concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court’s disposition of the claim against Aetna. I cannot concur, however, in the decision to reject plaintiff’s claim that the trial court should have charged the jury that violation of 21 V.S.A. § 241(b) could be considered evidence of negligence despite the absence of control of the boiler by Island. Plaintiff pled the statute and tried the case on the alternative theory that control was irrelevant. First the trial court, and now this Court, has cut the heart out of plaintiff’s case despite the fact that it is firmly based on precedents from this and other states. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
It is helpful to an understanding of this issue to know the theories of negligence involved here. They fall into two general categories.
The first category involves the safety of the boiler itself. Plaintiff argued that the boiler was unsafe for three reasons. First and foremost, it lacked a safety interlock that prevented the grate from rising when an operator had entered through an *145• observation door. This reason was supported by testimony of an expert witness. Second, the automatic coal feeder could not operate without a risk that the coal would burn outside the boiler, and, as a result, coal had to be fed manually at night. As discussed below, some of the witnesses testified that night operation by a watchman was unsafe. Third, the system that operated the grate had been separated from the furnace when the furnace was modified for low pressure operation during the 1970s. The decoupling of the systems allowed the grate to operate when the boiler coal fire was low, the condition when plaintiff entered the boiler, although it would not have operated prior to the modification. This reason is significant because arguably it allowed the grate to operate and catch plaintiff’s foot.
The second category involved the operation of the boiler. None of the operators, including plaintiff and plaintiff’s supervisor, had training in operating the boiler. Expert witnesses for both sides found it unsafe to have a person operate it alone at night, as plaintiff was doing at the time of the accident. The expert witnesses agreed that it was unsafe for an operator to enter the boiler while the fire was going. However, plaintiff’s supervisor testified that he did so and would have done exactly as plaintiff under the circumstances present at the time of the accident.
This second category requires a tie to Island if the jury is to find that it breached a duty of care. Plaintiff based his theories on the actions of Stewart Read, president and sole stockholder of Island. Mr. Read had a key to the leased premises and was present at them virtually every day. At the request of plaintiff’s supervisor, he provided books on boiler operation. He failed, however, to provide the manual for the boiler which was in his possession. Although he observed the operation of the boiler, he did nothing. Nor did he do anything when he was told the boiler was a piece of junk. He negotiated a memorandum of understanding to serve as a lease and in that memorandum attempted to place the entire responsibility of the maintenance, repair, and operation of the boiler on Railroad Salvage.
It is obvious why the control question was critical to plaintiff’s case. Despite his evidence that the boiler was unsafe, he could not establish liability under the court’s charge unless the jury found that the boiler was controlled by Island rather than *146Railroad Salvage. Similarly, his evidence about the actions of Stewart Read did not help him if the jury found that Railroad Salvage controlled the boiler. Not surprisingly, he turned to the statute, which reads:
(b) A person shall not operate, cause to be operated, or permit to be operated any boiler or pressure vessel under his control or ownership, in a manner which causes or is likely to cause harm to other persons or property.
His theory was that Island “permit[ed] to be operated [a] . . . boiler ... under [its]... ownership, in a manner which causes or is likely to cause harm to other persons or property” in violation of the statute, and this violation was evidence of negligence.
Our law is clear that “violation of a safety statute is evidence of negligence.” Gilbert v. Churchill, 127 Vt. 457, 461, 252 A.2d 528, 530 (1969). The statute on which plaintiff relies is clearly a safety statute; it governs unsafe boilers that can cause harm to persons. This is not a case, as suggested by the majority, where plaintiff is arguing for a private right of action for violation of a statute that does not provide the remedy. Nor is it a case, as suggested by the concurring opinion, where plaintiff seeks strict liability. See Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 17.6 (1977) (statute or warranty of habitability establish the duty; liability attaches only on failure to exercise due care to discharge the duty). Plaintiff’s claim is common law negligence which is breach of a duty of care. That duty may arise as here from a statute. See Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 597, 538 A.2d 157, 158 (1987).
The majority’s answer appears to be that the statute doesn’t mean what it says because it leads to an “unjust, unreasonable and absurd consequence” and because the Legislature didn’t demonstrate with sufficient clarity that it intended to change the common law. The majority’s characterization of the statute should be compared to that of a plurality of this Court in Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 222, 228, 591 A.2d 68, 72 (1991), a case decided only three months ago. The opinion said:
The trial court here properly shunned the common-law categories. As stated in a leading treatise, “it is no part of the general law of negligence to exonerate a defendant sim*147ply because the condition attributable to his negligence has passed beyond his control before it causes injury ...2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 27.16, at 1509 (1956). The New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1973 called the rule of landlord tort immunity an anomaly, manifesting “untoward favoritism” to landlords. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 391, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973). “We think that now is the time for the landlord’s limited tort immunity to be relegated to the history books where it more properly belongs.” Id. at 396, 308 A.2d at 533. We concur, and now hold that Vermont landlords too may be held liable for exposing their tenants to unreasonable risks of harm in the leased premises, whether or not they retain “control” of the dangerous condition. See id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
The statement in Favreau apparently didn’t command a majority because Justice Peck concurred in the result only and the Chief Justice and I, dissenting on other grounds, indicated that we did not have to reach the issue of the control test. Whether or not we decide to abolish the control test generally, however, the plurality was correct in saying it is largely based in history and not in modern notions of duties that underlie negligence concepts. The trend is definitely away from it. See J. Page, The Law of Premises Liability § 9.37, at 251 (2d ed. 1988). Abolition of the control test can hardly be labeled as “unjust,” “unreasonable” or “absurd.”
It is particularly ironic that the majority would use those labels in this case. A witness described the boiler as taller than the Windham superior courtroom was high and it would “probably occupy half of this [courtjroom front to back and side to side.” The landlord here had a key to the leased premises and was on the site virtually every day. He often met the on-site manager at the boiler. If there is anything unjust, unreasonable or absurd here, it is that a commercial tenant would come into possession of an unsafe piece of equipment of this size and complexity and would replace it with safe equipment or that a tenant with no assistance from the landlord, without even the operation manual in the landlord’s possession, would always be able to ensure safe operation. It is unjust and unreasonable that a landlord who observed the boiler day-in and day-out could *148claim that he had no duty with respect to it even though he was told it was a piece of junk.
Nor can I accept the majority’s second reason, that the Legislature has not spoken clearly enough to change the common law. Obviously, the Legislature can change common law doctrine if it does so in clear and unambiguous terms. See State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 306, 561 A.2d 392, 398 (1989). The statute is clear and unambiguous; I do not know what else the Legislature could have said to express its intent. See Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 18, 134 N.E. 703, 704 (1922) (Cardozo, J.) (general safety statute eliminated the control test; “Apter words could hardly have been chosen . . . .”). In unmistakable terms, the statute imposes a duty on owners to require safe operation. We cannot assume that the Legislature used the words “or ownership” for no reason. See State v. Kreth, 150 Vt. 406, 409, 553 A.2d 554, 556 (1988).
The majority’s holding here is clearly outdated. Prior to 1950, courts routinely held that safety statutes applicable to landlords did not obviate the control test. See Davis & DeLaTorre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by the Warranty of Habitability, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 141, 145 (1984). The decisions now are almost entirely to the contrary. See id. at 150-51. The decision of the majority is a throw-back, showing such adherence to the control test that it is willing to ignore a statute specifically modernizing the underlying duty of care in this area.
The reasoning of the concurrence is also at variance with the clear weight of authority in this area. The two leading cases in the area established duties of care based on statutes no more specific than § 241(b). See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (regulation required landlord to rent premises that were in “clean, safe and sanitary condition, in repair”; applied where bedroom ceiling collapsed); Leiberson, 233 N.Y. at 18, 134 N.E. at 704 (statute required apartment to “be kept in good repair”; also applied where bedroom ceiling collapsed). Most of the cases that have followed have involved statutes and regulations no more specific than § 241(b). See, e.g., Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 101, 256 A.2d 246, 253 (1969) (statute required stairs to “be maintained and kept in sound condition and good repair”); Ford v. Ja-Sin, *149420 A.2d 184, 186 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (statute requires landlord to provide “a rental unit which shall not endanger the health, welfare or safety of the tenants or occupants and is fit for the purpose for which it is expressly rented”); Jackson v. Wood, 11 Kan. App. 2d 478, 481, 726 P.2d 796, 799 (1986) (statute requires owner to “maintain [heating appliances] in good and safe working order and condition”); Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 544, 40 N.W.2d 719, 721 (1950) (statute requires owner to keep premises “in good repair”); Horvath v. Burt, 98 Nev. 186, 188 n.1, 643 P.2d 1229, 1231 n.1 (1982) (electrical wiring must be “maintained in good working order”); Paprock v. Defenbaugh, 71 Or. App. 624, 626, 693 P.2d 654, 655 (statute requires “[a]dequate heating facilities . . . maintained in good working order”), petition for review denied, 299 Or. 37, 698 P.2d 965 (1985); Boe v. Healy, 84 S.D. 155, 162 n.1, 168 N.W.2d 710, 714 n.1 (1969) (statute required boilers to be constructed and maintained so as not to “create a hazardous condition”); Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 303-04, 108 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1961) (statute required public buildings to be maintained in a “safe” condition). Further, none of our prior cases show concern about the specificity of safety statutes. See, e.g., McKale v. Weeks, 115 Vt. 155, 156, 55 A.2d 199, 200 (1947) (statute applied which requires use of “due and reasonable care” in backing an automobile). The concurring opinion misses the central point: the statute is specific on the issue here, that is, whether the landlord owed any duty with respect to the boiler. The fact that it says no more than to provide for safe operation should not be used to ignore the Legislature’s assignment of responsibility.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial against Island.