I write this separate concurrence to an opinion I have authored for the court (see, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]) because I believe there are additional legal impediments to the superior court’s authority under the federal and state statutory scheme to issue job search orders to custodial parents collecting aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) who are exempt from workfare requirements by virtue of state and federal welfare provisions.
The purpose of the AFDC program is to “[encourage] the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, . . .” (42 U.S.C. § 601.)
The program “ ‘is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.’ ” (Shea v. Vialpando (1974) 416 U.S. 251, 253 [40 L.Ed.2d 120, 125, 94 S.Ct. 1746], quoting King v. Smith (1968) 392 U.S. 309, 316 [20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1125, 88 S.Ct. 2128].) “It is financed in large measure by the Federal Government on a matching-fund basis, and participating States must submit AFDC plans in conformity with the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). (Ibid. [40 L.Ed.2d at p. 125]; 42 U.S.C. § 602(b).) The states administer the program and are given broad discretion in determining both the standard of need and the level of benefits. (Ibid.)
To be approved the state must designate “a single State agency to supervise the administration of the plan.” (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3).) The state agency is prohibited from delegating “its authority for exercising administrative discretion in the administration or supervision of the plan, including the issuance of policies, rules, and regulations on program matters.” (45 C.F.R. § 205.100(b)(1).) Other state and local agencies are expressly prohibited from reviewing, changing or disapproving any administrative decision of the state agency designated to administer the AFDC program. (45 C.F.R. § 205.100(b)(3).) Although the states may determine the level of benefits without federal interference, states have no discretion with regard to eligibility for AFDC and may not create conditions of eligibility in addition to those created by Congress. (42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.; see, e.g., Miller v. Youakim (1979) 440 U.S. 125, 133 [59 L.Ed.2d 194, 201-202, 99 S.Ct. 957].)
*1333California has designated the Department of Social Services (DSS) as “the single state agency with full power to supervise every phase of the administration of public social services ... for which grants-in-aid are received from the United States government ... in order to secure full compliance with the applicable provisions of state and federal laws.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10600.) The DSS must establish statewide standards for the administration of state or federally assisted public social services “which define and control the conditions under which such public social services may be granted or refused.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10604, subd. (b).) The director of DSS is the “only person authorized to adopt regulations [and] orders ... to implement [and] interpret the law enforced by the department.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10554.) “The state is responsible for maintaining uniformity in the public social service programs . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11050.) San Diego County is an agent of DSS and must administer the AFDC program in conformity with DSS regulations. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 10800, 11209.)
Federal and state law establishes workfare requirements for persons receiving AFDC. However, both statutory schemes provide exemptions from job search requirements for certain AFDC recipients.
In 1967 Congress enacted the Work Incentive Program (WIN), the first AFDC work program, to create greater incentives for AFDC recipients to become employed. (Pub.L. 90-248 (1967) § 204; 1967 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News at pp. 1002-1012; 1967 U.S. Code and Cong. Admin. News at p. 2837; 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19).) From WIN’s inception Congress was “deeply concerned” with the protection of children and the Senate committee stressed that certain recipients must not be considered appropriate for the program. (1967 U.S. Code and Admin. News at p. 2984.) Among those exempted were mothers caring for one or more preschool age children if the mother’s presence was necessary and in the best interest of the child. (Ibid.) Exempt AFDC recipients could volunteer for WIN, but only if the state provided child care. (Ibid.) The Senate stressed that each state was responsible for carrying out the intent of Congress in implementing the WIN program. (Ibid.) At present an AFDC recipient is exempt from WIN if he or she is “the parent or other relative of a child under the age of six who is personally providing care for the child with only very brief and infrequent absences from the child.” (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(v).)1
*1334California adopted the WIN program and requires registration as a condition for eligibility for AFDC. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11310, subd. (a).) California recognizes the same exemptions as the federal program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11310, subd. (b).)
Following the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) and a change in welfare philosophy at the federal level away from financial incentives toward work programs (see Heckler v. Turner (1985) 470 U.S. 184, 204-208 [84 L.Ed.2d 138, 152-155, 105 S.Ct. 1138]), San Diego County embarked on a major workfare program from 1982 to 1985 which required a job search followed by community work experience for nonexempt AFDC recipients. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 11311.)
In 1985 California adopted the Greater Avenues for Independence Act (GAIN), a statewide experiment in work programs for welfare recipients. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 11320.) Each county was required to submit a GAIN plan for DSS approval with the program to be fully operational. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320.2, subds. (f) and (g).) Those who participate in GAIN are provided with supportive services which include transportation and paid child care for persons with children under age 12. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320.3, subd. (e)(1) and (2).) All persons required to register for WIN are required to register for GAIN. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320.1.) Similarly, those recipients exempt from WIN, such as parents with primary responsibility for the care of children under six, are exempt from participation in GAIN. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 11310, subd. (b)(6) and 11320.1.) In addition GAIN provides that a person who attends school full-time and has a child under six is not required to participate. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320.5, subd. (a)(1).) This exemption continues as long as there is satisfactory progress in the self-initiated program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11320.5, subd. (b)(5).)
In my view there is nothing in the foregoing detailed description of the federal and state statutory welfare scheme which authorizes the family law division of the superior court to issue the job search orders to AFDC recipients who are exempt from workfare requirements. Only federal and designated state agencies have the authority to administer the AFDC program. I am unable to find any statutory authority for the imposition on custodial parents of the court’s own conditions of AFDC eligibility which require those parents to initiate job searches or sign up for GAIN. Indeed, the federal statute and regulations limit the discretionary role of DSS within the scheme of “cooperative federalism” to a determination of the standard *1335or need and level of benefits. Not even the state is authorized to establish its own conditions of eligibility.
I am also concerned here with the job search orders issued to Karen Anderson, Mona Asuncion, Theresa Jacobo and Stacy Cope which conflict with express exemptions from workfare set forth in 42 United States Code section 602(a)(19)(A)(v) and raise questions of federal preemption.
The court contends that pursuant to Civil Code sections 196, 206 and 2422 parents must provide financial support for their minor children to the full extent of their ability. It says a parent’s desire to pursue higher education or provide full-time care to children under school age is not sufficient to overcome the obligation to provide immediate financial support for the children. Although the Agnos Child Support Standards of 1984 establish the minimum mandatory amount of child support as the AFDC standard for the same number of children (Civ. Code, §§ 4720 and 4722), the court rejects any suggestion that a parent who receives AFDC has satisfied his or her support obligation under California law. In general the court argues there is a place within the AFDC scheme of cooperative federalism for state courts to foster the traditional state interest in domestic relations and that it has carried out its responsibilities in a manner consistent with the broad purposes of AFDC.
I acknowledge the general principles of family law that both parents have an equal responsibility to support their minor children (Civ. Code, §§ 196 and 242), child support orders can be entered against either or both parents of a minor child (Civ. Code, § 4700, subd. (a);3 see State of Florida ex rel. Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Vernon (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 827, 830-831 [188 Cal.Rptr. 322]), job search orders are authorized by statute for noncustodial parents (Civ. Code § 4709),4 and the court may *1336consider either parent’s ability to earn in fashioning a child support order (Civ. Code, § 4720, subd. (e)).5 **5 However, here the obligation to support must be viewed in the context of federal welfare legislation. I believe the court’s position in this case ignores the fundamental rule that “ ‘in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.’” (Carleson v. Remillard (1972) 406 U.S. 598, 600 [32 L.Ed.2d 352, 355, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1932], citing Townsend v. Swank (1971) 404 U.S. 282, 286 [30 L.Ed.2d 448, 453, 92 S.Ct. 502]; see also King v. Smith (1968) 392 U.S. 309 [20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1125, 88 S.Ct. 2128].) The superior court cannot do what the state is prohibited from doing.
In New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino (1973) 413 U.S. 405 [37 L.Ed.2d 688, 93 S.Ct. 2507] the Supreme Court applied preemption principles in a challenge to work rules of the New York Social Welfare Law which denied welfare assistance to certain employable persons. The court held that WIN did not entirely preempt the work rules, but remanded the case for the court to consider whether specific sections of the work rules conflicted with the federal WIN requirements. (Id. at pp. 421-422 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) The court noted that “[conflicts, to merit judicial rather than cooperative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and not merely trivial or insubstantial. But if there is a conflict of substance as to eligibility provisions, the federal law of course must control.” (Id. at p. 423, fn. 29 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 700].)
Here it is helpful to note that Congress has made several important policy determinations which are reflected in the present welfare system as set forth in 42 United States Code section 601 et seq. These policy determinations reflect many of the concerns shared by the several states. With regard to exemptions from workfare requirements, Congress has expressed concern for the welfare of young children (see discussion, ante, at pp. 1333-1334) *1337and decided that these children should be cared for by their parents or relatives until they reach sufficient maturity to function well in day care outside the home. Thus Congress enacted the specific exemption found in 42 United States Code section 602(a)(19)(A)(v).
Obviously, Congress could not permit each of the 50 states—or the courts of those states—to modify or eliminate the exemption for parents or other relatives caring for children under the age of 6. The practical result would be the elimination of the exemption and abrogation of clear congressional policy. If there is any area requiring judicial restraint, it is where the legislative branch has defined the problem and set up a framework to solve it. (See Bowen v. Gilliard (1987) 483 U.S. 587, 595-597 [97 L.Ed.2d 485, 497-498, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 3014-3015]; Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 486-487 [25 L.Ed.2d 491, 502-503, 90 S.Ct. 1153].)
This is not to say that the court must excuse all AFDC recipients from their support obligations. In County of Yolo v. Francis (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 647 [224 Cal.Rptr. 585] the court properly ordered a noncustodial parent receiving AFDC to reimburse the county for support paid to his children by a former marriage. In contrast with the case before us, there is nothing in Yolo to suggest the defendant was otherwise exempt from work requirements.
Obviously comments which I have expressed are unnecessary to the disposition of this case and reflect only my personal view of the applicable law. My motivation to express my views is prompted not only to alert trial courts to the many difficult issues which must be hurdled if the court is desirous of entering a valid job search order following proper notice, but particularly appropriate here in light of the extensive briefing and argument on the issues which I have discussed.
New federal legislation effective in 1989 amends 42 United States Code, section 602(a)(19) and limits the exemption for AFDC recipients with preschool age children to “the parent or other relative of a child under 3 years of age (or, if so provided in the State plan, under any age that is less than 3 years but not less than one year) who is personally providing care for the child, or . . . the parent or other relative personally providing care for a child under six years of age, unless the State assures that child care in accordance with [42 U.S.C. § 602(g)] will be guaranteed and that participation in the program by the parent or relative *1334will not be required for more than 20 hours per week. . . (102 Stat. (100th Cong. 1988) at p. 2357.)
Civil Code section 196, subdivision (a) provides: “The father and mother of a child have an equal responsibility to support and educate their child in the manner suitable to the child’s circumstances, taking into consideration the respective earnings or earning capacities of the parents.”
Civil Code section 206 states: “It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability."
Civil Code section 242 provides: “Every individual shall support his or her . . . child,. . . when in need.”
Civil Code section 4700, subdivision (a), states: “In any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child or a child for whom support is authorized under Section 206, the court may order either or both parents to pay any amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child.”
Civil Code section 4709 provides: “A court may require a parent who alleges that his or her default in an order issued pursuant to this title is due to his or her unemployment to submit to the appropriate child support enforcement agency or any other entity designated by *1336the court, including, but not limited to, the court itself, each two weeks, or at a frequency deemed appropriate by the court, a list of at least five different places he or she has applied for employment.
Civil Code section 4720, subdivision (e) reads in part: “A parent’s first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent’s circumstances and station in life. In this regard, the Legislature recognizes that a parent’s circumstances and station in life are dependent upon a variety of factors, including his or her earned and unearned income; earning capacity, assets; and the income of his or her subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner, to the extent that the obligated parent’s basic living expenses are met by the spouse or other person, thus increasing the parent’s disposable income and therefore his or her ability to pay more than the mandatory minimum child support award established by this chapter.”