I concur in the judgment. The dispute in this case is over the scope of the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) in cases involving the right to a leave of absence with salary under Labor Code section 4800. This statute entitles any designated member of the Department of Justice who is disabled by injury arising out of and in the course of his duties to a leave of absence with pay for a period not exceeding one year in lieu of ordinary disability payments. The designated members are those who fall within the “state safety” class and whose principal duties consist of active law enforcement. (Lab. Code, § 4800.) I agree that the Board does not have jurisdiction to determine whether an employee of the Department of Justice is such a designated member and thereby meets the eligibility requirements of this statute. Under the terms of the accompanying statute, the power of the Board begins and ends with the duty to determine “whether or not the disability referred to in Section 4800 arose out of and in the course of duty” and “when such disability ceases.” (Lab. Code, § 4801.) And even this limited duty to determine causation and *205cessation of disability arises only “upon the request of the . . . Department of Justice, . . .” (Ibid.) In this case, the Department of Justice made no such request and thus even the limited jurisdiction of the Board was never invoked.
The power of the Board over leave of absence benefits for members of the Department of Justice springs only from Labor Code section 4801 and this special reference statute does not confer plenary jurisdiction upon the Board to determine eligibility. Rather, the statute imposes only limited duties, and hence confers only restricted jurisdiction, upon the Board. The California Supreme Court made the Board’s limited jurisdiction clear in Boyd v. City of Santa Ana (1971) 6 Cal.3d 393 [99 Cal.Rptr. 38, 491 P.2d 830], in the content of Labor Code section 4850, an analogous statute conferring similar leave of absence with pay benefits upon various local policemen, firemen, sheriff’s deputies and investigators in the district attorney’s office. Prior to its amendment in 1977 and 1985, this statute, like the present version of Labor Code section 4801, provided that the Board, upon request, shall determine “whether or not the disability referred to in Section 4850 arose out of and in the course of duty.” It further provided that the Board in any disputed case shall also determine when such disability exists. (Stats. 1969, ch. 639, p. 1292, § 4.)1 “Payments pursuant to section 4850”, the high court declared, “are not salary but workmen’s compensation benefits. The Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board has jurisdiction, when requested, to determine whether the disability arose out of or occurred in the course of duty, but the board has neither the power nor the duty to fix the amount of compensation by an award. The liability of the [local agency] under the section is enforceable in the courts in mandamus proceedings.” (Boyd v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 397.)
As the Court of Appeal earlier remarked in a case cited with approval by the Boyd court, and once again in the context of Labor Code section 4850, “[t]he act of [the public employer] complying with section 4850 is purely ministerial. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the Industrial Accident Commission [now the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board] is *206vested with jurisdiction to determine whether the liability referred to in section 4850 arose out of and in the course of duty. It has so determined. It is without jurisdiction to enforce the liability. The liability is enforcible by the courts under section 21 of article XX [now § 4850 of art. XIV] of the Constitution. Where there is no room for discretion in the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, mandamus is proper.” (Hawthorn v. City of Beverly Hills (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 723, 731 [245 P.2d 352], fn. omitted.)
Thus, the Board has “no jurisdiction to compel a [local agency] to grant such leave of absence. . . . [Its] only responsibility is to determine upon request whether the disability claimed arose out of and in the course of the employment.” (Hawthorn v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 568, 572 [225 P.2d 966], construing former version of Lab. Code, § 4850. ) In short, the Board has been conferred only a limited jurisdiction under the leave of absence with pay statute for members of the Department of Justice,2 and that constricted grant does not include the power to determine eligibility any more than it includes the power to fix the amount of compensation paid during the leave of absence or the power to order the employing agency to grant the leave. Consequently, the Board erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the question of eligibility and the Department of Justice is entitled to the relief it seeks.
Evans, Acting P. J., concurred.
As a result of those amendments, this statute now authorizes the Board both to determine the amount of benefits under Labor Code section 4850 and to award and enforce those benefits. As amended, the statute now provides that upon request the Board shall determine “whether or not the disability referred to in Section 4850 arose out of and in the course of duty. The Board shall also, in any disputed case, determine when the disability commenced and ceased, and the amount of benefits provided by this division to which the employee is entitled during the period of the disability. The Board shall have jurisdiction to award and enforce payment of these benefits pursuant to Part 4 (commencing with Section 5300).” (Lab. Code, § 4851; Stats. 1985, ch. 1050, § 1.)
No similar amendment was made to Labor Code section 4801.
The Board has been conferred the same limited jurisdiction over similar leave of absence benefits for members of the University of California fire department (Lab. Code, § 4804.2) and members of the University of California Police Department. (Lab. Code, § 4807.)