(dissenting). Grammar controls even kings, a. seventeenth century playwright suggested. 1 Certainly, grammar often determines the meaning of a sentence. Punctuation marks used, as well as words used, are not to be disregarded in construing what is meant or was intended by a statute or rule. In construing the rule of the Milwaukee county welfare department here involved, initial attention should be focused on a semicolon (here underlined and identified for emphasis), midway in the rule which reads:
“No. 72-109. In General Assistance cases, automobiles, motorcycles, trucks, etc., are to be sold, except where the assistance is temporary, in which case the plates and title will be turned over to the department; [NOTE: the semicolon referred to] or where a specific budgetable income is directly traceable to the continued use of such vehicle; or in other emergency situations. ...” 2
Thus phrased and thus punctuated, the rule sets forth, before the semicolon, two general policies: (1) Where permanent or continuing general assistance is provided, automobiles are to be sold; and (2) where temporary assistance is provided, auto plates and titles are to be turned over to the department. However, such flat requirements are modified by what follows the semicolon. As to both permanent and temporary assistance recipients, there are two exceptions set forth: (1) Where a specific budgetable income is directly traceable to the *230continued use of such vehicle; and (2) in other emergency situations. As applied to an applicant for temporary assistance, as was the appellant here, the rule requires that he turn over his auto plates and titles unless (1) there is a specific budgetable income, or (2) there is some other emergency situation warranting the continued operation of his automobile by the applicant.
In giving the rule a differing construction, the majority opinion has repunctuated the rule. As the writer sees it, what the majority opinion does is to relocate the semicolon so that the rule, as revised by the court majority, would read :
“No. 72-109 [Revised and repunctuated] In General Assistance cases, automobiles, motorcycles, trucks, etc., are to be soldj. [NOTE: the semicolon relocated] except where the assistance is temporary, in which case the plates and title will be turned over to the department, or where a specific budgetable income is directly traceable to the continued use of such vehicle, or in other emergency situations. . . .”
By thus transposing one semicolon and one comma, the majoiity finds and construes the rule to set down one general policy with three exceptions to it. The general policy becomes that of requiring the sale of an automobile where permanent assistance is granted. The three exceptions become: (1) Applications for temporary assistance where plates and title are to be turned over; (2) where a budgetable income is directly traceable to the continued use of the vehicle; and (3) in other emergency situations. With the rule thus revised and repunctuated, the majority construes it as a flat requirement that applicants for temporary assistance turn over auto plates and title, with no exceptions and no provisions for special needs warranting a specific budget item for continued operation of the car and no provisions for emergency situations requiring continued use of an automobile. The majority strikes down the rule thus construed and, in *231the writer’s opinion, thus repunctuated, as beyond the provisions of ch. 49 of the statutes. That might well be, but the conclusion, in this writer’s opinion, does not fit or apply to the rule as written and punctuated by the county welfare board.
The challenge to the rule here does not relate to whether or not an applicant is indigent and thereby entitled to receive temporary public assistance.3 The rule, as to applicants for temporary relief, requires only that the auto plates and title to the car be turned over to the department, to be held until an application and determination is made that such applicant is entitled to permanent or continuing assistance. Operation, not ownership of the vehicle, is involved. Where there is no specific budgetary allowance for automobile operation or no emergency situation, the applicant may own, but may not operate the automobile or vehicle involved. Where there is a specific budgetary allowance based on need to operate, or an emergency situation, he may both own and operate the motor vehicle involved. So the value of the car, on this issue and under this rule, is immaterial. Here the trial court found the applicant’s automobile to be worth one hundred dollars. Value of a possession may well be relevant on the question of in-digency, but it is not involved in the operation of the “turn over title and license” rule. Neither a junkyard clunker nor a late model car can run on air. This rule prohibits the operation of an automobile by an applicant for temporary assistance, in the absence of budgetary allowance or emergency situation, and the reason for and result of the rule have nothing to do with what such automobile might sell for at a used car lot.
*232All that the rule proscribes is the continued operation of a motor vehicle by one receiving temporary assistance where, except for emergency situations, there is no budgetary allowance for public payment of the costs of such operation. It is a condition attached to the receiving of temporary assistance, analogous to conditions such as assignment to a work project or referral to private employment or job training, upheld by this court as reasonable conditions with which recipients of public assistance must comply.4 As this court has said as to assignments for work or training: “. . . Such activity and direction by welfare authorities tends to implement the declarations set forth in sec. 49.002.” 5 Where conditions are spelled out or required by ch. 49 or reasonably related to its proper implementation, those receiving public assistance, temporary or otherwise, must comply with them.6
Is it reasonable for a county welfare board, statutorily directed to furnish relief only to all eligible dependent persons in its area, to attach as a condition to the receipt of temporary assistance the restriction that the recipient may not operate his automobile unless there is a budgetary allowance for the cost of such operation or an emergency situation exists? The writer would answer that such rule is not only reasonably related to the proper implementation of the responsibility assigned, but is *233required by the provisions of the state Public Assistance Act, ch. 49. The definition of public assistance or relief in the act is as follows in sec. 49.01 (1), Stats.:
“ ‘Relief’ means such services, commodities or money as are reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to provide food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water, medicine, medical, dental, and surgical treatment (including hospital care), optometrical services, nursing, transportation, and funeral expenses, and include wages for work relief. . . . The relief furnished, whether by money or other-wise, shall be at such times and in such amounts, as will in the discretion of the relief official or agency meet the needs of the recipient and protect the public.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The welfare agency, here the county welfare board,7 is directed to provide “transportation” for an applicant for assistance, temporary or permanent, but only where, in the discretion of the agency, it will “meet the needs of the recipient and protect the public.” Publicly provided funds may be used to provide the costs of transportation, which includes or can include the expenses of automobile operation, but they are to be provided only on a discretionary basis, considering the special needs of the recipient and with regard for protecting the public interest. The rule challenged properly refers to “specific budgetary allowance” for car operation, for the statute clearly authorizes the department, in its discretion, to make such allowance for such purpose. All the rule adds is that, except for emergency situations, the recipient of temporary assistance may not operate his automobile if no such budgetary allowance is made.
The majority opinion holds that, even where no emergency situation exists and even though no specific budgetary allowance is provided for the operation of an *234automobile, the applicant for and recipient of temporary assistance may continue to drive his automobile. Where is the money to come from for gasoline and maintenance? Obviously, with no specific budgetary allowance made, it can come only from public welfare allotments for other purposes: food, housing, clothing, light, fuel, water, medicine, etc. Money paid by the public to put cornflakes on the table and milk in the stomachs of the children will be spent to put gasoline in the tank and rubber on the wheels. Such diversion of public moneys allocated for specific purposes is not only permitted, but required, by . the majority opinion, giving the applicant for temporary welfare the right to keep on driving his car even though no funds are provided for such purpose. The wife and children may enjoy the ride with papa in the car that the majority holds he, as an applicant for temporary assistance, is entitled to continue to drive, but they will predictably return to a colder house and an emptier table for it is only from relief allowances made for essentials such as fuel, food and shelter that the money to keep the car going can come. The writer would find the rule, as punctuated and promulgated by the county welfare board, to have a reasonable basis in sound public policy, reasonably related to the proper implementation of the public assistance statute, and required by its express provisions.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join me in this dissent.
Les Femmes Savantes (1672), act II, sc. 6, the exact quote reading, “Grammar, which knows how to control even kings.” Quoted in Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations (14th ed.), page 361-b.
Memorandum, No. 72-109, promulgated January 30, 1973, by Milwaukee county board of welfare.
For definition of indigency or dependency, see: Sec. 49.01 (4), Stats. See also: Sec. 49.06 relating to equities in property, as construed and applied on question of indigency in Outagamie County v. Brooklyn (1962), 18 Wis. 2d 303, 314, 118 N. W. 2d 201.
State ex rel. Arteaga v. Silverman (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 201 N. W. 2d 538, this court holding: “. . . While a ‘dependent person’ is entitled to general relief, he may be assigned to a work project or referred to private employment or job training. . . .” and also making clear that “. . . recipients that refuse a bona fide offer of employment without good cause, or who accept and inadequately perform through ‘wilful neglect’ will be considered to have the available means of self-support and shall have their general relief discontinued. . . .”
Id. at page 118.
Id. at page 118, this court holding: “Sec. 49.002, Stats., establishes conditions, and those receiving general assistance must comply with them. . .
See. 49.02 (1), Stats., provides in part: “Every municipality shall furnish relief only to all eligible dependent persons therein .. . .” Sec. 49.51 (2) (a) provides that the Milwaukee county-department of public welfare administers the public assistance program in Milwaukee county.