in Shide-ler, the court based its decision not to apply the discovery rule in part on the fact there was no attorney/client relationship between Dwyer, an intended beneficiary under a will drafted by Shideler, and Shide-ler, the attorney. Further, the Shideler court recognized that application of the discovery rule might be warranted in some cases.
Here, unlike in Skideler, there is an attorney/client relationship. Courts from other jurisdictions have held that the special nature of the relationship between attorney and client justifies application of the discovery rule to attorney malpractice claims brought by the client. See, e.g., Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins (1973), 15 Ill.App.3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677. In Kohler, the Illinois Court of Appeals explained that in cases of attorney malpractice, as well as in cases of malpractice by other professionals,
"postponement of the period of limitation until discovery finds justification in the special nature of the relationship between the attorney and his client.... [A] client may not recognize the negligence of the professional when he sees it, and if he must ascertain malpractice at the moment of its occurrence, the client must hire a second professional to check the work of the first, which would be an impractical duplication and would destroy the confidential relationship between the practitioner and his client."
Id., 304 N.E.2d at 680, citing Neel v. Magana (1971), 6 Cal.3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837.
If Judy Buck's signature was in fact forged, Madlem had no way to know it until he tried to foreclose on the mortgage and the defense of forgery was successful. He hired Arko to prepare the mortgage and had a right to assume that it would be properly executed. However, the majority-by finding that Madlem's cause of action accrued against the attorney and his secretary Johnston when the forged mortgage was recorded-puts the burden on Madlem to duplicate the work which he hired Arko to do.
Although our supreme court refused in Barnes v. A.H. Robins (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 84, to apply the discovery rule to all tort claims, the court did not foreclose its application to situations other than the one which arose in Barnes. In fact, the court stated that the discovery rule is applicable in cases where, as here, a wrong has occurred and a claimant could not be aware that a cause of action exists. The court explained:
"The [discovery] rule is based on the reasoning that it is inconsistent with our system of jurisprudence to require a claimant to bring his cause of action in a limited period in which, even with due diligence, he could not be aware a cause of action exists. In the typical tort claim, injury occurs at the time the negligent act is done and the claimant is either aware of the injury, or at least the cause of the injury, and is put on notice to determine the extent of that injury. The claimant, therefore, has the whole statutory time provided for in the limitations statutes to make his determinations and bring his cause of action. The problem comes about when the act, seemingly innocent, causes changes so subtle and latent that they are not discoverable to *1295the plaintiff until they manifest themselves many years later."
Id. at 86.
Therefore, I would hold that Madlem's cause of action against Arko and Johnston did not accrue until he knew or should have known that Judy Buck's signature on the mortgage and note was a forgery-in this case, when he attempted to foreclose on the mortgage. However, I would nonetheless affirm the decision of the trial court.
Here, the trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 52. Madlem does not argue the trial court's findings of fact were not supported by the evidence; rather, he argues the court's conclusions of law and judgment are clearly erroneous. By attacking only the conclusions of law and judgment, Madliem is arguing that the trial court reached an erroneous conclusion of law from the facts as found. See Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wolfe (1968), 142 Ind.App. 206, 233 N.E.2d 690. Further, by not challenging the court's findings, Madlem is bound by the findings of fact as being fully and correctly found by the trial court. Id.; Registration & Management Corp. v. City of Hammond (1972), 151 Ind.App. 471, 280 N.E.2d 827. Thus, our review is limited to whether the conclusions of law and judgment were erroneous based on the facts as found by the trial court. The judgment of the trial court will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. DeHaan v. DeHaan (1991), Ind.App., 572 N.E.2d 1315. A judgment is clearly erroneous where a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Lueth v. Gardner (1989), Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 298.
Madlem alleged attorney Arko and secretary Johnston were negligent for failing to obtain proper execution of the note and mortgage. As in any other negligence action, the burden was on Madlem to show 1) duty-that he employed Arko and Johnston; 2) that they failed to exercise reasonable care; 8) causation; and 4) loss. Schneider v. Wilson (1988), Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 1341.
Madlem alleged-and asserts here on appeal-that Judy Buck's signature on the note and mortgage was forged and that Arko and Johnston were negligent in allowing such a forgery. Therefore, the burden was on Madlem initially to show that the documents were indeed forged. If Madiem had proven that the documents were forged, the burden would have shifted to Johnston to establish the veracity of the signature or that she used reasonable care and skill in making her certificate on the document. 58 Am.Jur.2d Notaries Public § 66 (1989). However, I have searched the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and find no indication that the trial court did in fact determine that a forgery had occurred. Buck testified she did not sign the papers; however, the judge was not required to believe her testimony-he could have determined that her testimony was self-serving and, therefore, not believable. In any event, there was no finding Buck's signature was forged. Because Madiem does not challenge the findings on appeal, we must accept them as being fully and correctly found. Therefore, Madlem failed to establish that Arko and his secretary breached the duty of care owed to him. Thus, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.