dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, the majority’s narrow interpretation of section 17’s “sought to be adopted” language, as meaning exclusively the filing of a petition for adoption, creates untenable inconsistencies between section 17 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004)), and section 2 — 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2 — 29(2) (West 2004)), addressing parental obligations after the termination of parental rights. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993) (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act”). Second, the majority’s holding is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. The majority avoids these issues by inappropriately finding that Warner procedurally forfeited the argument. A proper analysis of section 17 requires the construction of “sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s efforts to place C.S. and B.S. with an adoptive family. Under a proper construction of the statute, Warner’s duty of support to C.S. and B.S. ended with the order terminating his parental rights and DCFS setting a goal of an adoptive placement for the children. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s analysis and result.
To begin, section 2.1 of the Adoption Act specifically mandates: “This Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987.” 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2006). The majority’s construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act conflicts with section 2 — 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. The majority acknowledges that we are required to “ ‘read the statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts.’ ” 227 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (2006). Nevertheless, the majority ignores that section 2.1 mandates that the Adoption Act be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act and, instead, declines to address this argument because it contends that Warner forfeited our review by raising pertinent sections of the Juvenile Court Act for the first time on appeal here, by not expounding on its significance to the present case, and by failing to include any termination orders in the record demonstrating that his parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 2 — 29(2). 227 Ill. 2d at 233.
The majority bypasses section 2 — 29(2) because the juvenile orders are not in the record. The record in this case indicates that the parties stipulated to the termination proceedings and orders. Those proceedings and the most recent review order were presented to the court as evidence, and the court took judicial notice of the termination proceedings.
Supreme Court Rule 321 (155 Ill. 2d R. 321) provides that “[t]he record on appeal shall consist of *** the entire original common law record ***. The common law record includes every document filed and judgment and order entered in the cause and any documentary exhibits offered and filed by any party.” Thus, under Rule 321, the juvenile proceedings offered in evidence should be part of the common law record in this case. It may have been a clerical error in omitting these orders from the record on appeal. Even though the record does not contain a copy of the orders terminating Warner’s parental rights, this court is required to take judicial notice of the juvenile proceedings.
In People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161 (1976), this court noted:
“In McCormick on Evidence, section 330, at 766 (2d ed. 1972), it is said to be ‘settled, of course, that the courts, trial and appellate, take notice of their own respective records in the present litigation, both as to matters occurring in the immediate trial, and in previous trials or hearings. The principle seemingly is equally applicable to matters of record in the proceedings in other cases in the same court, and some decisions have recognized this, but many courts still adhere to the needless requirement of formal proof, rather than informal presentation, of recorded proceedings in other suits in the same court.’ *** Taking judicial notice of matters of record in other cases in the same court is simply an application of the increasingly recognized principle that matters susceptible of judicial notice include facts ‘capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 65 Ill. 2d at 161, quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §330, at 763 (2d ed. 1972).
Here, the circuit court properly took judicial notice of the proceedings in the juvenile cases, and this court must also take judicial notice of those proceedings. Section 8 — 1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
“In case of the review by the Supreme Court of a judgment or order of the appellate court, the Supreme Court shall take judicial notice of all matters of which the circuit court was required to take judicial notice ***.” 735 ILCS 5/8— 1002 (West 2004).
Under section 8 — 1002, therefore, this court is required to take judicial notice of the termination proceedings and orders judicially noticed by the circuit court. It is improper for the majority to avoid the issue by finding that respondent has forfeited the issue.
On the issue of statutory construction, “[o]ur primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.” Barragan v. Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441 (2005). We must, therefore, consider all authorities that weigh upon the legislature’s intended meaning of section 17, regardless of whether they were specifically cited by the parties. Indeed, it would be improper to construe a statute in a manner that the legislature did not intend based merely on a party’s shortcomings in argument. This court has never confined itself to the research and argument of the parties, or even of the courts below, in affirming a correct result in the appellate court. See, e.g., People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991) (“The reasons assigned by the [court below] for its judgment are immaterial if the decision is correct. *** An appellee may raise any argument or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the judgment, even though he had not previously advanced such an argument”). Most importantly, the legislature calls on us to interpret the Adoption Act and Juvenile Court Act harmoniously. Accordingly, section 2 — 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act should be considered because it is clearly relevant to construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act.
Section 2 — 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act states:
“If a petition or motion alleges and the court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor that parental rights be terminated and the petition or motion requests that a guardian of the person be appointed and authorized to consent to the adoption of the minor, the court, with the consent of the parents, if living, or after finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of the Adoption Act, may terminate parental rights and empower the guardian of the person of the minor, in the order appointing him or her as such guardian, to appear in court where any proceedings for the adoption of the minor may at any time be pending and to consent to the adoption. Such consent is sufficient to authorize the court in the adoption proceedings to enter a proper order or judgment of adoption without further notice to, or consent by, the parents of the minor. An order so empowering the guardian to consent to adoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights as respects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility for him or her, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenance and obedience to his or her natural parents.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2— 29(2) (West 2004).
Section 2 — 29(2) specifically provides that an appointed guardian empowered to consent to adoption may give consent when an adoption “may at any time be pending.” The section’s employment of “may” and “any time” indicates the termination of parental rights accompanied by an order appointing a guardian with power to consent to adoption strips the natural parent of all rights and relieves him or her of all responsibilities toward the child even though no adoption action may be pending at that time.
The majority’s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act creates disharmony between that section and section 2 — 29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act. Both statutes address the rights and responsibilities of natural parents upon termination of parental rights. Both statutes also address a context where adoption is encouraged, either through a judicial order appointing a guardian with power to consent to an adoption at some time, or through DCFS’s promotion of an adoptive placement. Yet, under the majority’s construction of section 17, the statutes resolve natural parents’ subsequent responsibilities differently. Under the Adoption Act, the natural parent’s duty of support continues unless, fortuitously, a third party seeks an adoption. Under the Juvenile Court Act, however, the natural parent’s duty of support ends irrespective of whether any party actually seeks an adoption.
To allow this disparity invites absurdity into the overall statutory scheme surrounding the termination of parental rights. I can conceive of no reason why the legislature would treat similarly situated natural parents differently under the Adoption Act and the Juvenile Court Act. See Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 134 (2005) (“we must presume that when the legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust results”). Moreover, allowing an inconsistency between the statutes violates standard principles of statutory construction requiring us to harmonize the effect of different statutes addressing the same subject matter. See People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 133 (2006) (“Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to one another to give them harmonious effect”). Embracing a construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act that allows this disparity violates the legislature’s specific instruction to the courts to harmonize the Adoption Act with the Juvenile Court Act. See 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2004) (“This Act shall be construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987”); see also In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 61 (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act”).
To create harmony, both statutes must operate to relieve natural parents of their ongoing responsibilities when their parental rights have been terminated and when DCFS or the circuit court takes some action to promote the child’s adoption. This goal is achieved by construing “sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s seeking an adoptive placement for C.S. and B.S. In fact, the majority concedes that this construction is reasonable. 227 Ill. 2d at 230; see also Barragan, 216 Ill. 2d at 441-42 (“Where two statutes are allegedly in conflict, a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible”).
The reasonableness of this interpretation is demonstrated by the legislature’s repeated instructions to DCFS to facilitate adoptive placements, and DCFS’s extensive efforts to adhere to the legislature’s commands. See 20 ILCS 505/5(r) (West 2006) (“The Department [DCFS] shall promulgate regulations encouraging all adoption agencies to voluntarily forward to the Department or its agent names and addresses of all persons who have applied for and have been approved for adoption of a hard-to-place or handicapped child and the names of such children who have not been placed for adoption. [A list of such persons] shall be made available, without charge, to every adoption agency in the State to assist the agencies in placing such children for adoption”); 20 ILCS 505/7.1 (West 2006) (“There is created the One Church One Child Advisory Board to advise the Department [DCFS] in the placement of children by encouraging black churches to help find permanent homes for black children waiting to be adopted”); http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/ adoption/index.shtml (last visited December 12, 2007) (“The Department helps thousands of adoptable children to find a new home each year. *** DCFS provides and funds a variety of financial and non-financial benefits after adoption or guardianship, including subsidies for families who adopt waiting children or become guardians of children in DCFS care”). These legislative commands and executive undertakings by DCFS contradict the majority’s assertion that “it is clear that the state cannot seek the adoption of a child.” 227 Ill. 2d at 230. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, section 2 of the Adoption Act, requiring certain qualifications of individuals seeking to adopt, in no way undermines the fact that the state may seek to facilitate a child’s adoption. See 750 ILCS 50/2 (West 2004).
Additionally, the majority’s holding is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. Construing “sought to be adopted” to include DCFS’s efforts at facilitating adoption, and relieving a natural parent of the duty to support, is consistent with our prior holding interpreting the termination of parental rights as a bright-line event forever severing all relations between parent and child. This court has stated: “Termination of parental rights destroys the parent-child relationship. The effect of a termination of parental rights is made grimly clear by section 17 of the Adoption Act.” (Emphasis added.) In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274-75 (1990). Likewise, in In re C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d 686 (1991), the appellate court observed: “When viewed from the perspective of the child, the parent whose parental rights have been terminated no longer exists. To be blunt, the situation is as if the parent had died.” C.B., 221 Ill. App. 3d at 688. Warner, in fact, presented these persuasive authorities to us, yet the majority refuses to acknowledge that these cases support respondent’s claim that termination of his parental rights ended his parental responsibilities.
The majority’s interpretation of section 17 blurs the previous bright-line rule and creates potential practical difficulties. For example, if the filing of an adoption petition triggers the effect of section 17, what is the status of a natural parent’s obligations when a petitioner voluntarily withdraws the petition, or is found unqualified to adopt under section 2?
The majority’s interpretation of section 17 of the Adoption Act also requires us to overlook whether a residual common law duty of support remains even in the wake of the termination of parental rights. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 62 (“With the exception of the biological parents’ residual duty to support their children *** adoption constitutes a complete and permanent severance of all legal and natural rights between such parents and children”). The parties presented this issue, but the majority sidesteps it by its construction of section 17 of the Adoption Act. 227 Ill. 2d at 232-33.
I believe that we must determine this issue to avoid confusion, and we must hold that the common law residual duty to support is abrogated when section 17 applies. In reviewing the residual duty, M.M. and its predecessors all relied on Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630 (1937). The applicable section of the Adoption Act at the time of Dwyer, unlike section 17 of the current version of the Adoption Act, never addressed the duties of natural parents to their children; rather, it only removed the natural parents’ rights respecting the children and relieved the child of any duties to the natural parents. Compare 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 2004) (“After either the entry of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents”) with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 4, par. 8 (“The natural parents of a child so adopted shall be deprived, by the decree, of all legal rights, as respects the child, and the child shall be freed from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such parents”). Given this change in the statutory language, the legislature intended natural parents’ common law residual obligation of support to end with the termination of parental rights under section 17.
To conclude, I cannot concur with an interpretation of section 17 creating conflict with another statute on the same subject, when a reasonable construction exists that will both harmonize the overall statutory scheme addressing the termination of parental rights and adoptions, and acknowledge DCFS’s adoptive placement efforts. Today’s opinion is also inconsistent with prior judicial holdings on the effect of the termination of parental rights. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICES FITZGERALD and KARMEIER join in this dissent.