(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision as it relates to appellant’s claim against the manufacturer. I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on appellant’s defective design and failure to warn claims.
1. Summary Judgment
This is not a proper case for summary judgment. Appellant has clearly submitted sufficient evidence that he was exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm when using the window screen for its intended purpose to allow the claim to withstand a summary judgment motion. Summary judgment shall be granted
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03.
On appeal from a summary judgment, this court must determine (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of the law.
Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). The reviewing court
must take a view of the evidence most favorable to the one against whom the [summary judgment] motion was granted.
Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 242 Minn. 416, 424, 65 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1954).
2. Defective Design
As the majority acknowledges,
a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well as any unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (1976), quoted in Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn.1984) (citations omitted).
The case at bar is analogous to the landmark case of McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967). Plaintiff in McCormack was severely injured when she accidently tipped over a vaporizer manufactured by defendant and was splashed with near boiling water. Id. at 326-27, 154 N.W.2d at 492-93. Plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer negligently adopted an unsafe design for the vaporizer. Id. at 324, 154 N.W.2d at 491. After verdict for plaintiff, the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the defective design claim. Id., at 326, 154 N.W.2d at 492.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that “the primary, intended use of the vaporizer was for the treatment of children’s colds and croup.” Id. at 334, 154 N.W.2d at 497. The court held, however, that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim that
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care * * * to guard against the reasonably foreseeable danger that a child would tip the unit over when it was in use and be seriously burned by coming in contact with the scalding water * * *.
Id. Therefore, under Hankscraft, a manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to protect against dangers arising when the product is used for its intended purpose. These dangers include reasonably foreseeable accidents with naturally arise from the use of the product. See id.
Here, the window screen’s primary, intended purpose was to provide ventilation in a residential dwelling. The record is clear that appellant did use the screen for this purpose. Appellant has presented substantial evidence to establish that it was
*887foreseeable that a young child would acci-dently come in contact with the window screen. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, see Huber v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn.1988), I would conclude that manufacturer had a duty to manufacture its window screen so as to avoid unreasonably exposing users to this foreseeable risk arising from the window screen’s intended use.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that a manufacturer’s duty of design
is met when the article is safe for its intended use and when it will fairly meet any “emergency of use” which is foreseeable.
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501 (8th Cir.1968). As discussed above, appellant has submitted evidence to support his claim that a reasonably foreseeable “emergency of use” is that a child will accidently come in contact with a window screen. Thus, manufacturer had a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing a window screen which would mitigate the risk of harm associated with this “emergency of use.” Id.
I would not hold that a manufacturer has a duty to design a screen which will in every instance prevent a child’s fall. A “manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or fool-proof” product. Id. at 502. Rather, a manufacturer has a duty only to exercise reasonable care in adopting a design for its product. Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn.1982).
What constitutes “reasonable care” will, of course, vary with the surrounding circumstances and will involve “a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm.”
Id. (quoting Micallef, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121, 348 N.E.2d at 577-78 (other citations omitted), quoted in Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 621). The question of whether a manufacturer met its duty will in most cases be a question of fact for the jury. Peterson v. Little-Giant Glencoe Portable Elevator Div. of Dynamics Corp. of Am., 366 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn.1985).
Here, appellant presented evidence that the manufacturer took no steps in the design of the screen to alleviate the risk that a child would dislodge the window screen and fall out of the window. The manufacturer designed a screen for use in a residential complex. The screen in place was a mere 24 inches off the floor and was held in place by only four “clips.” Police investigators reported that “the screen appeared to be extremely flimsy” and could be popped out with two fingers. The record also contains evidence that the window screens could be dislodged by a cat. I believe that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, establishes the existence of a material issue of fact as to whether manufacturer met its duty of reasonable care. Huber, 430 N.W.2d at 467.
3. Failure to Warn
To determine whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn, this court
goes to the event causing the damage and looks back to the alleged negligent act. If the connection is too remote to impose liability as a matter of public policy, the courts then hold there is no duty, and consequently no liability. On the other hand, if the consequence is direct and is the type of occurrence that was or should have been reasonably foreseeable, the courts then hold as a matter of law a duty exists.
Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn.1986), quoted in Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn.1987).
Appellant produced evidence to establish that the manufacturer was aware a great many children have been injured by dislodging low level window screens and falling out of windows. This evidence also established the severe nature of the injuries associated with this type of accident. I do not believe appellant’s injury is so remote as to warrant limitation as a matter of public policy. Rather public policy favors the imposition of a duty to warn. *888Appellant’s injury is a direct consequence of the use of low hanging window screens in residential dwellings. Appellant has submitted substantial evidence that the screen manufacturing industry has been aware of this problem for many years, and yet the industry has refused to take steps to warn potential users of this serious risk.
As the majority notes, generally a manufacturer has no duty to warn of obvious risks. While the dangers of falling out of a window may be considered obvious, it is not obvious that a screen will dislodge without offering any resistance whatsoever. Further, because it was foreseeable that children would come in contact with the screen, the manufacturer was required to exercise a higher degree of care in warning potential users of the risks associated with the product. See Augustine v. Hitzman, 287 Minn. 311, 314, 178 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1970) (“A higher degree of care is required with respect to children than with respect to adults.”)
After finding that the manufacturer had a duty to warn, “issues such as the adequacy of the warning, breach, and causation” are for the jury to resolve. Balder, 399 N.W.2d at 81. I recognize that appellant may have difficulty establishing that the manufacturer’s failure to warn was the proximate cause of his injury, but “the fact that the nonmoving party is unlikely to prevail at trial does not warrant granting summary judgment.” Writers, Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn.App.1991) (citations omitted).
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.