I concur with the majority in the interpretation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450. However, I dissent from that portion of the opinion which relates to the award of attorney’s fees.
There is no question that legal aid has provided a valuable service in the instant case. This, however, in no way diminishes the fact that nothing in Welfare and Institutions Code section 109621 in any way authorizes the *385payment of attorney’s fees where legal services are provided without charge to the applicant or recipient by an organization designed for the purpose of providing free legal services to persons who canno.t afford private counsel.
An individual eligible for welfare very probably could not enforce his rights under the law if to do so he were required to pay attorney’s fees. In an effort to resolve this problem, the Legislature enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 10962.
It is not the purpose of this provision to dispense fees to attorneys without regard to whether or not those fees are owed by the indigent applicant, nor is there any indication that the Legislature intended to require payment of attorney’s fees for the purpose of punishing the state for losing its lawsuit. The Legislature in enacting section 10962 intended to provide to the applicant or recipient the means to enforce his rights under section 11450 et seq. without being subjected to the burden of raising the money necessary for the payment of legal fees. The words of the statute are clear and unambiguous. They should not be added to by this court. (People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175 [217 P.2d 1]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal.2d 907, 918 [80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33].)
The majority bases its award of fees on Trout v. Carleson, 37 Cal.App. 3d 337 [112 Cal.Rptr. 282]. The only authorities for an award to a legal services organization cited by the court in that case are State v. Carney, 172 Ohio St. 175 [15 Ohio Ops.2d 326, 174 N.E.2d 253], and Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 115 N.J. Super. 283 [279 A.2d 141]. Neither of these decisions is helpful in reaching the conclusion that an award can be made under the California statute where the applicant or the recipient has not incurred an obligation for legal fees.
In State v. Carney, supra, at page 254, the court relied on a statute which provided that “ ‘[c]ounsel assigned in a case of felony under section 2941.50 of the Revised Code shall be paid for their services by the county, and shall receive therefor: . . .’” In other words, the statute specifically mandated payment to counsel for the rendering of the prescribed services. Furthermore, counsel in that case was employed by the Legal Aid Society under an agreement to remit any fees collected to the agency funding the society. Thus, the fees awarded went to the funding agency rather than the Legal Aid Society.
*386Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, supra, involved a situation where the court assessed attorney’s fees against the husband in a divorce action stating its reasons as follows on page 142: . . I do not believe that a defendant husband against whom a judgment for divorce has been awarded in a contested case should reap the benefits of free legal representation to his wife. Nor should a husband be encouraged to litigate under the assumption no counsel fee will be adjudged in favor of the indigent plaintiff represented by Legal Services. Put in another way, the public should be relieved from the financial burden of obtaining an indigent plaintiff’s divorce or successfully defending against a husband’s complaint, to the extent that the husband is able to pay all or part of her attorney’s fee. The taxpayer has an interest in recovering where possible a portion of the costs in these situations. [f] Plaintiff is awarded a counsel fee of $100 payable to the Treasurer of the United States of America.”
In the case at bench there is no similar benefit to the taxpayers since the state taxpayers are being required to pay attorney’s fees to attorneys employed by an organization which is itself publicly financed. Again, it should be noted that in both cited cases the fees awarded went to the funding agency of the legal aid organization and not to the organization itself or to its attorneys.
In my opinion section 10962 does not authorize the payment of attorney’s fees unless the applicant or recipient legally has incurred an obligation to pay attorney’s fees. The basic purpose of publicly financed legal aid is to provide legal services to persons unable to afford the services of a private attorney. The award of attorney’s fees in the instant case is approximately $40 an hour. The amount of the award and the fact that in the instant case the efforts of legal aid have resulted in the establishment of a clear precedent regarding the special needs allowance under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11450 should encourage private attorneys to take similar cases in the future.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 24, 1974.
Section 10962 provides: “The applicant or recipient or the affected county, within one year after receiving notice of the director’s final decision, may file a petition with the superior court, under the povisions of Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for a review of the entire proceedings in the matter, upon questions of law involved in the case. Such review, if granted, shall be the exclusive remedy available to the applicant or recipient or county for review of the director’s decision. The director shall be the sole respondent in such proceedings. No filing fee shall be required for the filing of a petition pursuant to this section. Any such petition to the superior court shall be entitled to a preference in setting a date for hearing on the *385petition. No bond shall be required in the case of any petition for review, nor in any appeal therefrom. The applicant or recipient shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s ■fees and costs, if he obtains a decision in his favor.” (Italics added.)