dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although Pan-nette's representatives were never physically in Indiana, its activities constituted "doing any business" in Indiana under Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) therefore, the Madison court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Pannette.3 I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Baseball argues that it met its burden to present evidence to establish jurisdiction in that Pannette 1) knew it was doing business with an Indiana company; 2) telephoned Baseball in Anderson onee or twice a week for about five months; and 3) mailed checks to Indiana. The majority finds this evidence insufficient to establish jurisdiction. I disagree.
Trial Rule 4.4(A), Indiana's "Long Arm" statute, provides that a nonresident may be submitted to the jurisdiction of Indiana courts if certain conditions are met. In particular, T.R. 4.4(A)(1), which is at issue here, provides:
"(A) Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of this state who has left the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or his agent:
(1) doing any business in this state
666%. This long-arm statute is " 'intended to extend personal jurisdiction of courts sitting in this state ... to the limits permitted under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." " Suyemasa v. Myers (1981), Ind.App., 420 N.E.2d 1334, 1340, quoting Oddi v. Mariner-Denver, Inc. (S.D.Ind.1978), 461 F.Supp. 306, 308.
*757Due process requires that 1) the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit will not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95; and 2) there be provided a method of notice reasonably calculated to afford the defendant actual notice and thus an opportunity to be heard. Milosavljevic v. Brooks, (N.D.Ind.1972), 55 F.R.D. 543. Minimum contacts are required to assure that the defendant has purposefully availed itself to the jurisdiction of the forum state. Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. This "purpose ful availment" requirement was outlined by the Supreme Court in Hanson as follows:
"'The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."
Id. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239-40.
With these due process requirements in mind, this court outlined the following factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state:
"(1) The nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state;
"(2) the quantity of contacts with the state;
"(8) the relationship between those contacts and the cause of action;
"(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and
"(5) the convenience of the parties.
"The first three are the primary factors in determining whether International Shoe standards are met."
Tietloff v. Lift-A-Loft Corp. (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 986, 989.
Here, neither Pannette nor any other representative from J's came to Indiana. Rather, Pannette initially met with a Baseball representative in Illinois, where both Baseball and Pannette had gone to solicit business. Baseball's booth at the convention contained the words "Anderson, Indiana" underneath the Baseball logo. Contract negotiations and execution were carried out in Pennsylvania. Pannette telephoned Baseball's office in Anderson once or twice a week from mid July to November of 1989, and purchased $8,000 or more in merchandise during each contact from July through November, 1989.
In examining these facts with relationship to the above factors, it can be said that Pannette had a number of contacts-at least one and sometimes two times a week-with Baseball during the five month period between July and November. All of these contacts were to carry out substantial business between Pannette and Baseball. Further, this action arose directly out of those contacts-Baseball alleges that Pannette wrote bad checks to pay for the merchandise it ordered and that it breached the contract by failing to place minimum orders as required by the contract. Also, Indiana has an interest in providing a forum for its residents, especially with regard to the bad check allegation as evidenced by a statute which would permit Baseball to collect treble damages if it could prevail on its claim that Pannette committed conversion by writing bad checks. See Ind.Code 34-4-81-1(1). Finally, the "inconvenience factor" is of little importance here. It would be just as inconvenient for Baseball to go to Pennsylvania to litigate this matter as it is for Pannette to come to Indiana. Moreover, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction "may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State". Id. at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184.
In Woodmar Coin Center, Inc. v. Owen (1983), Ind.App., 447 N.E.2d 618, this court indicated that Indiana courts could properly exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state de*758fendant even though he-like Pannette--had never physically entered Indiana. Owen, a resident of Texas, phoned Wood-mar, an Indiana corporation, in response to its advertisement in the Wall Street Journal for silver coins Woodmar had for sale. The parties conducted substantial negotiations over price, the method by which Owen was to inspect the coins, and the manner of payment during several telephone calls, which both Woodmar and Owen initiated. As agreed, Woodmar sent the coins to Owen's bank in Texas for inspection. Owen decided the coins were not satisfactory and sent them back to Woodmar. - Woodmar sued Owen in Indiana for breach of contract. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Owen, finding no personal jurisdiction over Owen. On appeal, Woodmar argued that three key facts established sufficient minimum contacts to permit the Indiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Owen: 1) Owen's two phone calls which initiated the relationship between Woodmar and Owen; 2) the substantial negotiations conducted between the parties; and 3) the contract entered into by the parties. After reciting the factors outlined in Tietloff, we stated:
"Owen purposely availed himself of the benefits and responsibilities of doing business in this State by soliciting, negotiating and forming a contract with an Indiana resident, The trial court erred by entering summary judgment on this issue."
Woodmar Coin Center, supra, 447 N.E.2d at 621. Our reasoning in Woodmar, though dicta, is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Burger King, supra-a defendant need not enter this state before our courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
I cannot agree with the majority that Pannette's contact with Indiana "is similar to that by consumers who place orders for goods from the state in which they reside to national and international businesses." Maj. op. at 756. J's had a contract with Baseball which obligated it to place regular, minimum orders with Baseball. Base ball, in turn, was obligated by the contract to fill those orders. Thus, the contact between Pannette and Baseball (and Indiana) was more than that of a consumer who places a random order with a foreign company with no obligation to continue to place those orders and with no obligation on the part of the company to fill those orders.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Pannette had sufficient contact with this state so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of Indiana's courts. I would reverse the trial court's dismissal.
. The court's order stated:
"Comes now the Court and having previously taken this matter under advisement, hereby sustains Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant."
Although the trial court phrased his order in terms of granting Pannette motion for summary judgment, we note that the proper mechanism for dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is provided in a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(2). A motion to dismiss under 12(B)(2) is not converted into a motion for summary judgment when the trial court hears evidence on the motion. See Mid-States Aircraft Engines, Inc. v. Mize Co., Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 1242; 1 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice § 12.6(B)(2), at 604 (1987).