I dissent.
Roscoe Pound once wrote, “To justify an elaborate dissenting opinion the question of law .should be one of at least considerable importance.” (Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent (1953) 39 A.B.A.J. 794.) This case presents but an application of existing law to a particular factual situation.1 Since it does not present any question of law of importance, I shall attempt to keep my discussion brief.
My disagreement with the majority is on a rather simple issue—the scope of appellate review. As I understand the rule, if the evidence is without conflict and the decision depends on inferences therefrom, this court is not at liberty to draw its own inferences and decide a case the way we think it should be decided. Where different inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidence, the conclusions of the trial judge must be accepted by this court. In this case there is no dispute as to the basic facts. From them the trial judge drew reasonable inferences which were favorable to the respondent. The majority simply disagrees with these inferences, calls them a “question of law” and comes to a contrary conclusion. In so doing, I respectfully submit that the majority has simply retried the case—a luxury not afforded this court under our judicial system. Unfortunately, this is a rather common practice which is being used increasingly by result-oriented reviewing courts.
Unless we start with the assumption that all land development is “bad,” there is really nothing very startling about the chronology of events outlined in this case. Even before the Coastal Act, building practices had become quite sophisticated and complicated. No longer does the builder simply go to the city hall with his plans and specifications, have them stamped “approved” and begin building. Building today is a long, involved, drawn out process. Yet the majority read the passage of events- in this case into a headlong dash to beat the target date of the Coastal Act.
*553Sometime prior to 1970, plans had been made for a 64-unit apartment house on the property in dispute. These were approved and, prior to Aries’ purchase of the land, Aries was advised that they could proceed to construct the apartment house. Obviously, they now wish they had—and a 64-unit apartment house would now be standing on the disputed land. However, in July 1972, Aries began to consider the possibility of reducing the density from 64 to 45 units and developing the property for condominium purposes. This apparently met with the enthusiastic approval of the City. Therefore, in October 1972, Aries purchased the land for $225,000 of which purchase price $80,000 represented architectural and engineering plans for the apartment house. At that point, $80,000 went down the drain but this was a calculated decision by Aries who assumed that they were going to be able to go ahead with the condominium concept. Thereafter, the chronology set forth in the majority opinion followed and the end result was that as of November 8, 1972, Aries had made expenditures and incurred liabilities of over $353,000, and as of February 1, 1973, the total" amount was over $470,000.2
The point of these observations is that this is no trifling matter from a fiscal standpoint. Aries may be a land developer and a soulless corporation, but its stockholders have lost a lot of money—all expended, the trial court found, in a good faith effort to develop this land with the full approval of the City of San Clemente—and stopped improperly by the Coastal Commission. The trial court found that prior to November 8, 1972, Aries, in good faith and in justifiable reliance on the approvals and permits from the City, had diligently commenced construction of the development, performed substantial lawful work thereon, and incurred substantial expenses and liabilities for the work and materials necessary for construction, and that as of February 1, 1973, Aries had commenced and performed substantial lawful construction on the development. From this, the trial court concluded that pursuant to sections 27400 and 27404 of the Public Resources Code, and, additionally, pursuant to constitutional and common law principles of vested rights, Aries’ development was exempt from the permit requirements of the Coastal Act.
*554I shall not attempt to go through the whole majority opinion and take issue with each of the conclusions reached therein. However, a few brief comments will suffice.
(1) The environmental impact report.
At the November 1, 1972 meeting, the City council did approve Aries’ tentative tract map. It is true that at that meeting the City adopted a resolution requiring EIRs on all projects within the City. However, it must be remembered that on October 2, an EIR was submitted to the City planning commission even though there was no City ordinance calling for such a study and on October 25 that EIR was accepted by that body. Then after approving the tentative tract map on November 1, 1972, the City council approved the EIR on November 15, 1972. I find the majority’s removal of this situation from section 21169 of the Public Resources Code strained and an exaltation of form over substance.
(2) Good faith.
The trial judge found good faith—the majority, apparently as a matter of law, finds bad faith. The majority finds that Aries “speeded up its timetable in a calculated effort to escape impending state land-use controls,” because on the “very day” Aries received its grading permit it incurred a liability of $28,300 for grading work and commenced work promptly. This, according to the majority, amounts to “unseemly haste.” Certainly, Aries was in a hurry. They were obligated on a construction loan of $1,778,082. For months they had worked diligently with the City ironing out the wrinkles in an effort to get this operation off the ground. Simple business prudence dictated that the development proceed as expeditiously as possible. As Aries states, if their only concern was beating the deadline of Proposition 20, it could have proceeded on the previously approved plans for the 64-unit apartment.
In words of one syllable, on uncontradicted facts the trial judge drew an inference of good faith. On the same facts, this court now draws an inference of bad faith. This, I submit, we are not at liberty to do.
(3) The performance of substantial work and the incurrence of substantial liabilities.
It is true that of the total of $353,912 expended before November 8, 1972, most was spent for land purchase, architectural, engineering and *555other planning expenses, demolition of the existing structure and rough grading. All of these activities were completed before November 1. However, I think that labeling them as “irrelevant” is a trifle harsh. This was all part of an ongoing program aimed at developing the property. It is true that these expenditures “could not have been undertaken in reliance on a final discretionary governmental approval yet to be obtained.” Nevertheless, I do not think we should just disregard them and label them as being irrelevant. They exist, they are part of the overall picture.
The “only” expenditure or liability incurred before November 8 in reliance on a final discretionary governmental approval was the $28,300 laid out for grading. This was the “only” item because that was the “only” item in Aries’ timetable of construction which fell due during that particular period. This was an expenditure which was vital to the overall development and I cannot join in a finding that it was insubstantial as a matter of law. The trial judge took a more realistic view and evaluated the grading job in its entirety. I note that the grading job, when it was finally completed on November 14, was for a total cost of $65,000. The majority complains that this grading was done in excess of the permit. Perhaps so, but the City engineer said that Aries “did in good faith proceed with the grading.” The trial judge so found. Under applicable rules of appellate review, I cannot argue with that finding.
(4) The See the Sea exemption.
Here, we advance the target date to February 1, 1973. As of that time the existing structure had been demolished, lawful grading completed and limited grading for the parking structure completed. The majority finds that since the demolition and rough grading were merely “preparatory” and the work done on the grading permit for the parking structure “insubstantial as a matter of law,” this exemption is not available. But what actually happened?
Prior to February 1, Aries had submitted and approved a tentative tract map, had received a use permit, a demolition permit, a rough grading permit, a final grading permit, an approval of an EIR and a building permit for the entire development. A home of the approximate value of $60,000 had been demolished. The entire property had been cleared and rough graded, a hole for the parking structure excavated and 20,000 yards of dirt removed and exported. Eighty percent of the dirt on the site was removed and replaced to satisfy soils engineering require*556ments and to stabilize the site pursuant to the design of the proposed building. Subsurface draining facilities were installed to release any potential ground water and subcharge pressures as requested by the City of San Clemente. Shoring for a 20-foot-high cut to retain the street and protect contiguous property was installed, and the main gas line and water and power facilities were relocated. All of the above had been performed pursuant to various permits and other governmental approvals.
The trial court found that this was lawful construction and from all of the above drew the reasonable inference that substantial lawful construction on the Aries’ project had commenced by February 1, 1973. Again, under applicable rules of appellate review, I cannot argue with that inference.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 18, 1975, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 23, 1975. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
This particular factual situation—the position of those developing land on the California shoreline at the time of the enactment of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972—was a matter of considerable import three years ago. Now, except for a few cases laboriously working their way through the appellate process, this is a dead issue.
For their efforts Aries now has a piece of land with a hole in it. This land originally cost $225,000 but of that cost $80,000 was for architectural and engineering plans. A $60,000 home had been demolished. So by my primitive arithmetic for their $470,000 expenditure, Aries now have a lot which would be worth about $85,000 without the hole in it.