State Ex Rel. Jones v. Division Administrator, State, Division of Hearings & Appeals

*675SUNDBY, J.

(dissenting). I conclude that the language of § 302.335, Stats., clearly establishes that the time limits contained therein are mandatory. Statutory time limits may be construed as directory "if necessary to carry out the legislature's clear intent." In Interest of R.H., 147 Wis. 2d 22, 27, 433 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 150 Wis. 2d 432, 441 N.W.2d 233 (1989). I conclude from the language of the statute that the "clear intent" of the legislature is that revocation hearings must be held within the prescribed time limits. I therefore dissent.

The title of § 302.335, STATS., assists in determining the legislature's "clear intent." See Kell v. Raemisch, 190 Wis. 2d 755, 759, 528 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Ct. App. 1994). The title is: "Restrictions on detaining probationers and parolees in county or tribal jail." The restrictions are not on the probationer or parolee; they are imposed on three entities and persons: (1) the Division of Hearings and Appeals in the Department of Administration; (2) the Department of Corrections; and (3) the sheriff or jailor.

To "restrict" is to "circumscribe," "delimit," "set or mark the boundaries," "draw the line," and "set conditions or limits." J.I. Rodale, The Synonym Finder 1030 (1978).

The "restriction" as to the Department of Corrections (department) is that if a probationer or parolee is detained in a county jail, the department shall begin a preliminary revocation hearing within fifteen working days thereafter. The department may extend this deadline, for cause, by not more than five additional working days upon written notice to the probationer or parolee and the sheriff or jailor. Section 302.335(2)(a), STATS. A "directory" construction is not possible when the legislature has prescribed how a time limit may be *676extended. The department is not subject to the five-day restriction if the probationer or parolee has either admitted his or her guilt or has had that question resolved against him or her through a preliminary hearing or an adjudication of guilt by a court. Id.

There is also a restriction on the Division of Hearings and Appeals in the Department of Administration (division). A preliminary revocation hearing may be held by the department but a final revocation hearing must be conducted by the division. The purpose of requiring the final revocation hearing to be conducted before the division is to separate the adjudicatory function from the prosecutorial function.

The restriction imposed on the division is that it shall begin the hearing within fifty calendar days after the person is detained in the county jail. "The department may request the division to extend this deadline by not more than 10 additional calendar days, upon notice to the probationer or parolee, the sheriff [or jailor], and the division. The division may grant the request." Section 302.335(2)(b), STATS. Again, the legislature has prescribed how the hearing time may be extended.

The final restriction is on the sheriff or jailor. Section 302.335(3), STATS., provides: "If there is a failure to begin a hearing within the time requirements under sub. (2), the sheriff... or other person in charge of a county facility shall notify the department at least 24 hours before releasing a probationer or parolee under this subsection." This provision is meaningless if the time limit is merely directory.

Considering these restrictions leads to the conclusion that a final revocation hearing is mandatory except that the department may request the division to *677extend the deadline by not more than ten calendar days.

A probationer or parolee has only conditional liberty. However, that liberty cannot be interfered with unless the parolee or probationer has violated a "condition" which entitles the State to deprive that individual of his or her liberty. His or her liberty may not be restrained except pursuant to a due process hearing which satisfies the requirements of § 302.335, STATS.

Finally, the consequence of failure to begin a preliminary or final revocation hearing is that the sheriff must release the probationer or parolee. Section 302.335(3), Stats. Because the consequences of failure to comply with the time requirements under sub. (2) are prescribed, the time restraints for preliminary and final revocation hearings are inconsistent with a construction of § 302.335 as directory. I therefore dissent.