Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones,In February of 1965, Elmer J. Paienscar instituted an action. in trespass against Michael J. Bobb, Inc. (Bobb) and Best Markets, Inc., to recover damages for injuries sustained as the result of an accident which occurred on July 13, 1964. A nonjury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County re-*103suited iu a verdict against Bobb in the amount of $51,-000.1 The instant appeal is from the judgment non obstante veredicto which was entered by a court en banc, the trial judge dissenting, upon motion by Bobb.
In July of 1964, Elmer A. Palenscar (Palenscar, Sr.) and Elmer J. Palenscar (Palenscar, Jr.) were partners in an electrical contracting business.2 At this same time, Bobb was the lessee of a warehouse owned by Best Markets, Inc., and had called upon the firm of Elmer A. Palenscar and Son more than one hundred times over the previous eighteen months to do all of Bobb’s electrical work.
On July 13, 1964, it was discovered that at least part of the warehouse electrical system was inoperative, and the Palenscar firm was contacted to locate the problem and malee repairs. Palenscar, Sr., went to the warehouse and, after a brief inspection, called the Philadelphia Electric Company to have them send over a “primary man.”3 The two men checked the “primary” system, and, haring found no problems there, the Philadelphia Electric Company employee left the premises.
Palenscar, Sr., next met Mr. Leno, an employee of Bobb, and told him that the entire electrical system was obsolete and dangerous. Specifically, Leno was told that the circuit breakers had been in need of re*104pair since before Bobb leased tbe premises. Palenscar, Sr., estimated that it would cost well over $1,000 to replace the existing system, and Leno told him that, since the building was due to be condemned at any time for tbe construction of tbe Delaware Expressway, Leno preferred not to make such an investment.4
In response to a call from Palenscar, Sr., William Lawler, an employee of Beeman Electric Company, brought some electrical meters to tbe warehouse, and the two men proceeded to check tbe circuitry for tbe east side of tbe building, having first cut off tbe power to that side. Meanwhile, Palenscar, Jr., arrived with a coil of wire bis father bad requested, and proceeded to check tbe west side of tbe building. However, be did not first shut off the power for that side.
During tbe course of bis work, Palenscar, Jr., came upon one particular circuit breaker, which be believed to be tbe source of tbe problem. By this time, Palenscar, Sr., and Lawler bad found everything to be satisfactory in their half of the warehouse, and bad restored the power to tbe east side. In order to examine tbe circuit breaker, Palenscar, Jr., began removing tbe cover from tbe box which enclosed tbe breaker. Before be could finish, there was a flash of light and an explosion, as tbe result of which Palenscar, Jr., was severely burned, suffering the injuries for which be presently seeks recovery. The explosion was apparently caused by a short circuit in tbe box, a contact between two burned and disconnected wires. Tbe wiring in tbe box was generally in very poor condition, most of it more than fifty years old.
The question before this Court involves tbe propriety of tbe entry by tbe court en banc of a judgment *105n.o.v. in favor of the defendant, Bobb. In particular, we must determine whether Bobb breached any duty which was owed to Palenscar, Jr.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, §343 (1965), defines the liability of a possessor of land to an invitee, particularly with respect to “Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor,” and reads as follows: “A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.”
This portion of the Restatement has been cited numerous times by this Court as support for the proposition that “the law of Pennsylvania does not impose liability if it is reasonable for the possessor to believe that the dangerous condition would be obvious to and discovered by his invitee.” Mike v. Lebanon Miridites League, 421 Pa. 217, 220, 218 A. 2d 814, 815 (1966). It is perfectly clear under Section 343(b), as quoted above, that Bobb would have no duty to warn an invitee, such as Palenscar, Jr., of a danger which was more obvious to and more likely to be discovered by Palenscar, Jr., than by any employee of Bobb. Repyneck v. Tarantino, 415 Pa. 92, 95, 202 A. 2d 105, 107 (1964). Contrary to the terms of this section of the Restatement, it was the expectation and the intention of both the possessor and the invitee in the case at bar that the electricians would “discover or realize the danger,” and, accordingly, “protect themselves against it.” That is precisely why they were hired.
*106The record in this case supports the statement by the court en banc that “defendant knowingly maintained a faulty and dangerous electrical system in its warehouse.” Therefore, an excellent case for liability might exist if the plaintiff had been on the premises, for example, to paint the walls. See Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 81 A. 2d 910 (1951). However, the record also amply supports the finding of the court en banc that “[t]here is little doubt that plaintiff knew of the dangerous condition of the entire electrical system.”
Bobb’s electrical system was faulty and malfunctioning, and the plaintiff had been hired to locate and repair the fault, for which work he represented himself to be well qualified. It would be unjust to find that Bobb. should have repaired the system, and yet hold the company liable to one who had been employed to do exactly that. See Engle v. Reider, 366 Pa. 411, 77 A. 2d 621 (1951). “[A]s an exception to the general rule requiring the owner or occupier of premises (contractee) to furnish a safe place of work to an independent contractor and the latter’s employees, the owner or occupier is under no duty to protect them against risks arising from or intimately connected with defects of the premises . . . which the contractor has undertaken to repair.” Annot., 31 A.L.R. 2d 1375, 1381-82 (1953). Accord, Searles v. Boorse, 264 Pa. 454, 107 Atl. 838 (1919).
Palenscar, Jr., did locate the defect he was employed to repair, but he failed to take proper precautions to protect himself.
Judgment affirmed.
At trial a voluntary nonsuit was granted in favor of Best Markets, Inc.
The father, Palenscar, Sr., testified that he took care of any emergency repair work, but that he deferred to his son for the more difficult work: “Well, if it’s over my head, you know, I call the boys in. If there’s a wiring job, then they come in.”
The “primary” system carried 13,200 volts and any repairs thereto would have been the responsibility of Philadelphia Electric. Transformers were used to reduce this high voltage first to 550 volts and then to 110 volts, this portion of the wiring being the “secondary” system.
The warehouse was subsequently taken and had been demolished approximately one year before this ease went to trial.