(concurring). I quite agree with the majority opinion and join it. The record in this case does not reflect the findings of fact or the analysis required to sustain the decision as a proper exorcise of judicial discretion. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1970).
I write separately to emphasize that the case law in this state for at least the last 25 years — and more recently, the statutes — have required the trial court, when imposing restitution as a condition of probation, to establish a reasonable schedule of payments for the probationer at the beginning of the probationary term.
*501In 1960 this court stated that in determining the amount of restitution as a condition of probation, it was "incumbent upon the trial court to individualize each case and give it careful and humane consideration." State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 423, 101 N.W.2d 77 (1960).1
Later, in State v. Garner, 54 Wis. 2d 100, 105-106, 194 N.W.2d 649 (1972), and in State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d 611, 619, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973), this court cited with approval and adopted the American Bar Association Standards relating to probation (Approved Draft 1970), which instruct the trial court that "conditions requiring payment of. . . restitution . . . should not go beyond the probationer's ability to pay."2
In Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978), this court relied on both Garner and Gerard in concluding that the goals of probation would be defeated if the trial court did not consider the defendant's ability to pay.3 "[CJonditioning probation on the satisfaction of requirements which are beyond the probationer's control undermines the probationer's sense of responsibility." Huggett, supra 83 Wis. 2d at 798-99.
*502The legislature appears to have codified the case law requiring the trial court to make an individualized determination of restitution based on the victim's loss and the defendant's ability to pay when it amended sec. 973.09 in 1979. Section 973.09(l)(b) instructs the trial court to set restitution to compensate the victim "to the extent possible" and to "specify the amount consistent with sub. (lm)."4 Under sec. 973.09(lm)(a) the trial court, in determining the amount and method of restitution, is to consider "the financial resources and the future ability of the probationer to pay."5 Furthermore, sec. 973.09(lm)(c) provides that the court "shall not establish a payment schedule extending beyond the maximum term of probation that could have been imposed for the offense. . . ."6
The legislature did not authorize the trial court to es*503tablish a restitution schedule and order probation for whatever period is necessary to pay the victim's total loss. Had the legislature intended to allow probation to continue ad infinitum and to use the probation system to collect full restitution regardless of the other goals of probation there would have been no point in the legislature expressly tying the payment schedule to the maximum original term of probation and to the probationer's financial resources and future ability to pay.
When the trial court establishes a restitution schedule that reflects the victim's loss, the probationer's financial resources and future ability to pay, the maximum original term of probation, and the goals of probation, then the probationer should be able to comply with the restitution payment schedule within the probationary term set by the trial court. If the probationer fails to comply with the restitution schedule established by the trial court pursuant to the standards set forth in sec. 973.09, the statute provides that the probationer shall not be discharged unless the court finds substantial reason not to continue the payment. Section 973.09(3)(b). 7
To constitute a proper exercise of discretion and to avoid the problems posed in this case, trial courts must make a record regarding the imposition of restitution which sets forth the facts upon which the order is based *504and the rationale of the order.8 The trial court failed to do so. For this reason I join the majority opinion.
The probation statute pertinent in Scherr was sec. 57.01(1), Stats. 1959, which provided that "[t]he court may, by order, withhold sentence or impose sentence and stay its execution and in either case place him on probation to the department for a stated period, stating in the order the reasons therefore, and may impose as a condition of such order or of continuing it in effect that he shall make restitution or pay the costs of prosecution or do both."
The standards are reproduced in their entirety in Huggett, supra, 83 Wis. 2d at 796-97, n.3. See also sec. 301.1(1) of the Model Penal Code set forth in Huggett, supra, 83 Wis. 2d at 797 n.4, stating that courts must consider probationer's ability to pay in conditioning a restitution order.
In Huggett, we said the validity and reasonableness of a condition of probation must be measured by the extent to which it effectuates the dual objectives of probation, namely, "the rehabilitation of those convicted of crime and the protection of the state and community interest." 83 Wis. 2d at 798, quoting State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976).
Sec. 973.09(1)(b), Stats. 1983-84, provides, inter alia:
"If the court places the person on probation, the court shall require restitution designed to compensate the victim's pecuniary loss resulting from the crime to the extent possible, unless the court finds there is substantial reason not to order restitution as a condition of probation. If the court does not require restitution to be paid to a victim, the court shall state its reason on the record. A court may require that restitution be paid to an insurer or surety which has paid any claims or benefits to or on behalf of the victim. If the court does require restitution, it shall specify the amount consistent with sub. (lm) and shall notify the department of justice of its decision if the victim may be eligible for compensation under ch. 949. . . ."
Sec. 973.09(1m)(a), Stats. 1983-84, provides:
"In determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall consider the financial resources and future ability of the probationer to pay. The court may provide for payment of restitution to the victim up to but not in excess of the pecuniary loss caused by the offense. The probationer may assert any defense that he or she could raise in a civil action for the loss sought to be compensated by the restitution order."
Sec. 973.09(1m)(c), Stats. 1983-84, provides, inter alia:
"The court shall not establish a payment schedule extending beyond the maximum term of probation that could have been imposed for the offense under sub. (2)."
Sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats. 1983-84, provides:
"The clerk or the department, as applicable under sub. (lm), shall notify the sentencing court of the status of the ordered payments unpaid at least 90 days before the probation expiration date. If the clerk is acting under sub. (lm), he or she shall give the department the same notification. If payment as ordered has not been made, the court shall hold a probation review hearing prior to the expiration date, unless the hearing is voluntarily waived by the probationer with the knowledge that waiver may result in an extension of the probation period or in a revocation of probation. A probationer shall not be discharged from probation until payment of the ordered restitution, costs, attorney fees, fines and related payments under s. 973.05 has been made or the court determines that there is substantial reason not to continue to require payment."
According to the rules promulgated by the Department of Health and Social Services, the department stands ready to assist the court in arriving at an appropriate restitution schedule in light of the circumstances of each case. HSS 328.07 states that if a court so orders, the department shall document the nature and amount of a victim's pecuniary loss, and recommend an appropriate payment schedule to the court. HSS 328.27 requires the department to perform a presentence investigation to provide the court with "accurate and relevant information upon which to base its sentencing decision." This information is to be compiled in a report which includes a summary and conclusions. HSS 328.27(3)(b). Agents are directed to suggest a tentative treatment plan which should include any recommendations about restitution. HSS 328.27(3)(d).