dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the language of Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 20 is “clear and unambiguous” and “means precisely what it says: no person shall be discriminated against in regard to housing because of that person’s marital status.” I further agree with the majority that the term “marital status” “connotes whether one is married or not married.”
Here the record shows that under the applicable contractual covenant, C. Lynn Kuhr (Kuhr), a female, was entitled, without Greenbelt approval, to reside in a Greenbelt housing unit with Richard Searight (Searight), a male, if she was married to him. Kuhr, however, was not entitled, without Greenbelt approval, to reside in a Greenbelt housing unit with Searight if she was not married to him. Manifestly, under the applicable contractual covenant, Ruhr’s right to reside in a Greenbelt housing unit with Searight depended upon whether she was “married or not married” and, therefore, depended upon her “marital status.”
In sum, Kuhr was prohibited by the applicable contractual covenant from residing in a Greenbelt housing unit with Searight because she was “not married” or, in other words, “single.” In my view, she was “discriminated against with regard to housing because of her marital status.” See, e.g., Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 234, 187 Cal.Rptr. 712, 714 (1st Dist.1982); Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, 59 Cal. App.3d 89, 99, 130 Cal.Rptr. 375, 381 (5th Dist.1976); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 405, 301 A.2d 754, 757 (1973); Loveland v. Leslie, 21 Wash.App. 84, 87, 583 P.2d 664, 666 (Div. 1, 1978). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.