concurring.
Ridge appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 2003). We should affirm for different reasons than those in the majority’s analysis. Because the Court does not do so, I concur in the judgment but not the opinion of the Court.
In Ridge’s first three issues, he contends that the interpreter appointed by the trial court to interpret the testimony of one Spanish-speaking witness was not licensed in accordance with the Texas Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 57.001(5), 57.002(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1139, § 1, sec. 57.002(c), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2537, 2538 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 57.002(c) (Vernon Supp.2006)); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 57.041-57.051 (Vernon 2005). In Ridge’s first issue, he contends that the Government Code requires the appointment of licensed interpreters. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 57.002(a)-(b). In his second and third issues, he contends that the confrontation clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions require the appointment of licensed interpreters. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.
“As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that ... the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion....” Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). “Except for complaints involving systemic (or absolute) requirements, or rights that are waivable only ... all other complaints, whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are forfeited by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 175 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (quoting Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex.Crim.App.2004)).
*599[W]hen a trial judge is aware that the defendant has a problem understanding the English language, the defendant’s right to have an interpreter translate the trial proceedings into a language which the defendant understands is a category-two Marin right. In these circumstances, the judge has an independent duty to implement this right in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant.
Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). However, “a trial court is under no duty to question the interpreter to determine her qualifications; instead if a question regarding her qualifications arose, the Appellant should have objected and made a record.” Escamilla v. State, No. 08-03-00193-CR, 2005 WL 1303303, at *7, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 4193, at *19 (Tex.App.-El Paso May 31, 2005, no pet.); accord Montoya v. State, 811 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.); Castillo v. State, 807 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd). An appellant forfeits a complaint concerning the qualification of an interpreter not presented to the trial court. Mendoza v. State, No. 13-03-755-CR, 2005 WL 2476211, at *5, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 8247, at *18 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Oct.6, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); accord Montoya at 673; Castillo at 9.
Ridge did not object to the qualifications of the interpreter. We should overrule Ridge’s first, second, and third issues on that basis.1
In Ridge’s fourth issue, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the period for filing a motion for new trial.2 See U.S. Const. *600amend. VI; Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “Ineffective assistance under Strickland[v.Washington] is deficient performance by counsel resulting in prejudice, with performance being measured against an ‘objective standard of reasonableness,’ ‘under prevailing professional norms.’ ” Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2464 (quoting Strickland at 687, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “[Cjounsel is ‘strongly presumed’ to make decisions in the exercise of professional judgment.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (quoting Strickland at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). “A Strickland claim must be ‘firmly founded in the record’ and ‘the record must affirmatively demonstrate’ the meritorious nature of the claim.” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)); accord Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). When “there [i]s no evidence in the record to show ‘that trial counsel thought that his duties were completed with the end of trial, and had therefore abandoned the appellant’ ”; “[tjhere is nothing in the record to suggest that the attorney did not discuss the merits of a motion for new trial with the appellant, which the appellant rejected”; and “[w]hen a motion for new trial is not filed in a case, the rebuttable presumption is that it was considered by the appellant and rejected.” Smith v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (quoting Oldham v. State, 977 S.W.2d 354, 362, 363 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)). Likewise, an appellant’s giving notice of appeal pro se is “an indication that she was aware of some of her appellate rights, ‘and we presume she was adequately counseled unless the record affirmatively displays otherwise.’ ” Id. (quoting Oldham at 363).
Ridge points to his allegation of ineffective assistance in his pro-se notice of appeal. The record does not affirmatively show that trial counsel did not adequately represent Ridge during the period for filing a motion for new trial. Accordingly, Ridge does not establish that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We should overrule Ridge’s fourth issue on that basis.
We should, after overruling Ridge’s issues on the above grounds, affirm.
. Moreover, the Government Code does not mandate the appointment of a licensed interpreter. The Government Code provides:
(a) A court shall appoint ... a licensed court interpreter if a motion for the appointment of an interpreter is filed by a party or requested by a witness in a civil or criminal proceeding in the court.
(b) A court may, on its own motion, appoint ... a licensed court interpreter.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 57.002(a)-(b). At least in the absence of a party's motion or a request for an interpreter, Section 57.002 does not mandate the appointment of a licensed interpreter. See id. § 57.002(b). "The interpreter is not required to be an 'official' or 'certified' interpreter under the Code, but only to have sufficient skill in translating and to be familiar with the use of slang.” Menjivar v. State, No. 08-02-00143-CR, 2003 WL 361272, at *1, 2003 Tex.App. LEXIS 1553, at *2-*3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Feb. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (citing Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1139, § 1, sec. 57.002(a)-(c), 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws at 2538 (amended 2005); id. sec. 57.021 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 57.021 (Vernon Supp.2006)); Act of May 21, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 700, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2505, 2505 (amended 2005) (current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30(a) (Vernon Supp.2006))); accord Mendiola v. State, 924 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref’d); see Hernandez v. State, No. 05-03-00107-CR, 2003 WL 22017228, at *5-6, 2003 Tex.App. LEXIS 7322, at *14-*17 (Tex.App.-Dallas Aug.27, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication). To that extent, Section 57.002 is thus in accord with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.30. See TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30(a). "The question of an interpreter's competency and qualifications is committed to the discretion of the trial court and absent an abuse of this discretion, decisions on this subject will not be disturbed on appeal.” Castaneda v. State, No. 13-02-146-CR, 2004 WL 2632951, at *2, 2004 Tex.App. LEXIS 9773, at *4 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 4, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem.op.); see Montoya, 811 S.W.2d at 673. Ridge did not file a motion for an interpreter. Moreover, the record does not show whether the interpreter was licensed. Accordingly, Ridge does not show that the trial court erred in appointing the interpreter.
. I assume that the right to effective assistance applies to that period. See Smith v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 663 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).