Fancsali v. University Health Center

NEWMAN, Justice,

Concurring and Dissenting.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

I agree with the Majority that the Minority Tolling Statute applies to this case. Susan Fancsali’s cause of action accrued when she was born. The Minority Tolling Statute suspends the running of the two-year limitation period for her personal injury claim1 until she is eighteen years old. She may pursue her claim during her minority only through a guardian, but that guardian’s decision to file suit does not magically cause the suspended limitation period to begin running, nor does it rewrite history to say that the limitation period was never suspended. The two-year limitation period remains suspend*452ed, and Susan’s guardians are free to initiate, and discontinue, and reinstitute2 her minor’s action at any time during that suspension without a limitation defense being available to the Appellees. However, this does not mean that Susan’s guardians have an absolute and unfettered right to file, discontinue and reinstitute actions leaving the Appellees without recourse while they anxiously wait for the extended statute of limitations to run. Rule 229 provides:

(a) A discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff before the commencement of the trial.
(b) A discontinuance may not be entered as to less than all defendants except upon the written consent of all parties or leave of court after notice to all parties.
(c) The court, upon petition and after notice, may strike off a discontinuance order to protect the rights of any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense or prejudice.

Furthermore, Pa.R.C.P.2039(a) provides:

(a) No action to which a minor is a party shall be compromised, settled or discontinued except after approval by the court pursuant to a petition presented by the guardian of the minor.

Therefore, the control over discontinuance of a minor’s action pursuant to Rule 2039(a),3 and the general provisions of Rule 229(c), provide a basis for the court to hold a hearing on the issue of prejudice to the defendant. The power of the court to prohibit a voluntary discontinuance of an action without prejudice to refile is separate and distinct from the question of *453whether the plaintiff remains within the applicable limitation period.

I view the enactment of the Minority Tolling Statute as a legislative decision to extend the limitation period for all minors for the duration of their minority, which leaves all tortfeasors who have harmed children potentially liable to a lawsuit until that child attains his or her majority. Accordingly, the legislature has determined that it is not unfair to defendants that they may be sued twenty years after an accident occurred and not have a limitation defense available to them. Therefore, when a guardian files the minor’s action soon after the cause of action accrues and then decides voluntarily to discontinue that lawsuit, the defendant cannot claim prejudice merely because the suit can be refiled many years later with no limitation defense available to him or her. He or she may be in no worse a position, with respect to the passage of time, than if no minor’s action had been filed but the child institutes his or her own action when he or she is no longer a minor.

However, this does not mean that the defendant is precluded from seeking relief. If there are circumstances involved in his or her long-term susceptibility to suit, the trial court should consider this when deciding whether to allow a discontinuance with prejudice. In the similar situation of a motion for non pros due to docket inactivity, Jacobs v. Halloran, 551 Pa. 350, 710 A.2d 1098 (1998), this Court held that prejudice to a defendant will not be presumed. However, if a plaintiff fails to proceed promptly, offers no compelling reason for the delay, and the delay causes prejudice to the defendant, non pros may be entered. The determination of actual prejudice should focus on the conduct of the parties, as specifically set forth below in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

It is my belief that when we read the Minority Tolling Statute in conjunction with the relevant Rules of Civil Procedure, prejudice to defendants is important in deciding whether to discontinue an action with or without prejudice. I therefore disagree with the Majority that it was necessarily an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider the effect that being *454susceptible to suit until July of 2012 would have on the Appellees. Accordingly, I would remand this matter for the trial court to evaluate whether the Appellees have suffered any actual prejudice. The determination of prejudice should focus on the conduct of the parties, such as: (1) the extent to which discovery has proceeded; (2) the expenses already incurred by the defendants; (3) how many times the plaintiffs have filed and then discontinued the litigation; (4) any hardship to the defendants by postponement of the litigation; (5) whether important evidence or testimony may be lost if the action is put in abeyance; (6) whether the guardians made a good-faith effort to advance the litigation after filing suit; and (7) whether the guardians have provided sufficient reasons why they wish to discontinue the litigation without prejudice.4

Accordingly, I dissent from the portion of the Majority’s Opinion that directs the trial court to grant the Petition for Leave to Discontinue a Minor’s Action.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).

. There is another example to illustrate this point: a person to whom a cause of action accrues that is governed by a six-year limitation period may file suit two years after the accrual date, voluntarily discontinue the suit without prejudice, refile the action a year later, then again discontinue without prejudice, and refile the action again a year later— all without the risk of facing a limitation defense. Cf. Haefner v. Sprague, 343 Pa.Super. 342, 494 A.2d 1115 (1985) (although first action dismissed on procedural grounds, second action permitted because still within limitation period).

. The Minority Tolling Statute makes no mention of the right of the guardian to withdraw and reinstitute the action of the minor.

. In the present case, the Fancsalis apparently sought a discontinuance because they could not afford to pay the experts who would be necessaiy to prove proximate causation. It would not be inappropriate, under those circumstances, for the trial court to probe the veracity of that claim by inquiring into the financial arrangements between the Fancsalis and their attorneys and whether they could have made a contingent fee agreement where counsel would have paid costs. Such arrangements are customary between plaintiffs’ attorneys and their clients.