dissenting.
I concur there is error, but dissent to the affirmance and reformation.1 The majority makes a giant leap when they conclude the record contains sufficient information for this Court to reform the judgment. The record reflects: (1) the original sentence was ten years and a fine of $1000,2 and he was placed on “regular” community supervision for eight years, (2) Kimball pleaded “true” to the motion to revoke community supervision, and (3) the trial court sentenced Kimball to fifteen years’ confinement. There is nothing in the record to determine why the judge assessed fifteen years’ confinement.3
The majority assumes the judge intended to impose the original sentence, the maximum available. I disagree. My experience tells me trial judges rarely impose the maximum sentence when a plea of “true” is made.4 The jailhouse communication system would soon get the word out — “there is nothing to be gained by pleading ‘true.’” As the majority has made an assumption, I can make one that is just as plausible.5 It is conceivable the trial judge mistakenly thought Kimball was on “unadjudicated community supervision” and subject to the entire range of punishment.6 If this conclusion is correct, then the trial judge intended to give Kim-ball a twenty-five percent reduction against the maximum.7 Therefore, if reformation were possible, perhaps this court should give Kimball the same twenty-five percent reduction and reform the punishment to seven and one-half years.
The point is neither the majority nor I can say why the trial judge did what he did; all we can say is it was incorrect. Consequently, we should remand for a new heaaing.8 Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
. As noted by the majority, the State conceded error and suggested a remand for a new "sentencing” hearing.
. The range of punishment was two to twenty.
. This was an extremely experienced trial judge.
. I have prosecuted (1972-1974), defended (1975-1978), and presided (1978-1984) over numerous revocation proceedings.
. Kimball’s attorney describes this as an "obvious conclusion”.
. The court, at the sentencing hearing stated: “The Court finds the defendant guilty....” This is language consistent with an adjudication of guilt rather than a revocation of community supervision.
. Fifteen years as opposed to twenty.
. For judicial economy, I believe we should adopt the partial remand rationale of Stevens v. State, 951 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.), but I have no real quarrel with the majority’s refusal to do so.