dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for cruelty to animals. I do not believe that the record supports a conclusion that Appellant’s action was cruel conduct to animals or that Appellant acted wantonly or cruelly.
¶ 2 The criminal statute at issue reads as follows:
Cruelty to animals. — A person commits a summary offense if he wantonly or cruelly illtreats, overloads, beats, otherwise abuses any animal, or neglects any animal as to which he has a duty of care, whether belonging to himself or otherwise, or abandons any animal, or deprives any animal of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter or veterinary care, or access to clean and sanitary shelter which will protect the animal against inclement weather and preserve the animal’s body heat and keep it dry. This subsection shall not apply to activity undertaken in normal agricultural operation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(c).
¶ 3 When construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record reveals that Humane Society Officer McGown arrived at Appellant’s house at approximately 3:40 p.m. and found Appellant’s dog tied to a chair on the front porch. Food and water were on the porch. The dog had become entangled in its own leash so that the dog could not reach the available food or water. Also, the dog could have choked if it had attempted to reach the food or water. The officer untangled the leash and placed the food and *605water closer to the dog. At approximately 10:40 p.m. that evening, Officer McGown drove past the house and observed that the dog was tied to the chair, but “was not tangled to where it couldn’t reach the water.” N.T., 1/27/2000, at 7. Appellant was not home at 3:40 p.m. or at 10:40 p.m.
¶ 4 First, I am unsure which aspect of subsection 5511(c) Appellant is alleged to have violated. If Appellant is guilty of neglecting or abandoning her dog, then such should be specifically addressed. It appears that Appellant was found guilty of depriving her dog of necessary sustenance or drink because the dog could not reach the food and water after it became tangled in the leash.
¶ 5 The record does reflect that Appellant provided her pet with food and drink throughout the entire day in question. The record reflects no claim that her leashing of the dog was cruel. Is the condemned conduct one of omission, ie., that Appellant failed to foresee the risk that the dog would become tangled in the leash and not be able, one point in the day, to reach the food and drink? And, if so, what should Appellant have done? Leash the dog with a shorter leash?
¶ 6 Pets are often leashed to an object during the absence of an owner. This is done to prevent the pet from freely running through the neighborhood. The leashing often permits the pet some space to move around. Otherwise, the pet may strain unreasonably at the neck because it wants or needs to move. The risk of allowing some movement is that the pet may become tangled in the leash and be unable to reach to places like the location of food and water. The risk of a tight leashing is to permit such little movement that the pet may hurt itself as it strains to move. Who can reasonably say one method or the other is cruel and wanton? It appears that both are reasonable methods of leashing a pet dog in light of certain risks. Thus, I believe that the record fails to reflect conduct that constitutes a violation of the statute.3
¶ 7 Second, I address the intent element. The statute appears to require a demonstration of “wantonness” or “cruelty.” The majority cites, and I have found, no case law indicating the requisite mental state under this subsection. Here, Appellant placed food and water on the front porch for her dog. This fact suggests that Appellant took steps to care for her pet. Her pet became entangled in its leash and could not reach its food and water at 3:40 p.m.
¶ 8 Even if the requisite mental state is recklessness,- such a mental state is not borne out by the record. At worst, it would appear that Appellant was negligent (and not criminally negligent) for failing to anticipate the fact that her dog could become entangled and unable to reach the nourishment that she had provided.
¶ 9 I deplore cruelty to animals. This is not a case where the owner intentionally beat her dog or intentionally neglected to provide food or drink for her dog. Rather, it is a case where a common incident, ie., a pet becoming entangled in its own leash, is used to criminalize conduct that was negligent at best. I am constrained to conclude that the record fails to establish that Ap*606pellant committed such a crime. As such, I respectfully dissent. .
. The record also fails to reflect that the dog suffered harm. The focus of the statute appears to be on the abuse of animals. This abuse can be shown where an animal is ill treated, neglected, abandoned or deprived of food and drink.
Here, the record reveals that at one point in time (3:40 p.m.), Appellant’s dog could not reach food or water because he was tangled in his leash. The Commonwealth did not, however, establish that the dog was dehydrated or starving or that Appellant deprived the dog of food or drink for any particular length of time. Indeed, when Officer McGown arrived at Appellant’s home at 10:40 p.m., the dog had access to water. Officer McGown did not testify as to whether food was accessible. In other words, with the exception of the 3:40 p.m. incident, no evidence of record existed that the dog lacked access to food or water for any appreciable time. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the pet suffered harm.