I concur in the judgment because I agree there was not sufficient evidence to establish a patient/psychotherapist communication of serious threat of physical violence.
However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant was “part of a group of ‘reasonably identifiable victims.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1245.)
In my judgment Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701], provides compelling authority precluding characterization of appellant as a ’’reasonably identifiable victim.” (Civ. Code, § 43.92, subd. (a).) The majority discusses Thompson in footnote 5 of its opinion and in the interest of brevity I refer the reader to that discussion. It is sufficient to note that the Thompson court in affirming dismissal of the failure to warn claim described the communication as “a generalized threat to a segment of the population” and a threat to “a member of a large amorphous public group of potential targets.” Appellant here fits within the category described in Thompson.
The majority recognizes that the patient’s sexual attentions were directed to women for they acknowledge that “. . . his [Jan’s] persistence in pursuing the available women made it reasonable for one familiar with his actions to assume he might assault any accessible woman. ” (Maj. opn., p. 1245, italics added.)
The majority seeks to distinguish the Thompson rationale by employing the unreasonable predicate that “here only the female employees on a single floor of the hospital would have been implicated.” (Maj. opn., p. 1245, fn. 5.) This is an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the threatened population for several reasons. First, it assumes a fact on which the record is silent, i.e., that the patient Jan was confined to the hospital’s seventh floor. Second, it concludes that “any accessible woman” is limited to female “employees,” thus ignoring the presence of female patients, visitors and various categories of volunteers who frequent hospital hallways and rooms. Finally, it seemingly overlooks the reality of patient service and care in a large metropolitan hospital where food handlers, cleaning and maintenance personnel, doctors, aides, therapists, suppliers, engineers, clerical and administrative workers, all services performed by women as well as men, are brought into proximity with patients throughout the hospital. Moreover, hospitals function 24 hours a day, everyday, and patients and their visitors are constantly changing.
Just as in Thompson, where it was unreasonable to require the county to warn all parents of young children in the parolee’s neighborhood (27 Cal.3d, at p. 756), so here it would be unreasonable to require the psycho*1248therapist to warn all women who might become exposed to the threatening patient. I am confident that the Legislature, in limiting a psychotherapist’s duty to warn to “reasonably identifiable victim or victims,” did not intend to extend the duty to situations where it is impracticable or impossible to comply.
Justice Tobriner, author of the majority opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166], the decision which prompted the legislative response set forth in Civil Code section 43.92, subdivision (a), was cognizant of the dangers attendant to imposing on the psychotherapist a duty to warn where identification of the victim was uncertain. In footnote 11 the Justice observes: “Defendant therapists and amicus also argue that warnings must be given only in those cases in which the therapist knows the identity of the victim. We recognize that in some cases it would be unreasonable to require the therapist to interrogate his patient to discover the victim’s identity or to conduct an independent investigation. But there may also be cases in which a moment’s reflection will reveal the victim’s identity. The matter thus is one which depends upon the circumstances of each case and should not be governed by any hard and fast rule.” (Id., at p. 439, italics added.) Tarasoff involved a victim who although unnamed was readily identifiable. (Id., at p. 432.)
Concluding that appellant is a reasonably identifiable victim by relying on a myopic analysis which ignores the realities of hospital routine, the majority seeks to establish precedent1 despite the caveat of Tarasoff, the guidance of Thompson, and clear legislative direction that the victim be reasonable identifiable. Appellant is merely a “member of a large amorphous public group of potential targets.” The effort by the majority to extend the duty to warn under circumstances where warning is certainly impractical if not impossible places an intolerable burden on psychotherapists and guts the legislative intent of Civil Code section 43.92, subdivision (a).
I recognize that the majority’s discussion regarding appellant as a reasonably identifiable victim is unnecessary to their judgment and therefore dicta. However, as they seek to promulgate their highly disputed point of view despite the lack of need to do so, I can only assume they intend their views to influence the future development of the law in this area. I am thus forced to write in an effort to highlight the mischief I perceive exists in their opinion.