specially concurring:
I write this special concurrence because I do not agree that Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d 501 (1987), was wrongly decided. In Knapp, the trial judge first entered an order that did not tell the parties which complaint was dismissed or whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The motion at issue did not ask for findings of fact or law. It asked that the order be changed to provide clarity for the action taken by the trial judge.
The court correctly held the motion for findings came within the “other relief’ portion of section 2 — 1203(a) because it requested “a change in the form of the original judgment to reflect the actual action taken.” Knapp v. City of Decatur, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 503. The first order did not further a policy of bringing finality to judgments and ends to disputes. See Sizer v. Lotus Grain & Coal Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 739, 740 (1979).
In contrast, the motion for findings filed by DMBC was not a post-trial motion within the meaning of section 2 — 1203 (735 ILCS 5/2— 1203(a) (West 2000). See Lewis v. Loyola University, 149 Ill. App. 3d 88 (1986) (motion for entry of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is not directed against the judgment as required by Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)). For that reason, I agree we have no jurisdiction to consider this case.