(concurring). I agree that Judge Grady should be disciplined.
I also agree with the majority that inasmuch as it declares sec. 757.025, Stats. 1981-82, unconstitutional, it ought to adopt a rule encompassing the broad public policy decision reflected in sec. 757.025.1 Although I would have preferred to submit the formulation of a rule to the Judicial Council, where public, open deliberations by representatives of the public, the bar, the legislature, and the trial and appellate bench may be held, I am satisfied that a public hearing in November after six months’ experience with the rule may be a reasonable alternative under these circumstances. I therefore join the majority in promulgating the rule appended to the majority opinion.
I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that sec. 757.025, Stats. 1981-82, is unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.2 I cannot join the majority because it has significantly altered the historical reading of the separation of powers doctrine in this state.
*789While the majority concludes that a regulation like sec. 757.025, which is designed to promote the orderly and expeditious disposition of matters submitted to a judge, “lies within an area of authority exclusively reposed in the judicial branch of government” (emphasis added), supra, p 783, I conclude that the regulation lies within the zone of authority shared by the legislature and the judiciary.3 Although I believe that this court is better qualified than the legislature to deal with problems of delay in circuit court decision-making, this court need not claim exclusive authority to take full advantage of its superior expertise and flexibility in working toward solutions to problems of delays.3a
*790While this court should invoke the separation of powers doctrine when necessary to maintain the integrity and independence of the courts, it should hesitate to remove a matter from an area of authority shared by the legislature and the judiciary to an area exclusively reposed in the judicial branch of government. An expansive concept of exclusive judicial authority supplants the legislature’s primary constitutional power to balance competing social policies and creates the danger of unchecked power in the judiciary.4 Concurrent governmental powers afford the people greater protection: when the people perceive a need to which one branch has not been responsive, they can turn to the other branch for assistance. Concurrent governmental powers do not jeopardize the judiciary’s independence. The court remains the final arbiter of constitutionality of a legislative enactment and, as such, retains power to check any legislative enactment which unduly hinders or hampers the administration of justice.
In determining whether sec. 757.025 violates the separation of powers doctrine, the proper inquiry focuses on the following three issues:
I. Since the Wisconsin legislature has plenary legislative power to act for the general welfare — except as its *791power is expressly proscribed by the state or federal constitution or federal law — the first issue to be addressed is whether there is any such proscription on the enactment of sec. 757.025. We do not consider at this stage of the discussion the separation of powers doctrine.
Judge Grady asserts that sec. 757.025 violates article IV, section 26, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits diminution of judicial salaries. I conclude that sec. 757.025 does not constitute a diminution of salary. Even if it does, such diminution is permitted. The Wisconsin Constitution, unlike other constitutions, empowers the legislature to change judicial salaries during the term of office of the judge if the change in salary applies to all judges and the effective date of the law complies with the constitution.
II. Since the legislature is not expressly prohibited from adopting sec. 757.025, the second issue is whether sec. 757.025 falls within an area of authority within which the court may act.
Judicial power extends beyond the power to adjudicate a particular controversy and encompasses the power to regulate matters related to adjudication. It is undisputed that the constitutional grant of judicial power to this court includes the power to adopt rules regulating the time within which decisions are to be rendered. I therefore conclude that sec. 757.025 falls within an area of authority in which the court may act.
III. Since sec. 757.025 falls within an area of authority in which the legislature is not expressly prohibited from acting and in which the court may act, the third issue is whether sec. 757.025 falls within an area of exclusive judicial authority or within an area of authority shared by the legislature and court.
If a law falls within the court’s exclusive authority, this court has held that such a law is valid if this court accepts it as an aid to the court’s power; it is invalid if this court determines that the law thwarts the court’s *792power. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
If a law falls within an area of shared authority, this court has held that such a law is constitutional unless it unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the judicial branch. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 68, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1981).
I conclude that sec. 757.025 falls within an area of shared authority. This court has recognized that both the legislature and the courts have a duty under article I, section 9, of the state constitution to ensure prompt justice. Since sec. 757.025 has not proven an undue burden on the judiciary in the 25 years since its enactment, I conclude it is constitutional.
Even if I were to agree with the majority that sec. 757.025 falls within an area of authority exclusively reposed in the judicial branch, I would accept sec. 757.025 as an aid to the court’s power because it neither interferes with substantive decision-making nor sets unreasonable time limits.
I.
The legislature’s exercise of legislative power is subject only to the limitations and restraints imposed by the state constitution, the federal constitution, or federal laws. State ex rel. Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 Wis. 600, 615, 37 N.W.2d 472 (1949). The separation of powers doctrine does not necessarily prohibit the legislature from exercising its legislative policy making powers in areas that may in some way affect the judicial branch of government. State v. Holmes, supra, 106 Wis. 2d at 46; John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W. 576 (1932). The legislature adopted sec. 757.025 for the purpose of ensuring prompt resolution of litigation. There is no express federal or state constitutional prohibition or federal statutory prohibition on the legis*793lature enacting laws to ensure prompt resolution of litigation.
Clearly, the legislature has power to control judicial salaries. The constitution expressly provides that “judges shall receive such compensation as the legislature may authorize by law. . . .” Art. VII, sec. 10(2), Wis. Const.
Judge Grady challenged the pay-withholding provisions of sec. 757.025 as violating article IV, section 26, which provides as follows:
“Section 26. . . . nor shall the compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office except that when any increase or decrease provided by the legislature in the compensation of the justices of the supreme court or judges of any court of record shall become effective as to any such justice or judge, it shall be effective from such a date as to each of such justices or judges. . . .”
The majority does not decide whether sec. 757.025 violates this provision.
I am not persuaded that sec. 757.025 diminishes salary within the meaning of article IV, section 26. Sec. 757.025 does not reduce or eliminate a judge’s salary upon the judge’s failure to decide a case promptly; it merely delays payment.
I do not believe that the people intended the constitutional prohibition against diminution of salary to mean that a legislature was powerless to delay payment of salary if the judge was not performing up to minimum, reasonable, objective performance standards. Any diminution in the judge’s salary based on the difference in value of present payment versus delayed payment is de minimis. I conclude the delay of payment of salary— which the judge can avoid — does not constitute a diminution of compensation within the meaning of the state constitution.
I agree with the Judicial Conduct Panel which concluded that sec. 757.025 “does not, on its face, diminish *794the compensation of a judge of a court of record during the judge’s term of office. The statute merely places conditions on a judge drawing his or her compensation, which [condition] has not proven to be unreasonable.”
Finally, article IV, section 26, of the constitution does not bar the legislature from diminishing the compensation of a judge during the term of office. It allows the legislature to increase or diminish compensation of judges during their terms of office as long as the change in compensation applies to all judges of that court (circuit court, court of appeals, or supreme court) and the change becomes effective for any judge of that court who takes office after the change has been enacted. Thus even if sec. 757.025 is viewed as a diminution of salary, sec. 757.025 is constitutional because it applies to all circuit court judges and has been in effect as to circuit court judges since 1959.
hH
I agree with the majority that this court’s express, implied, incidental, and inherent judicial powers include the power to adopt rules regulating the time within which decisions are rendered. The state constitution vests the judicial power of this state in a unified, court system, grants this court superintending and administrative authority over all courts, and provides that the chief justice exercise this administrative authority as the administrative head of the judicial system pursuant to procedures adopted by the supreme court. Wis. Const., art. VII, secs, 2, 3, 4(3). The constitution grants the court the power to adopt measures necessary for the due administration of justice in the state.
Furthermore, article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which guarantees to each person justice “promptly and without delay,” imposes an obligation on this court “to realize as fully as possible the constitutional *795guaranty of justice administered ‘promptly and without delay.’ ” Lumbermen’s National Bank v. Corrigan, 167 Wis. 82, 86, 166 N.W. 650 (1918).5
On the basis of article I, section 9, and the judiciary article of the constitution (article VII), I conclude that sec. 757.025 falls within an area of authority within which the court may act.
III.
While the majority opinion discusses the existence of areas of shared power in which both the legislative and judicial branches may act, it does not examine whether each branch has power to regulate the time in which decisions are rendered. In a quantum leap and with no explanation, it. moves from recognizing that some areas of authority are exclusively reposed in the judicial branch to asserting that sec. 757.025 falls within such an area.
Keeping in mind the need for comity and cooperation between the branches of government as well as the need to maintain the integrity and independence of the judiciary, I conclude that sec. 757.025 falls within the area of shared powers and not within the exclusive power of the court.
The overlap of judicial and legislative powers to ensure prompt resolution of litigation arises from the court’s power to adopt measures necessary for the due administration of justice and the legislature’s power to protect the public welfare by promoting the efficient and impartial administration of justice.
Sec. 757.025 does not fall within the court’s exclusive power to decide a case. Sec. 757.025 does not usurp or interfere with the adjudicative function. It does not dictate the substantive outcome of the case. It does not apply the law to the facts of a case.
*796I recognize that the institutional independence of the judiciary must include the ability not only to decide an individual case but also to decide it in an atmosphere free from coercion or interference by another branch of government. While the requirements that an affidavit be filed and that pay be withheld if decisions are delayed beyond a prescribed time limit encourage judges to decide cases promptly, no one claims that the imposition of reasonable time limits or the delay in compensation affects the circuit court’s ability to reach a reasoned decision. Supra, p. 783. What is more, if the 90-180 day time limits in sec. 757.025 constitute coercion or interference with the circuit court’s ability to independently and ably decide the merits of a case under the law, the rule adopted today would be outside the power of this court. Cf. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 107, n. 3, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980).
Our prior cases support my conclusion that sec. 757.025 falls within the area of shared powers and is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Sec. 757.025 is not the only statute — or the first statute— establishing time limits for decision making. Sec. 757.025 has roots in the legal history of this state. As early as 1856 the Wisconsin legislature enacted statutes setting time limits within which the trial judge had to make certain decisions. See Anderson v. Eggert, 234 Wis. 348, 291 N.W. 365 (1940). This court has viewed these statutes favorably, as important provisions enacted by the legislature “for the purpose of requiring courts in the interest of sound public policy to administer justice ‘promptly and without delay’ in accordance with the constitutional mandate [of art. 1, sec. 9].” Anderson v. Eggert, supra 234 Wis. at 354.
In holding that sec. 757.025 falls within the judiciary’s exclusive authority, the majority ignores article I, section 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution and this court’s interpretation of that provision. Article I, section 9, provides that every person “ought to obtain justice *797freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This court has expressly recognized that article I, section 9, of the state constitution imposes on every officer of the state “an imperative duty which should be performed without hesitation.” Strange v. Harwood, 172 Wis. 24, 27-28, 177 N.W. 862 (1920). The declaration in article I, section 9, is not “mere rhetoric”, Strange v. Harwood, supra 172 Wis. at 27. It expresses one of the “fundamental purposes of our system of jurisprudence” and relates “to the whole scope of the administration of law.” Ward v. Racine College, 176 Wis. 168, 176, 185 N.W. 635 (1921). See also Lumbermen’s National Bank v. Corrigan, 167 Wis. 82, 86, 166 N.W. 650 (1918).
The majority’s only explanation for concluding that sec. 757.025 falls within the area of exclusively judicial authority is that “the setting of time limits for judicial decision-making concerns the efficient and effective functioning of the court system, and therefore is a matter of court administration. As such it comes within the administrative authority over all state courts which the Wisconsin Constitution vests in the Supreme Court. Art. VII, sec. 3(1) as amended in 1977. The legislature does not have the power to promulgate a rule of court administration.” Supra, p. 783.
The majority appears to say that the legislature’s lawmaking authority and the Supreme Court’s administrative authority are mutually exclusive.6 Yet the majority *798makes no attempt to delineate the boundary line between these two spheres of authority. The boundary line is not self-evident. While it is possible to view many issues concerning the efficient and effective functioning of the court system as administrative matters, labeling them administrative should not place them within the court’s exclusive power. Policy issues appropriate to legislative determination are as likely to appear in what might be labeled “administrative” areas as in other areas.7 Sec. 757.025 may also be labeled a procedural regulation, as this court has defined that term. See Estate of Delmady, 250 Wis. 389, 391, 27 N.W.2d 497 (1946). This court has frequently recognized that the legislative and judiciary share the power to regulate pleading, practice, and procedure issues that concern the efficient and effective administration of the court system. See In re E.B., 111 Wis. 2d 175, 181, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983); sec. 751.12, Stats. 1981-82.
For the reasons I have set forth, I conclude that sec. 757.025 falls within the area of shared powers in which both the legislature and judiciary may properly act.8 The next question then is whether sec. 757.025 is nevertheless unconstitutional because it materially impairs or practically defeats the circuit court’s power or the proper functioning of the judicial system.
As the majority opinion acknowledged, “aside from Judge Grady’s testimony that the statutory limit for *799deciding cases was burdensome in exceptional cases and that the statute dictated which cases should be decided first, there is no evidence that the statute establishes unreasonable time limits for judges to decide cases submitted to them or substantially interferes with the exercise of their judicial duties.” (Supra, pp 774, 775.)
Sec. 757.025, Stats., was enacted first in 1909 as to county judges9 and then in 1959 as to circuit judges.10 Except for a change in the length of the initial time period,11 it has remained substantially unchanged and uncontested for almost 25 years. While the length of time the statute has been on the books does not govern its constitutionality, the statute’s longevity does suggest that it is not an onerous regulation and has not posed difficulties for the circuit judges in the framework of their day-to-day routine, such that it “materially impairs or practically defeats the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction and power or the proper functioning of the judicial system so as to constitute a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.” State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 69, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
Even if the majority were correct in concluding that sec. 757.025 falls within the exclusive constitutional power of the judiciary, this court has recognized that “other branches or departments of government by statute, rule, or regulation may aid but not thwart the court in its exercise of the court’s [exclusive] constitutional powers.” State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961). In Dinger this court recognized the validity of a statute imposing penalties for the unlicensed practice of law. Even though the court regarded the practice of law to be within this court’s exclusive *800constitutional power, this court nevertheless concluded that the statute was valid as an aid to the court’s exercise of its exclusive constitutional power. The court also refused to invalidate a regulation allowing real estate brokers to complete purchase contract forms since it considered this regulation of the practice of law a salutary one which the court “long tacitly permitted and which has worked reasonably well.” State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, supra 14 Wis. 2d at 206.
Thus, even if the majority view as to “exclusivity” is accepted, the majority must still determine whether sec. 757.025 aids or obstructs the court in the exercise of its exclusive power. Since it is clear that sec. 757.025 does not impose unreasonable time limits, does not interfere with substantive decision-making, has worked reasonably well, and has been tacitly permitted by this court for a long time, I would think the majority should “respect” the legislature’s declaration upon this question and “adopt” the statute since it does “not embarrass the court or impair its constitutional functions.” In re Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943). As we said in Dinger, supra, 14 Wis. 2d at 206: “[Ajlthough we have the power to declare void [the Rule]... we do not use the power in this instance because we, ourselves, consider the rule a salutary one. . . .”
The majority’s decision that sec. 757.025 is unconstitutional leads to several undesirable consequences: (1) this decision impedes the legislature’s constitutional obligation to decide issues of public policy related to the administration of justice; (2) this decision relieves the legislature from its constitutional obligation to effectuate the state constitutional guarantee to each person that justice be obtained promptly and without delay; (3) this decision jeopardizes the validity of existing statutes that regulate pleading, practice, procedure and other matters which might be viewed as impinging on what this court *801has now characterized as the court’s exclusive administrative authority.
For the reasons set forth, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that sec. 757.025 is unconstitutional.
The rule, like sec. 157.0,25, requires a judge to file an affidavit and keeps the same 90 and 180 day periods. There is no withholding of salary. It is not clear that the court, unlike the legislature, has the power to withhold pay. The chief judge and the director of state courts are to assist a judge who reports delay in deciding cases. Although the “sanctions,” namely, the chief judge and the director of state courts are to assist the “overloaded judge,” the judge may be held in contempt by this court, or the director of courts may file a complaint of judicial misconduct with the Judicial Commission, preexisted the promulgation of the rule, it is perhaps useful to spell out these matters clearly in this rule.
The court has frequently said that a statute is presumed constitutional and that its invalidity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This canon is based on the separation of powers doctrine and a presumption of the good intentions and wisdom of executive and legislative officials who have also sworn to uphold the constitutions. I am not persuaded by the briefs, the majority opinion, or my own research that sec. 757.025 is unconstitutional.
The majority interprets sec. 757.025 as setting “time periods for judges to decide cases.” Supra, p. 783. For purposes of this concurring opinion I accept this characterization of sec. 757.025. I conclude that even as so interpreted sec. 757.025 is constitutional. Sec. 757.025 can be interpreted in other ways. A statute will be construed to preserve it from unconstitutionality. In re City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 155 N.W.2d 633 (1968).
Sec. 757.025 may be viewed as having two parts: The first requires the circuit judge to advise the public, via the affidavit, of the status of undecided cases. The second requires withholding of pay. The affidavit requirement is certainly constitutional under the majority’s reasoning. If the majority views the pay-withholding provision as coercive and unconstitutional, the majority should read sec. 757.025 as permitting this court to extend the 180-day period and allow for continued payment of compensation upon the petition of a circuit court judge showing good cause. Such an interpretation comports with this court’s obligation “to uphold the constitutionality of a statute whenever possible” and the court’s practice of rectifying “statutory deficiencies by court rule in order to save a statute.” State ex rel. Deisinger v. Treffert, 85 Wis. 2d 257, 268, 270 N.W.2d 402 (1978).
Although I conclude that sec. 757.025 is constitutional, I further conclude that the court may adopt a rule that if good cause is shown the court may grant an extension beyond the statutory 180 day period. Such a rule would, in my view, be wise, would be within the court’s power, and would be an example of the way the legislative and judicial branches of government act together to improve the administration of justice.
The doctrine of separation of powers is not an absolute rule but a working principle of government. It recognizes that each branch of government has exclusive functions which no other branch can perform, but that many governmental duties may be shared by one or more branches. The doctrine is applied to maintain balance between three branches of government, to preserve their respective independence and integrity, and to prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch. See, e.g., In re E.B., 111 Wis. 2d 175, 181-85, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42-45, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); Layton School of Art & Design v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 347-48, 262 N.W.2d 218 (1978); In re Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 45-46, 11 N.W. 2d 604 (1943); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932); Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 503-04, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).
See also Strange v. Harwood, 172 Wis. 24, 27-28, 177 N.W. 862 (1920); D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 294, 2B1 N.W.2d 196 (1977).
Secs. 3(1) and 4(3) oí article VII add no new power to this court. The language relating to administrative power was added to clarify the existence of this court’s administrative authority which it had claimed and exercised previously. See Martineau and Malmgren, Wisconsin Appellate Practice, 225-26 (1978). See also In re Court Rules, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); Rules Relating to the Creation of the Office of Chief Judge and the Creation of Administrative Districts for the Trial Courts, 71 Wis. 2d xiii (1975).
See ABA Committee on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Court Organization 75 (1974); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1958).
For similar reasoning see United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding federal Speedy Trial Act), and State ex rel. Emerald People’s Utility Dt. v. Joseph, 292 Ore. 357, 640 P.2d 1011 (1982) (upholding legislative command to court of appeals to hear and determine case within three months from time of taking appeal).
See eh. 19, Laws of 1909. This statute was repealed in 1945. See ch. 344, Laws of 1945.
Sec. 256.025 was adopted in 1959. Ch. 405, sec. 1, Laws of 1959. (One year period).
Ch. 253, secs. 2r, 3, Laws of 1969. (90-180 day period).