I respectfully dissent. The majority has cogently summarized the confused procedural developments in these two related lawsuits. I agree both that the order denying class certification in November of 1976 was appealable, and that appellant Guenter was not entitled to relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 on the ground of reasonable mistake of law. I cannot agree, however, that Guenter should be allowed to amend his complaint to add the 27 other beneficiaries of the deed of trust as named plaintiffs even though the statute of limitations has run on their causes of action.
Appellant Guenter commenced this litigation as a class action. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 382.) The California Supreme Court has repeatedly directed that in the absence of controlling state authority, our courts should utilize the procedures of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.) to ensure fairness in class action suits. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 469, fn. 7 [174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23]; LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 872 [97 Cal.Rptr. 849, 48 P.2d 1113]; Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 821 [94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964, 53 A.L.R.3d 513].) Under federal procedure, the filing of a timely class action commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently determined. (American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538, 550 [38 L.Ed.2d 713, 724, 94 S.Ct. 756].) If class action status is then denied for failure to demonstrate sufficient numerosity, the relevant statute of limitations is tolled between the commencement of the suit and the denial of certification, for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene in the surviving individual action. (Id., at pp. 552-553.) That tolling rule has been extended to cases involving denials of class certification on other grounds, such as untimeliness in seeking class certification. (McCarthy v. Kleindienst (D.C. Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 1269; see Annot. (1980) 46 A.L.R.Fed. 864.) At least one court has refused to extend that rule to putative class members *470who filed separate suits, rather than motions to intervene, after the class action was terminated and the statute of limitations had expired. (Stull v. Bayard (2d Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 429, 433.)
The result reached by the majority here is obviously inconsistent with the principles outlined above. In their complaints, both Guenter and the other beneficiaries allege the deed of trust was reconveyed without payment of the principal and interest owed to each of them. They make no allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee. Rather, they allege a conversion, i.e., an act of dominion wrongfully exerted over property inconsistent with their rights therein. (See Weiss v. Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590, 599 [124 Cal.Rptr. 297].) Actions for conversion are governed by the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision 3. (See Schneider v. Union Oil Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 987, 993 [86 Cal.Rptr. 315].) Ordinarily that statutory period begins to run from the date of the conversion, even though the injured person is ignorant of his rights. (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 561 [305 P.2d 20].)1
Accordingly, the statute of limitations on all the beneficiaries’ causes of action commenced to run on March 7, 1974, when the reconveyance occurred. When appellant Guenter’s class action complaint was filed on March 22, 1976, approximately a year remained of that statutory period. The filing of his action tolled that period until November 23, 1976, when the court denied the motion for class certification. Even if this court were to disagree with Stull v. Bayard, supra, 561 F.2d 429, and conclude that the statute was tolled for those who either moved to intervene or filed separate suits within the remaining statutory period, the 27 beneficiaries did neither. Appellant Guenter’s motion to amend his complaint was not filed until August 1979; appellants Blose and the other beneficiaries did not file their separate complaint until April 1980. Even the so-called “Association of Plaintiff” document was not filed within the year remaining of the limitations period after certification was denied.
Instead of discussing the applicability of the federal tolling doctrine, the majority relies on Jensen v. Royal Pools (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 717 [121 *471Cal.Rptr. 805] and Dhuyvetter v. City of Fresno (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 659 [168 Cal.Rptr. 61] to hold that an amendment adding new plaintiffs and relating back to appellant Guenter’s complaint should have been permitted.
I recognize that amendments to complaints have been liberally allowed to avoid the harsh result imposed by a statute of limitations. (E.g., Grudt v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575 [86 Cal.Rptr. 465, 468 P.2d 825].) As the majority admits, however, the general rule is that where an additional party plaintiff seeks to enforce an independent right or separate cause of action, the amended pleading does not relate back to preclude the bar of the statute of limitations. (Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Companies v. Colony Kitchens (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 140, 146 [128 Cal.Rptr. 893]; Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [124 Cal.Rptr. 370].) Those cases which do allow the addition of a new party by an amendment to the complaint usually involve a substitution because of a technical defect in the plaintiff’s status. (Id., at p. 534.)
Jensen v. Royal Pools, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 717, is merely an example of the latter principle. (Id., at p. 721.) An action was commenced by an unincorporated association of condominium owners; a subsequent case held that such associations had no standing to sue; an amendment relating back was permitted to substitute as plaintiffs two owners as individuals and as representatives of the class. The case does not stand for the proposition that an amendment should be permitted to add numerous new plaintiffs, each with his or her own independent cause of action, after the running of a statute of limitations.
In Dhuyvetter v. City of Fresno, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d 659, plaintiffs brought a class action against the City of Fresno for damages resulting from airplane overflights. Sixteen months after the class was decertified, plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add children residing with them as named plaintiffs. At issue was the children’s compliance with the requirements of Government Code section 900 et seq. First, the court construed the parents’ original claim against the city as substantial compliance with the claims statute with respect to the children’s claims. Relying on Jensen, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 717, the court then concluded that the amended complaint related back to the time of filing of the parents’ suit for purposes of compliance with Government Code section 945.6, which requires suit to be filed within six months after a claim is rejected. (Id., at pp. 664-666.)
Unlike the majority, I do not find Dhuyvetter to be controlling here. First and most obvious, the case is factually distinguishable. The Dhuyvetter court itself stated that the statute of limitations was not a factor (Dhuyvetter, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 666), and the real question in the case was whether there had been substantial compliance with all the requirements of the governmental claims statutes. In addition, however, even if the require*472ments of Government Code section 945.6 are viewed as analogous to a statute of limitations, the Dhuyvetter court’s reliance on Jensen seems unsound. As already discussed, Jensen illustrates only that an amendment will be allowed because of a defect in the original party’s status; it does not authorize an untimely addition of numerous new plaintiffs with separate causes of action. Finally, and perhaps most significant, I find Dhuyvetter to be questionable authority because the court failed even to acknowledge the tolling doctrine of American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. 538, despite our Supreme Court’s repeated reminders of the applicability of federal class action rules to state cases.
In effect, the majority has concluded that the mere filing of a class action lawsuit indefinitely suspends or eliminates the relevant statute of limitations for all members of the claimed class if the suit is subsequently found to be inappropriate for class action. The majority’s conclusion is both inconsistent with federal class action rules, and contrary to the fundamental policy underlying enactment of statutes of limitations. “ ‘The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ [Citation.]” (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 718 [106 Cal.Rptr. 21, 505 P.2d 213].)
Appellants Blose and the other beneficiaries had a year after the denial of class certification to pursue their causes of action against defendants. They failed to do so. I find no error in the court’s denying appellant Guenter leave to amend his complaint, and would also conclude that the Blose complaint was properly dismissed. I would affirm the judgments.
The petition of respondents Lomas & Nettleton Company and Vasil for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied May 4, 1983.
If there has been a fraudulent concealment of the existence of facts constituting a cause of action, however, the statute does not commence to run until the aggrieved party discovers or ought to have discovered the existence of the cause of action. To establish a fraudulent concealment, the complaint must show: (1) when the fraud was discovered; (2) the circumstances of its discovery; and (3) that the plaintiff was not at fault for his belated discovery, or had no actual or presumptive knowledge of the facts sufficient to put him on inquiry. “In urging lack of means of obtaining knowledge, it must be shown that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts could not have been discovered at an earlier date. [Citation.]” (Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 321 [114 Cal.Rptr. 171, 91 A.L.R.3d 981.) Neither complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment of the conversion. Although appellants now assert to this court that they did not discover the conversion until September 1975, they do not suggest that they could amend their complaints with sufficient specificity to establish fraudulent concealment.