(Dissenting in part; concurring in part.) I agree with the majority in reversing the court of appeals as to the convictions for abuse of inmates of an institution, party to a crime and holding the evidence sufficient to sustain them. However, I dissent from the majority in affirming the court of appeals which reversed the conviction of the defendant for homicide by reckless conduct arising from a resident’s death while the defendant acted as administrator of the Glendale Convalescent Center. As to that conviction, the majority finds the evidence insufficient in demonstrating that the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in causing Bruno Dreyer’s death.
The majority cites the standard of review to be applied in considering the conviction as stated in State v. Alles, 106 Wis. 2d 368, 376-77, 316 N.W.2d 378 (1982), as follows: “‘the jury verdict will be overturned only if, viewing the evidence most favorably to the state and the conviction, it is inherently or patently incredible, or so lacking in probative value that no jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” However, after stating the standard for reviewing the verdict, the majority never applies it to the facts which it reviews and on which the jury based its conclusion. Even though it is not stated, the majority must have considered Bruno Dreyer’s walking out of the building to his death as an intervening fact which relieved the defendant of any cause he had in the death. Based on this record, I disagree with the majority’s analysis.
Section 940.06 (2), Stats. (1975), states:
“Reckless conduct consists of an act which creates a situation of unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm to another and which demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of another and willingness to take known chances of perpetrating an injury. ...”
*865That was what the defendant did in placing budget considerations over the safety and protection of the residents. After being warned by his staff of the needs for more personnel for the number of residents, he not only refused to add employees but continued to accept additional residents which increased the hazard. The majority concedes: “Serebin’s main concern was operating within the budget.” (P. 844.) That means that his secondary concern was for the residents and when having been warned of potential consequences by his staff and by the state, he continued to place budget considerations over the welfare of the residents and that was the reckless conduct which caused the inability of the limited staff to properly supervise the residents in order to guard against what in fact occurred.
The evidence the jury considered in arriving at the conviction and which the majority must have found led to an inherently or potentially incredible verdict was:
(1) A health facility surveyor for the state found staffing deficiencies at Glendale “of such character as to jeopardize the health, safety, and welfare of the patients” and she ordered Glendale to correct these deficiencies. That finding and order were issued a year before Mr. Dreyer’s death.
(2) Twelve staff nurses testified that after the previous warning from the state, the defendant reduced, not increased, the nursing staff further even though they specifically told him “these reductions would make it impossible to supervise and care for patients, especially those who had a tendency to wander around and try to leave the building.” (P. 845.)
(3) One nurse testified she resigned from Glendale twice in 1975 and 1976 because of insufficient staffing and she spoke with the defendant weekly about the inadequate care and supervision the residents were receiving due to the insufficient staffing.
*866(4) Two nurses testified they asked defendant to employ more staff or stop admitting1 patients. He told one of them he had to keep admitting residents and that hiring more staff would exceed his budget.
(5) Approximately one week before Mr. Dreyer’s death, a nursing consultant for the state submitted a correction order to the defendant characterizing the under-staffing as “an occurrence which endangered the patients’ health, welfare and safety.”
The majority concedes the evidence from which the jury could have concluded the defendant’s actions evinced reckless conduct is overwhelming.
“Although Serebin denied his participation in staffing decisions at trial, the testimony of other witnesses from which the jury could have concluded that Serebin’s actions evinced reckless conduct is overwhelming. The above evidence indicates that Serebin was repeatedly warned by his own staff and state officials that the insufficient staffing created a situation in which patients did not receive adequate care and supervision and especially that wandering residents could not be adequately watched. From this, a reasonable jury could have inferred that Serebin’s actions regarding staff cuts and continued admissions created a high probability of death or great bodily harm. For example, if residents left the building and were exposed to the elements during harsh weather, or became ill or injured and required prompt medical attention, the lack of staff could aggravate those conditions, resulting in death or great bodily harm. It is common _ knowledge that elderly patients require close supervision and care because of the physical and mental conditions which often accompany the aging process. The evidence indicates that Serebin knowingly allowed the probability of such dangers to exist, from which the jury could infer a conscious disregard for the residents entrusted to his care and a willingness to take known chances of risks. The jury, therefore, could have concluded that in acting as he did, Serebin should have realized that he created a situation of unreasonable risk *867to the residents at Glendale. See, Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 397, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977).” (Pages 845-846.)
The majority finds, however, that his reckless conduct was not shown to be a substantial factor in producing Mr. Dreyer’s death. A licensed practical nurse and two aides were assigned to Mr. Dreyer’s ward, 1 North, but the aides were not assigned to that ward for the whole night. The same nurse was in charge of other units as well. In the three units for which the nurse was responsible there were 200 residents. Before the budget cuts three aides, not two, worked on 1 North and the nurse on the night shift was only responsible then for 1 North and one other unit, not two.
The doors leading from 1 North to the outside could not be kept locked because it was an emergency exit. There was an alarm installed on one door to alert the staff that it was opened. “However, the sliding glass doors through which Dreyer apparently left had no such alarm.” (P. 847.) In other words, for the sake of a budget saving by not placing an alarm on the sliding doors or one attendant to watch the hall while the other went into residents’ rooms, Mr. Dreyer wandered out of the building without notice and froze to death. The jury must have believed that there was a cause and effect between the defendant’s conduct and Mr. Dreyer’s wandering out of the building and freezing to death. I agree. I do not find that causal connection to be inherently or patently incredible or lacking in probative value as the majority must find.
Wisconsin Jury Instruction — Criminal 1160, dealing with homicide by reckless conduct which was given to this jury and quoted with approval by the majority, states in relevant portions to the issue of cause the following: “That is to say, that it was a factor actually operating and which had substantial effect in producing *868the death as a natural result.” (P. 849.) The defendant’s budget constraints and failure to hire necessary staff to care for and to supervise the residents, including Mr. Dreyer, “was a factor actually operating and which had substantial effect in producing the death [of Mr. Dreyer] as a natural result.”
On page 851 of the majority opinion, the majority uses conjecture to state that even if an aide monitored the hall while the others checked in the rooms, Mr. Dreyer still might have frozen. The reality is that there was no aide to watch the halls and there was no alarm on the sliding doors. We do not know what the population of residents was before the budget cuts so it is not relevant to know whether aides monitored the halls then. We do know, however, that the defendant continued to cut the staff and to increase the number of residents. To me, that is cause and effect, especially since as an administrator he had been told by his chief nurse that “if you do not have enough registered nurses and licensed practical nurses you do not have the supervision of the patients to see that their care is done and to supervise your wanderers. . . . [who] have a tendency to try to get out of the building.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant had been warned by state supervisors of care facilities, by his own staff nurses and by Glendale employees of the consequences of inadequate staff and of increasing the number of residents. He had been warned that his supervision was so inadequate as to be reckless and a result of that recklessness would be wanderers leaving the building. That is what occurred.
Justice Abrahamson in a concurring opinion decries the fact that this court is not consistent as to whether we will decide the “undecided” issues or remand them to the court of appeals. She states that therefore counsel are uncertain whether to raise and brief these unresolved issues in this court. This decision must be made by this *869court on a case-by-case basis and no general rule can be established. We are well aware that the court of appeals is inundated with appeals and that if appropriate, we will decide all issues bringing finality to the case. However, we are mindful that decisions of the Supreme Court are published and have a precedential status and, therefore, we have an obligation not to fill the law books with matters that are not truly of precedential value. The court of appeals in deciding issues before it may or may not publish a decision and unless published, the decision has no precedential value.
In the present case the state petitioned this court for review and stated the two issues as being:
“(1) Was the evidence sufficient to support Serebin’s conviction of homicide by reckless conduct arising from the death of a resident of a nursing home which Serebin administered?
“(2) Was the evidence sufficient to support Serebin’s conviction of twelve counts of abuse of residents of institutions?”
This court has decided both of those issues. In addition, the defendant in opposition to the petition for review stated another issue which had several sub-challenges. That issue was: “Were the constitutional rights of the defendant flagrantly violated during the prosecution?” The sub-challenges under that issue were:
(1) The number of charges brought against the defendant, 58 misdemeanor violations and one felony, was oppressive and unnecessarily excessive.
(2) The defendant was not allowed to present any evidence at the April 14-15, 1980, hearing in support of his motion concerning selective discriminatory enforcement.
(3) The nursing home records which were introduced against the defendant were seized without a warrant and the defendant’s motion to suppress was denied.
*870(4) The defendant’s motion to change venue was summarily denied.
(5) The trial court refused to grant the defendant’s motion to waive a jury trial.
(6) Although the voir dire examination was not reported, the prosecution used it as a vehicle to appeal to the passions of the jurors and to infect them with erroneous and inadequate legal standards.
(7) The defendant’s attempt to introduce polygraph testimony to support his defense that he had no knowledge of neglect of patients or that Mr. Dreyer was unattended on the night he eloped was barred by the court.
(8) The prosecution introduced testimony which brought collateral issues before the jury (including material which would incite feelings of religious and racial prejudice).
(9) The defendant was not allowed to introduce black character witnesses on his behalf before a jury that was composed of many black citizens.
(10) The prosecutor made remarks during opening and closing statements imploring the jury to consider those unheard voices of the aged who could not come into the courtroom and made an appeal that a conviction was expected as a community responsibility.
The defendant is entitled to have all of these claims of constitutional denial resolved; however, they were not presented to this court in detailed oral argument consistent with our usual practice, since the two issues before this court were as a result of the prior determination by the court of appeals as to the sufficiency of evidence.
The court of appeals in ruling on the remaining issues stated above may or may not consider them as matters deserving of publication and of precedential value in the context of the record in this case and for that reason alone, it is appropriate for these issues to be returned to that court for resolution.
*871I would reverse the court of appeals as to both the reckless homicide and abuse of inmate’s convictions and remand the cause to the court of appeals for determination of the other unresolved issues.
I am authorized to state that Justice Roland B. Day joins in this dissenting and concurring opinion.
I am also authorized to state that Justice William G. Callow joins that portion of this concurring opinion dealing with sending the issues back to the court of appeals for resolution.
I am also authorized to state that Justice William A. Bablitch joins in the dissenting portion of this opinion.