I dissent.
I agree with the majority that the Board’s discretion in establishing levels of aid must be exercised within the framework of the governing statute and based upon evidence of subsistence living costs (maj. opn., ante, p. 305); furthermore, since this is a legislative function, the resulting standards of aid and care for the indigent and dependent poor must be upheld unless the *314Board’s action is “arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in evidentiary support.” (California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212 [157 Cal.Rptr. 840, 599 P.2d 31].) (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 304-305.) Where I part company with the majority is in the conclusion derived from the application of that standard of review to this record.
The majority holds that because the amount of the cash grant allocated for commonly recurring subsistence needs such as food and shelter is less than the amounts specified in cost-of-living surveys, the standards of aid and care set by the Board are lacking in evidentiary support. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 305-306.) In so concluding, the majority ignores evidence that the allocations in question are supplemented by aid-in-kind funded by the county welfare department.
The cash grant is merely one form of aid available to eligible recipients to provide an adequate subsistence level for food and shelter. The evidence before the Board establishes that those needs can be met by a combination of cash grants and other programs. The county welfare department annually allocates substantial funds to various community-based organizations to provide food and shelter to general assistance recipients. The welfare department also supports homeless shelters and funds social workers to provide services to general assistance recipients such as locating affordable housing. Had the funds committed to aid-in-kind been used instead to increase the cash grant allocations for food and shelter, the record supports the conclusion those allocations as augmented would equal the “average” costs identified in the cost-of-living surveys. However, it is beyond the legitimate scope of judicial authority in effect to reorder the Board’s priorities. (Cf. Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 636-637 [12 Cal.Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247].) Where the Board in its discretion has determined to meet the needs of general assistance recipients through a combination of cash grants and aid-in-kind, it is not within the province of the court to substitute its own judgment as to the manner in which those resources should be distributed for the relief and support of the indigent. (See Patten v. County of San Diego (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 467, 470 [235 P.2d 217].)
The resolution of the Board setting the levels of aid was not passed in a vacuum. The Board established these grant levels after two public hearings in which extensive testimony and documentation were received from the welfare department and various welfare rights organizations including the plaintiff Poverty Resistance Center. The Board considered the welfare department’s cost-of-living surveys relative to transportation, shelter, food, and other commonly recurring subsistence needs. The Board also reviewed and considered conflicting evidence submitted by various organizations in substantiation of claims the grant levels recommended by the welfare *315department were inadequate. These included critiques of the welfare department’s cost-of-living survey and a survey recommending increased grant levels with specific allowances for utilities, laundry, and other personal household needs. In addition, the Board considered a report by the welfare department responding to the opposing claims. This report details the supplemental services available to the county’s indigent population, including homeless shelters, free medical and dental care to the medically indigent, free on-site food facilities, and clothing for needy recipients.
Only after reviewing all of this evidence did the Board adopt the welfare department’s recommended grant levels. The Board found that “Strict application of the cost-of-living survey results” was “not appropriate” in view of their hypothetical nature and the “multi-dimensional” supplemental services made available to general assistance recipients. “Implementation of a . . . grant level which provides more than the absolute minimal necessities could be counter-productive since it would eliminate a recipient’s incentive to become self-supporting.”
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001 confer upon counties broad discretion “‘to determine eligibility for, the type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief.’ ” (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669 at pp. 678-679 [quoting County of L.A. v. Dept. of Social Welfare (1953) 41 Cal.2d 455, 458 (260 P.2d 41)]; see Long v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 61, 68 [144 Cal.Rptr. 64].) Here the Board’s discretion was informed by economic and social data as well as opinion and argument and was guided by considerations of public welfare and public policy. (See Joint Council of Interns & Residents v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1202, 1211 [258 Cal.Rptr. 762].) Legislative bodies are uniquely able to make such decisions (see Quinchard v. Board of Trustees (1896) 113 Cal. 664, 670 [45 P. 856]), and once legislative discretion is so exercised, absent special circumstances, it is not subject to judicial control and supervision. (California Assn. of Professional Employees v. County of Los Angeles (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 38, 43 [141 Cal.Rptr. 290].)
While reasonable minds may differ as to appropriate levels of aid and care, I cannot say in light of the evidence considered that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or without evidentiary support, or failed in its obligation to adopt standards sufficient to carry out the mandate to “relieve and support” the county’s indigent residents (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17000). The Board considered the relevant factors of subsistence and acted within the fixed boundaries of its statutory authority after reviewing two conflicting cost-of-living surveys, two critiques thereof, three grant level proposals and the availability of aid-in-kind and supplemental services. While the data before it were conflicting, the Board based its decision on a substantial and *316presumptively reliable showing as to which there was a full public airing. Unlike the majority, I am satisfied there is a rational connection between the evidence presented and the “standards of aid and care [adopted] for the indigent and dependent poor of the county . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17001.) Unless and until the “standards” mandated by Welfare and Institutions Code section 17001 are legislatively defined, there is no basis for concluding the monthly assistance figures set by the Board, when considered in conjunction with the range of services available in supplemental programs, constitute an abuse of the legislative body’s broad discretion. (See Long v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 68.) In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority interferes with the legislative prerogative, reducing it functionally to the mere ratification of statistical data, and portends future judicial intrusions into the legislative function unless the Board slavishly enacts the latest cost-of-living survey into law.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.