(dissenting).
Facts
This case, tried upon a stipulation of facts, involves the question of whether defendants should be enjoined from using their property in violation of a local zoning ordinance. Subsequent to the effective date of zoning ordinance amendments,1 defendants placed a 14-foot by 70-foot mobile home2 *334on their property located within the township. The amended ordinance provides that mobile homes are a permitted use only in approved mobile-home parks or mobile-home subdivisions.3 Defendants stipulated that their land had not been approved for use as a mobile-home park or subdivision. Defendants also admitted that the mobile home was placed upon their property without first having obtained a building permit.4
The ordinance defines mobile-home parks and subdivisions5 and sets forth standards relating to *335approval of such developments. Mobile-home parks and subdivisions are a permitted use in all zoning districts within the township with the exception of recreational use districts.6
The stipulation of facts indicates that plans for a proposed mobile-home park have been approved by the township. The proposed park would cover 28 acres and offer facilities for approximately 100 mobile homes. However, at the date of trial no work had commenced on the park. Although it is unclear from the record how defendants’ land is presently zoned, there is nothing to indicate that defendants’ property could not be used to develop a mobile-home park or subdivision.
Robinson Township brought suit seeking to enjoin defendants’ use of their property as violative of township zoning ordinances. The trial court granted the desired injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. 70 Mich App 258; 245 NW2d 709 (1976).
Discussion
Defendants present a broadside challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance. The issue, squarely presented, is whether any and all local zoning ordinances which do not totally exclude mobile homes from a community but which restrict the location of mobile homes to mobile-home parks and subdivisions within the community are invalid. In view of the procedural posture of this case, the facial validity of the ordinance, and the insufficient factual development of this record, the *336ordinance survives defendants’ constitutional challenge.
I
Prior to placing a mobile home on their property, defendants not only neglected to obtain the requisite building permit but also failed to seek a variance from existing zoning provisions pertaining to their land. Under these circumstances it is questionable whether the Knolls should be permitted to raise constitutional challenges to the ordinance at issue. See State v Larson, 292 Minn 350, 356; 195 NW2d 180, 183 (1972); Napierkowski v Gloucester Twp, 29 NJ 481, 489; 150 A2d 481, 485 (1959).7 Further, in rejecting constitutional challenges to similar ordinances, courts have noted the landowner’s failure to make use of their land in a manner permitted by zoning ordinances regulating the use and location of mobile homes. McKie v Ventura County, 38 Cal App 3d 555, 557; 113 Cal Rptr 143, 144 (1974); Town of Greenland v Hussey, 110 NH 269, 272; 266 A2d 122, 124 (1970).
Additionally, defendants have failed to seek relief on other narrower grounds. The siting of individual mobile homes outside mobile-home parks or subdivisions has been permitted in certain cases where the courts were persuaded to either narrowly construe the term "mobile home” or broadly construe the terms "residence” or "dwelling” as defined in local zoning ordinances.8_
*337Defendants have instead broadly based their claim for relief on constitutional grounds. In so doing, defendants have pursued the path of greatest resistance.
II
A successful challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance requires the establishment of one of the following propositions:
" '[T]here is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the present zoning classification * * * or
"* * * '[The] ordinance * * * [is] unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question.’ ” Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429, 439; 247 NW2d 848 (1976); Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139, 158; 215 NW2d 179 (1974).
In the instant case, the burden of proof lies squarely with the defendants. It is axiomatic that in most instances, the burden of proof is placed upon the person attacking the validity of a zoning ordinance. Kirk, 439. Defendants have presented *338no facts which would indicate that the ordinance results in total or de facto exclusion of mobile homes from the township. Kirk, 442-444.9 Rather, the ordinance regulates the location of such land use within the township. In this instance, the burden of proof does not shift to the township to justify exclusion of the use, but remains with defendants.10
The Knolls do not contend that the ordinance has been applied in a discriminatory manner so as to prevent the proposed use of their property. 11 Nor have defendants advanced any facts indicating that the ordinance as applied is unreasonable or confiscatory.
The sole basis for affording relief is thus premised on the conclusion that constitutional infirmity appears on the face of the ordinance.
Ill
The standard of review applicable to zoning ordinances has been a limited one. This developed at least in part from a recognition by a majority of this Court that the functions of local zoning authorities are legislative in nature.
An integral part of this limited standard of *339review is the principle that zoning ordinances are accorded a presumption of validity. Kropf, 162; Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957). If this presumption is to have any viability, the reviewing court has a duty to conceive of possible rational bases to support the ordinance. If a state of facts which would warrant the ordinance can be reasonably perceived, those facts will be presumed to exist. In the absence of evidence tending to rebut the presumption, the ordinance’s validity should be upheld. Where any evidence is presented which tends to rebut the presumption of validity, the court must determine whether room for fair and legitimate differences of opinion exists concerning whether it is reasonable to draw a classification or exclude a use. If such a debatable question exists, the court must exercise judicial restraint and uphold the ordinance.12
No constitutional infirmity exists on the face of the ordinance in the instant case since the means employed by the ordinance may have a reasonable relationship to valid legislative zoning goals relating to public health, safety and general welfare. No evidence was presented tending to indicate that permissible legislative zoning goals would not be served by applying the ordinance and thus restricting defendants’ proposed use of their land. Defendants’ challenge, therefore, must be rejected.
IV
Zoning ordinances regulating the location of mobile homes within a township or municipality by restricting them to mobile-home parks have been upheld generally by this Court and other *340courts interpreting Michigan law. Wyoming Twp v Herweyer, 321 Mich 611; 33 NW2d 93 (1948); Connor v West Bloomfield Twp, 207 F2d 482 (CA 6, 1953); Courtland Twp v Cole, 66 Mich App 474; 239 NW2d 630 (1976); Lanphear v Antwerp Twp, 50 Mich App 641; 214 NW2d 66 (1973). See also Stevens v Royal Oak Twp, 342 Mich 105, 109; 68 NW2d 787 (1955).
Challenges to zoning ordinances, similar to the ordinance in the instant case, based upon claims that the ordinance was invalid on its face have been rejected by courts of other states. See, e.g., Village of Cahokia v Wright, 57 Ill 2d 166; 311 NE2d 153 (1974); Wright v Michaud, 160 Me 164; 200 A2d 543 (1964).
Courts considering the validity of zoning ordinances regulating the location of mobile homes within a community have, nearly universally, concluded that the zoning codes tend to promote the health, safety and welfare of the community’s residents and that rational bases may exist for distinguishing between mobile homes and site-built homes.13 The siting of mobile homes in a given residential district may have a tendency to depress *341property values of conventional dwellings.14 The development or growth potential of an area for residential purposes may be stunted.15 Some deference should be given to a community’s plan for development.16
It may be reasoned that a sufficient number of mobile homes tend to deteriorate more quickly than conventional dwellings. From a public safety standpoint, some may not be as secure, requiring concentrated protection efforts. Mobile homes can be sited more rapidly than conventional dwellings and may thus cause a sudden and severe load on municipal facilities. There may be differences in degree in the supplying of municipal services for and regulation of mobile homes.17 Accordingly, *342there are reasonable bases grounded in the police power for the existence of the ordinance. Furthermore, the record in this case presents no evidence to counter the presumption of the ordinance’s validity.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Amendments to pertinent sections of the township’s zoning ordinance became effective May 14, 1974. Prior to that date, defendants cleared brush and trees from the site, commenced digging a well and obtained a septic permit. However, the mobile home was not placed on defendants’ property until after the present zoning ordinance provisions became effective.
Art II, § 203 of the ordinance in effect on the date the Knolls placed the mobile home on their property defines a mobile home as follows:
"A movable or portable dwelling constructed to be towed on its own chassis, connected to utilities and designed without a permanent foundation for year-round living as a single-family dwelling. A mobile home may contain parts that may be separated, folded, collapsed, or telescoped when being towed and combined or expanded later to provide additional cubic capacity.”
Art II, § 203.6 of the ordinance defines a travel trailer somewhat differently:
"A transportable unit intended for occasional or short-term occupancy as a dwelling unit during travel, recreational, or vacation use.” Art II, § 203 of the ordinance, in effect prior to the 1974 ordinance amendments, described a mobile home as follows:
"Any house car, house trailer, trailer home, trailer coach or similar *334vehicle used or so constructed as to permit its being used as a conveyance upon the public streets or highways and duly licensable as such, and shall include self-propelled vehicles so designed, constructed, or added to by means of accessories in such manner as will permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling or sleeping place of one (1) or more persons, and having no foundation other than wheels, jacks or skirtings.”
Presently, art III, § 307.1 of the ordinance provides:
“Mobile homes are considered as dwelling units and are not permitted as an accessory use to a permitted principal use and are permitted only in approved mobile home parks.”
Art III, § 307.4 of the ordinance which had been in effect prior to the 1974 amendments, provided in part:
"No person shall * * * use or occupy or permit the use or occupancy of any trailer coach on any lot or parcel of land in any zoning district not licensed as a trailer coach park, except only as provided in this Ordinance.”
Art XIII, § 1302.1 of the township zoning ordinance requires that a building permit be obtained in certain circumstances prior to building or altering structures within the township:
"Except as otherwise provided, it shall be unlawful to erect any new building or structure or to alter any existing building or structure at a cost of $200.00 or more until a permit therefor has been obtained from the building inspector by the owner or his duly authorized agent. Application for a permit shall be in writing and upon duplicate printed forms furnished by the building inspector. Such permits shall be nontransferable and must be obtained before any work, excavation, erection, alteration, or movement is begun.”
A mobile-home park is defined in art II, § 203.3 of the ordinance as follows:
"A parcel of land under single ownership which has been planned and improved for the placement of mobile homes on a rental basis for nontransient use.”
Art II, § 203.4 defines a mobile-home subdivision:
"A mobile home park except that the mobile home lots are subdi*335vided, surveyed, recorded, and sold in accordance with Act 288 of the Public Acts of 1967, as amended.”
The record does not indicate what percentage of land within the township is classified as recreation use districts.
In Napierkowski, supra, the failure to seek a variance was excused since the record clearly indicated that township officials would have denied a variance had one been sought. The record in the instant case does not support the inference that the seeking of a variance would have amounted to a fruitless effort.
Individual siting of mobile homes was allowed in the following cases through construction of ordinances defining "dwelling”, "residence” or similar terms. Cook County v Hoytt, 59 Ill App 2d 368; 208 *337NE2d 410 (1965); Rundell v May, 258 So 2d 90 (La App, 1972), cert den 261 La 468; 259 So 2d 916 (1972); Sioux Falls v Cleveland, 75 SD 548; 70 NW2d 62 (1955).
Mobile-home owners have also been permitted to individually site their homes where the courts narrowly construed the meaning of "mobile home” contained in ordinances restricting mobile homes to mobile-home parks. Douglass Twp v Badman, 206 Pa Super 390; 213 A2d 88 (1965); State v Work, 75 Wash 2d 204; 449 P2d 806 (1969). But see: Duckworth v Bonney Lake, 91 Wash 2d 19; 586 P2d 860 (1978).
Of course, theories advanced by mobile-home owners concerning statutory construction have not always been accepted. See, e.g., Oakdale v Benoit, 342 So 2d 691 (La App, 1977), cert den 344 So 2d 670 (La, 1977); Town of Marblehead v Gilbert, 334 Mass 602; 137 NE2d 921 (1956); Asheboro v Auman, 26 NC App 87; 214 SE2d 621 (1975), cert den 288 NC 239; 217 SE2d 663 (1975).
It is to be noted that the facts in the instant case are insufficiently developed to raise an issue with respect to these considerations.
The trial judge correctly found:
"Defendants did not specifically allege nor have they proven that plaintiff has carried out a systematic de facto exclusion of mobile home parks from plaintiff township.”
See Clark v Lyon Twp Clerk, 348 Mich 173; 82 NW2d 433 (1957), and Gust v Canton Twp, 342 Mich 436; 70 NW2d 772 (1955), for instances where total exclusion of mobile homes from townships required the township to bear the burden of justifying the exclusion.
Mobile-home owners have obtained relief from ordinances restricting mobile homes to mobile-home parks where it was concluded that the ordinance was enforced in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Blackman Twp v Koller, 357 Mich 186; 98 NW2d 538 (1959); People v Husler, 34 Ill App 3d 977; 342 NE2d 401 (1975); State v Vadnais, 295 Minn 17; 202 NW2d 657 (1972).
Conclusory opinions which are not based upon factual predicates would be insufficient means to rebut the presumption of validity or to respond to evidence tending to rebut this presumption.
See, e.g., Board of Comm’rs of Jefferson County v Mountain Air Ranch, 192 Colo 364; 563 P2d 341 (1977); Cooper v Sinclair, 66 So 2d 702 (Fla, 1953), cert den 346 US 867; 74 S Ct 107; 98 L Ed 377 (1953); Village of Cahokia v Wright, supra (Illinois); Colby v Hurtt, 212 Kan 113; 509 P2d 1142 (1973); Wright v Michaud, supra (Maine); Town of Manchester v Phillips, 343 Mass 591; 180 NE2d 333 (1962); State v Larson, supra (Minnesota); State ex rel Wilkerson v Murray, 471 SW2d 460 (Mo, 1971); Napierkowski v Gloucester Twp, supra (New Jersey); People v Clute, 47 Misc 2d 1005; 263 NYS2d 826 (1965), aff'd 18 NY2d 999; 278 NYS2d 231; 224 NE2d 734 (1966); Duckworth v Bonney Lake, supra (Washington); Town of Stonewood v Bell, 270 SE2d 787 (W Va, 1980).
See also MCL 125.273; MSA 5.2963(3) which enables townships to promulgate zoning ordinances and sets forth legislatively prescribed goals to be achieved through such ordinances:
"The zoning ordinance shall be based upon a plan designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare; to encourage the use of lands in accordance-with their character and adaptability, and to limit the improper use of land; to conserve natural resources *341and energy; to meet the needs of the state’s residents for food, fiber, and other natural resources, places of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, and other uses of land; to insure that uses of the land shall be situated in appropriate locations and relationships; to avoid the overcrowding of population; to provide adequate light and air; to lessen congestion on the public roads and streets; to reduce hazards to life and property; to facilitate adequate provision for a system of transportation, sewage disposal, safe and adequate water supply, education, recreation, and other public requirements; and to conserve the expenditure of funds for public improvements and services to conform with the most advantageous uses of land, resources, and properties. The zoning ordinance shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to [sic] the character of each district; its peculiar suitability for particular uses; the conservation of property values and natural resources; and the general and appropriate trend and character of land, building, and population development.”
See, e.g., Cooper v Sinclair, supra; Colby v Hurtt, supra; Town of Manchester v Phillips, supra; State v Larson, supra; Wilkerson v Murray, supra; Napierkowski v Gloucester Twp, supra; Duckworth v Bonney Lake, supra.
See, e.g., Colby v Hurtt, supra; Town of Manchester v Phillips, supra; Wilkerson v Murray, supra; Duckworth v Bonney Lake, supra; 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2d ed), § 14.01, p 550, § 14.05, p 563.
See, e.g., Padover v Farmington Twp, 374 Mich 622; 132 NW2d 687 (1965); Napierkowski v Gloucester Twp, supra; Duckworth v Bonney Lake, supra;
McKie v Ventura County, supra; State v Larson, supra; Duckworth v Bonney Lake, supra.