(concurring in part; dissenting in part). In the first sentence of its discussion, the majority casts this case in a polemical mold that confines the analysis. The majority claims:
This case presents another attempt to expand the scope of "mind science" testimony within the framework of Wisconsin's "insanity plea" bifurcated trial system.
Majority op. at 403. Now where does that leave anyone who would dare to disagree? After all, the majority seems to ask, who would ever want to open our courtroom doors to charlatans of "mind science"? Who would ever want to expand the "insanity" defense?
*450To remove this case from its polemical mold, we would do well to begin by identifying the central issue in this appeal: whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence in the first phase of Morgan's bifurcated trial that, she maintains, would have supported her theory that she was guilty of first-degree reckless homicide rather than first-degree intentional homicide.
Therefore, particularly in light of the apparent misconceptions that may be surrounding this case, we also would do well to declare what this case is not about, in contrast to its real questions:
(1) This appeal is not about whether Felicia Morgan committed a ghastly crime — she did and, on that point, there is no dispute. The question, however, is whether she committed first-degree intentional homicide or first-degree reckless homicide.
(2) This appeal is not about whether Felicia Morgan will be incarcerated for her crimes — she does not challenge the prison sentences for four counts of armed robbery, one count of attempt armed robbery, and one count of robbery. The question is whether her additional confinement will be in prison for intentional homicide, or in a mental hospital for reckless homicide if, as she maintains, she did not intend to kill at the moment she pulled the trigger.
(3) This appeal is not about whether our courts are going to be fooled by some new-fangled "urban psychosis" defense.1 The question is whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to consider evidence *451arguably related to a most traditional defense — "lack of intent."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that "ordinarily admissible evidence which tends to prove the state of mind of the defendant" is relevant to the issue of "intent" in the first phase of a bifurcated trial. Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 97-99, 294 N.W.2d 2, 14 (1980). Providing clarification five years later, the supreme court further explained "that either psychiatric testimony or lay testimony detailing the psychiatric and personal history of the defendant may be admitted, if relevant, to cast doubt upon or to prove the defendant's intent to commit the crime charged." State v. Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d 282, 303, 361 N.W.2d 705, 716 (1985).
Is PTSD evidence admissible to cast doubt upon a defendant's intent? Perhaps. As the majority acknowledges, evidence of chronic abuse is admissible on behalf of battered women to support theories of defense that would reduce or eliminate their culpability in cases where they killed their abusers. See State v. Richardson, 189 Wis. 2d 418, 423-428, 525 N.W.2d 378, 380-382 (Ct. App. 1994) (trial court erred in excluding psychologist's testimony on "battered woman's syndrome" to establish self-defense by showing defendant's behavior consistent with profile of a battered woman); State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 504-516, 329 N.W.2d 161, 170-175 (1983) (counsel was ineffective for failing to present theory to refute "intent" and support heat-of-passion defense). The majority, however, distinguishes Morgan's defense in this case from those offered by the battered women in Felton (heat of passion) and Richardson (self-defense), explaining that "Morgan has not *452shown how evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder in this case is relevant to any legislatively recognized privilege or defense in the guilt phase of her trial." Majority op. at 424 (accent added).
Is PTSD relevant to any recognized defense? As the majority concedes, PTSD evidence indeed may be relevant to "lack of intent" in the first phase of a bifurcated trial on behalf of a Vietnam veteran to counter evidence of "intent" on charges of first-degree murder. See State v. Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 401, 453 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Ct. App. 1990). How, then, can PTSD evidence be irrelevant to Morgan's "lack of intent" defense — the most fundamental of all recognized defenses?
Notably, on appeal, the State implicitly concedes this issue. With specific reference to the first phase of the trial and to Morgan's attempt to introduce expert testimony that she suffered from PTSD, the State writes:
Unless Morgan actually suffered from PTSD at the time she killed Brenda Adams, evidence pertaining to the syndrome and to her past physical and emotional trauma was not relevant to any issue in controversy.
Morgan, of course, agrees because the absolute, logical corollary to the State's concession is that if Morgan actually did suffer from PTSD at the time she killed Adams, then PTSD evidence is relevant to her intent.2
*453Thus, understandably, Morgan attempted to offer testimony from five psychiatrists who diagnosed her PTSD, and from numerous lay witnesses who would have described her life experiences that, the psychiatrists concluded, were the sources of her PTSD. See Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d at 303, 361 N.W.2d at 716 ("lay testimony" also admissible to detail the "personal history of the defendant ... to cast doubt upon . . . the defendant's intent"). Curiously, although the majority acknowledges that "Morgan sought to introduce expert and lay testimony in support of the defense theory that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder at the time of Brenda Adams's killing, 'which caused [her] to unintentionally act' at the time of the shooting," the majority then rejects precisely what Wisconsin law may allow. Majority op. at 413 (emphasis added).
The majority contradicts its own acknowledgement of Morgan's theory of defense when it claims that she offered only "the mere diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder as a 'blanket' defense" but did not do so either to refute a specific element of the offense or to support a recognized defense. Majority op. at 427. That assertion is inconsistent with the record. In the first place, as noted, Morgan offered not "the mere diagnosis" of PTSD, but rather, the diagnosis in combination with its actual causation of her actions. See majority op. at 423-424 n.16. In the second place, just as the majority had conceded earlier, Morgan attempted to offer PTSD evidence both to refute a specific element — intent, and to support a recognized defense — lack of intent. See majority op. at 413-414. In *454the terminology of Flattum, she sought to have the jury consider both psychiatric and lay testimony "detailing" her PTSD "to cast doubt upon [her] intent to commit the crimes charged." Flattum, 122 Wis. 2d at 303, 361 N.W.2d at 716. Under that language in Flattum, and as implicitly conceded by the State, the jury would have been entitled to that evidence.3
Thus, this case probes whether the trial court erred in denying Morgan a fundamental theory of defense that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has accepted on behalf of others — lack of intent based on post-traumatic stress disorder. Legally and viscerally therefore, this case also may expose a conflict between attitude and law; between denial and confrontation with our society's most grotesque reality.
If the law allows the introduction of PTSD evidence on the issue of "intent," can a court reject it nonetheless because of the attitude that such evidence, while admissible to help a jury understand the background of battered adults, is not admissible to help a jury understand the background of a ravaged child? If the grotesque reality is that rapacious, murderous violence to children in their homes and on their streets causes PTSD that, in turn, can cause trance-like traumatic flashbacks comparable to those experienced by Vietnam veterans, can a court close a jury's eyes to the connection between a child's alleged PTSD and her possible lack of "intent"?
*455Still, although the language of Steele and Flattum provides substantial support for Morgan's argument, my comments must remain tentative. Steele allowed for "ordinarily admissible evidence" on the subject of intent in the first phase. Steele at 98-99, 294 N.W.2d at 14. By what measure may we determine whether PTSD evidence is "ordinarily admissible"? Although Flattum would seem to offer added support for Morgan's argument, Flattum was not a case involving a bifurcated trial. Part of the difficulty in the analysis of this issue may derive from Flattum's awkward attempt to graft "intent" analysis from a single phase trial onto the complicated standards of a bifurcated trial. Morgan's argument also draws some strength from Coogan, but the Coogan references to PTSD evidence are somewhat incidental to what seems, at best, a cursory analysis. See Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d at 401, 453 N.W.2d at 191.
Thus, we reach a perplexing point where, largely on policy grounds, a determination is needed to define whether the Steele /Flattum language and the Richardson /Felton I Coogan implications extend beyond the specific facts and defenses of those cases to encompass the PTSD evidence/lack of intent theory. Accordingly, this issue would have been appropriate for certification to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.4
*456Regarding the issues on appeal from the responsibility phase of Morgan's trial, I would only add emphasis to the majority's important recognition of the relevancy of Dr. James Garbarino's testimony, and the majority's acknowledgement that, at times, despite what may be our disagreement with a trial court's discretionary call, we must uphold the trial court's determination under our standard of review.
I would hope, nevertheless, that judges and policymakers everywhere will become familiar with Dr. Gar-barino's extraordinary research and writing. See generally James Garbarino et al., Children in Danger: Coping with the Consequences of Community Violence (1992); James Garbarino et al., No Place to be a Child: Growing up in A War Zone (1991); James Garba-rino et al., What Children Can Tell Us About Living in Danger, 46 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 376 (1991).5 Dr. Garba-rino's work is more than "relevant." His scholarship exposes the devastation of children throughout the world, pierces the conscience of those who are able to shed denial, and motivates all who will listen, learn, and fight for the protection of children.
Although the media may have offered insightful and provocative commentary using these words, see, e.g., Peggi Taylor, Urban Psychosis: Social History As A Defense Is On The Rise, Shepherd Express, Sept. 15-22,1994, at 6; Julie Gannon Shoop, Criminal Lawyers Develop "Urban Psychosis" Defense, TRIAL, *451August 1993, at 12, the record establishes that Morgan did not pursue any theory of defense in these specific terms.
The State's concession, in my estimation, goes too far. For PTSD evidence to be relevant, a defendant would have to show not only that he or she actually suffered from PTSD at the time, but also that the PTSD caused the criminal act. In this regard, however, Morgan's offer of proof was sufficient. She attempted to offer evidence not only that she suffered from PTSD at the time of the crimes, but also that the PTSD caused a "trance-like *453state" in which "she was re-experiencing the trauma of the previous robbery" in which she had been the victim. The State did not argue and the trial court did not rule that Morgan's offer of proof was insufficient.
This also necessarily would lead to the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying the lesser-included offense instruction on first-degree reckless homicide. Obviously, if the jury concluded that because of PTSD Morgan did not intend to kill, the jury then would have had a reasonable basis for acquittal on first-degree intentional homicide and conviction on first-degree reckless homicide.
1 agree with the majority's view that the case law leads us into a labyrinth on a dead-end trail. Majority op. at 419-420 n.15. Part of the confusion, I think, comes from the failure of the case law to distinguish a person's general mental "capacity to form... criminal intent," Steele, 97 Wis. 2d at 98, 294 N.W.2d at 14, from a person's actual incapacity to form "specific intent" at the moment he or she commits a crime. The majority makes the mistake of equating these distinct conditions. See majority op. at 423-424 n.16.
See also Alex KOTLOWITZ, THEEE Are No CHILDREN HERE: The Story of Two Boys Growing Up In The Other America (1991); Gary B. Melton, Is There a Place for Children in the New World Order?, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Public Pol'y 491 (1993); Aileen M. Bigelow, Student Article, In the Ghetto: The State's Duty to Protect Inner-City Children From Violence 7, Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Public Pol'y 533 (1993).