(dissenting).
I concur with the majority on the issue of personal jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent on the issue of an action for interference with custodial rights and would affirm the court of appeals. The majority’s emphasis on limited aspects of the case ignores those facets involving elemental fairness and honoring a custodial order.
Public Policy:
In analyzing the important public policies raised by this case, we should consider, inter alia, the following factors: a.) respect for unappealed court orders regarding custody; b.) a recognized need for compensation; c.) historical developments in related tort law; d.) the moral aspects of the defendant’s conduct; and e.) the prevention and punishment aspects of liability. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, at 20-26 (5th ed.1984). Larson was deprived of his parental rights for seven years in clear violation of the custody decree. Similarly, Jessica was denied the right to a relationship *48with her father during a critical stage in her development. Although this precious lost time can never be regained, some form of redress undoubtedly is in order.
Tort law long has protected “relational” interests, such as between family members, from interference. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 915; see, e.g., In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548 (1964); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (holding child could bring action for enticement of parent). In 1978, however, our legislature abolished alienation of affection and other “heart balm” actions because they “have been subject to grave abuses.” Act of March 23, 1978, ch. 515, §§ 1, 2, 1978 Minn.Laws 141, 141, codified at Minn.Stat. §§ 553.01; 553.02 (1988); see Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn.1979) (refusing to recognize a cause of action by a parent against relatives for alienation of a child’s affections). These limitations are distinguishable because, with the custody tort, “the interference with family relations is accomplished by means of some independent tort, such as fraud * * *.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 930; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699 (1977) (“Restatement”) (parent has no action for mere alienation of child’s affections). Indeed, Larson also pleaded fraud as a cause of action and, in support of the interference action, claims the Ri-genhagens and Olson gave fraudulent information to authorities and in court documents.
This litigation has precipitated bitter accusations and contradictory affidavits. Unfortunately, such personal disputes are common today and the parent-child relationship is increasingly threatened by family members. Cf Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn.1980) (abolishing parent-child immunity). Child abduction has become a recurring scenario on the family law landscape, and such situations, where the parties’ actions are motivated by runaway emotions, have evolved into a disturbing social trend. Indeed, about 100,000 to 750,000 parental child kidnappings occur each year, and the abducting parent often is aided by relatives and friends. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 754 (citing authority). The Rigenhagens argue tort liability will have little deterrent effect where, as here, the alleged interferers believe their actions were “morally right.” Loree Dunn, however, neither appealed the custody order nor petitioned for a change of custody, as is required once custody has been established, Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Minn.1985), but instead fled the state with Jessica. The custody decree vests the custodial parent with certain rights, including the right to determine the child’s upbringing, education, health care, and religious training. Minn.Stat. §§ 518.003, subd. 3(a); 518.176, subd. 1 (1988). These rights should be legally protected against intentional interference. See Minn. Const, art. 1, § 8 (everyone entitled to remedy for wrongs to “person, property or character”). No party is above the law and resort to such self-help measures is not justified.
As the majority notes, the legal system may not be the best arena to settle personal, family disputes. Yet, the familial relationships were already wounded by the divorce and kidnapping before this action was brought. Depriving the victimized parent of a forum for redress, then, will not necessarily promote the family’s healing. Further, a parent’s right to custody has been likened to a constitutional inalienable right. State v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 547-48, 75 N.W.2d 786, 794 (1956). Not only is the conduct alleged in violation of this right particularly egregious, but it was done in arrogant defiance of the sanctity of court orders. The majority does not indicate how best interests of the child are served by condoning this type of activity.
State legislatures have responded to this crisis by enacting the UCCJ, designed to prevent kidnapping aimed at forum shopping in hopes of gaining custody of the child. See Minn.Stat. § 518A.01 (1988). Redress also has been initiated at the federal level. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (West 1976 & Supp.1989) (criminal penalty for parental kidnapping). Under Minnesota’s current criminal code, to which Dunn *49apparently pleaded guilty, it is a felony to intentionally deprive another of custodial or parental rights. Minn.Stat. § 609.26 (1988 & Supp.1989). The statute, however, only provides for a discretionary award of costs incurred in recovering the child and does not allow compensation for other damages resulting from the kidnapping. Id. at subd. 4. This court, however, is in a position to fill the gaps left by the laws in this area. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 3, at 19.
The judiciary has broad discretion to protect custodial and visitation rights. See Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (custodial parent may not move child out-state if intent is to interfere with visitation rights) & subd. 4 (contempt of court for unwarranted denial of or interference with visitation rights) (1988); id. at § 518.176 (judicial supervision of custody and visitation terms); see, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn.1982) (approving requirement that noncustodial parent post bond and provide transportation for adult companion to secure return of child to custodial parent after foreign visits), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 1426, 75 L.Ed.2d 787 (1983). By limiting the frequency and circumstances under which custodial modification may be made, the legislature acknowledges the importance of maintaining a consistent and stable custody situation. See Minn.Stat. § 518.18 (1988). The fact that alienation of affection actions are not viable does not “diminish[ ] other remedies for interference with familial relationships * * Bock, 278 N.W.2d at 328. Indeed, liability for custodial interference appears to be the national trend. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 755 n. 3 & 4.1 The unifying thread running through these cases is the tacit recognition that a parent has an enforceable interest in the care and custody of a minor child.
Scope of Liability:
Section 700 of the Restatement delineates the parameters of the custody tort:
One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 (1977); see, e.g., Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 756; see generally Prosser & Keeton, supra at 925. Because parents generally have an equal right of access to their children, maintenance of an interference action has been limited to parents entitled to sole physical custody under a court decree, as Larson is. See Restatement § 700 comment c.
To be actionable, the alleged conduct must be intentional, that is, the interference must be done with knowledge, as the Rigenhagens admit, “that the child is away from home against the will of the parent.” Restatement § 700 comment b; but see Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 139-41, 706 P.2d 21, 29 (1985) (civil rights action allowed on negligence theory against police officer for aiding in child’s abduction). Of course, any consent by the child is immaterial. Restatement § 700 comment a. Because knowledge of the lack of parental consent is the focus, the actor’s “motive or *50purpose in preventing the child from returning home or inducing it not to return, is immaterial.” Id. at comment b. Accordingly, the Rigenhagens’ claims that they acted “out of love for their daughter and their granddaughter * * * [and] sought no gain nor sought to inflict damage on others” are irrelevant to the issue of whether Larson has established a prima facie case.
Under the Restatement, any actor with the requisite intent may be liable. Cf. Minn.Stat. § 609.26 (anyone who commits prohibited acts may be charged with kidnapping). Extended family members and even third parties have been held liable for assisting the noncustodial parent. See, e.g., Lloyd, 539 F.Supp. at 998 (grandparents); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 787, 562 P.2d 540, 543-44 (1977) (attorney). Liability is contemplated not only for physically taking the child, but for such conduct as “providing the means by which the child was carried off.” Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 925. The key is how active the participation was. Compare McEvoy, 211 Or. at 787, 562 P.2d at 543-44 (attorney who wrongfully provided passports for escape liable), with Finn v. Lipman, 526 A.2d 1380, 1382-83 (Me.1987) (no contact with children and no affirmative acts alleged so attorney not liable).
In addition to the alleged affirmative acts of interference by the Rigenhagens, however, Larson also impliedly claims the Rigenhagens’ and Olson’s failure to give correct information about Jessica’s and Lo-ree’s whereabouts delayed their recovery, aggravating his emotional and financial harm. Whether such conduct can give rise to liability is a more complicated issue. The Larson panel held:
Mere knowledge of the abduction scheme or of the location of the child and a failure to come forward is not enough to incur liability, absent some special status which would impose a duty on the defendant to come forward with the information. * * * A simple untruthful denial to police and others that the defendant knew where the child was is not enough to incur liability, nor is refusal to cooperate with an investigation necessarily actionable. A lie that goes beyond mere denial, however, may result in liability.
449 N.W.2d at 758.
The tort assumes a duty owed by third parties not to interfere with the custodial parent’s rights vested by the custody decree. See Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 758; Surina v. Lucey, 168 Cal.App.3d 539, 543, 214 Cal.Rptr. 509, 512 (1985). This duty also has been implied through criminal parental kidnapping and abduction statutes. E.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F.Supp. 998, 1004 (E.D.Wis.), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.1982); Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So.2d 200, 202 (La.Ct.App.1979); see Minn.Stat. § 609.26, subd. 7 (reporting duty for kidnapping); but cf. Minn.Stat. § 609.495, subd. 2 (1988) (prosecution for harboring felon exempted for relative of offender). Nonetheless, due to potential proof problems and policy concerns of foreseeability and notice, we should be reluctant to impose liability for mere failure to inform. Thus, Olson would not, without more, fall within this tort’s ambit. Further discovery, however, may disclose a more active role on his part which could give rise to liability.
The Restatement posits two “privileges,” whereby liability will not attach “for rescuing a child from physical violence inflicted by its parent * * * [and] inducing a child to leave its home for the purpose of marrying the actor.” Restatement § 700 comments e & f; cf. Minn.Stat. § 609.26, subd. 2 (defenses to parental kidnapping include to protect “child from physical or sexual assault or substantial emotional harm”). The Rigenhagens claim they acted to protect their grandchild, believing Loree’s claims that Larson physically and sexually abused Jessica. Whether this belief was reasonable and whether the actions were taken in good faith on behalf of the child would be issues for determination by the trier of fact.
Damages:
Larson claims he “has suffered severe mental anguish and suffering, the loss of the society and companionship of his daughter, and has incurred out-of-pocket expenses for locating and recovering the *51custody of his daughter * * * in a sum in excess of $50,000.” The complaint also alleges damages in excess of $50,000 for Jessica’s loss of her father’s companionship during their separation. Consistent with the Restatement, the Larson panel held the following types of damages to be recoverable under the custody tort: lost society, emotional distress, lost services, and expenses incurred in regaining custody and in treating the child for injuries resulting from defendant’s tortious conduct. 449 N.W.2d at 757-58; Restatement § 700 comment g. Punitive damages also have been awarded under certain facts. See, e.g., Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364, 369-70 (Mo.App.1982) (conspiracy theory; punitive damages awarded); Lloyd, 539 F.Supp. at 1005 (punitive damages escalating monthly until child returned).
The financial harm suffered by the victimized parent is evidenced by the over $50,000 in costs Larson claims he expended during the seven year search for Jessica, including loss of time, travel expenses, attorney fees and private investigator fees. Although our parental kidnapping statute expresses the policy that such costs be born by the wrongdoer, Minn.Stat. § 609.26, subd. 4, this provision is discretionary and Larson’s motion for such costs apparently was denied by the trial court in the criminal action. These expenses also are recoverable under the theory they were “incurred in the successful enforcement of a prior custody decree.” Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 757. Thus, to the extent such costs have not been recovered under the statute, they should be available in a civil action.
Consortium damages include “[l]oss of love, care, society, companionship, and, in the case of a spouse, sexual relations[,]” as well as loss of services. Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn.1982). While not claimed here, the loss of a child’s services is compensable under the Restatement, § 700 comment g, and generally under Minnesota case law. See, e.g., Eichten v. Central Minnesota Coop. Power Ass’n, 224 Minn. 180, 195, 28 N.W.2d 862, 871 (1947); 10 Minn.Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice, CIVILJIG 175 (2d ed. 1985). Loss of services, historically an essential element of consortium damages, however, is not required or is constructively found in an action where the child has been taken from the parents. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 924-25; Restatement § 700 comment d.
We have expressly prohibited recovery by minor children for loss of parental consortium resulting from the negligence of third parties. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 738 (negligently inflicted physical injuries to parents); Plain v. Plain, 307 Minn. 399, 403, 240 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1976) (mother negligently injures self); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 379, 263 N.W. 154, 155 (1935) (negligently caused physical injuries to father). The sound policies underlying such a limitation, however, are inapplicable when the damages stem from intentional harm to the parent-child relationship. Even the Salin court was “keenly aware of the need of children for the love, society, companionship, and guidance of their parents; any injury that diminishes the ability of a parent to meet these needs is clearly a family tragedy and harms all members of that community.” 322 N.W.2d at 742. Parents have similar rights flowing from the family relationship. Persuasive on this point is the earlier holding that a child may recover for enticement of its parent, just as the parent may bring such an action. Miller, 228 Minn, at 409, 37 N.W.2d at 548-49. Further support is found by analogy to employment and contractual relations which are protected from intentional interference. 228 Minn, at 411, 37 N.W.2d at 549. Surely, the interests of parent and child are as strong and the harm suffered from interference to their relationship as great as in these nonfamilial contexts. Common law consists “of broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason, and common sense * * * [that must adapt] as the progress of society may require.” Id. at 406, 37 N.W.2d at 547. There is no reason to deny recovery for the loss of society and companionship resulting from such egregious and direct interference with the parent-child relationship in *52flagrant violation of a court order as is alleged here.
As another component of damages, the custody tort contemplates recovery for emotional distress, as Larson alleges, stemming from the interference. Restatement § 700 comment g. Intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, also is recognized in Minnesota “as a separate and independent tort.” Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn.1983). Larson pleads in the alternative that the Rigenhagens’ and Olson’s conduct constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Emotional distress damages have been deemed recoverable under both the. custodial interference tort and the intentional infliction tort. See, e.g., Kunz, 660 F.Supp. at 684 (emotional damages allowed; father denied contact with child for seven months); Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978) (emotional distress claim allowed for one month denial); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 27, 99 L.Ed. 644 (1954).
Generally, to recover damages for emotional suffering, the alleged conduct must be extreme and outrageous, “involving particularly egregious facts.” Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. Because the conduct suggested by these facts potentially fits within this standard, I would hold emotional distress damages are recoverable under either the custodial interference or intentional infliction tort. Of course, double recovery is not permitted, and the plaintiff bears a heavy burden in demonstrating “the severity of his mental distress.” Id.
Conclusion:
I agree with the majority that “best interests” of a child should be considered, but not to the exclusion of other principles. The majority does not consider the child’s best interests during the seven years Jessica and her father were denied familial privileges, yet the majority now laments that Loree Dunn has not seen her daughter for two years since Jessica was reunited with her father. Dunn does know, however, where Jessica and her former husband are. During those seven years, Larson never knew where his daughter was, whether she was healthy, ill or missed him. Larson was deprived of all custody and visitation, despite having been awarded sole custody by the court. How are the principles of fairness and equity applied by denying this tort and not following the trend in other states?
Permitting a cause of action for interference with custody does serve the best interests of the child by encouraging the return of absent children by imposing a civil damages remedy. “A tort suit will be more likely to effect a speedy return of the child; it will result in better cooperation by potential third-party defendants seeking to avoid the suit; potential punitive damages will serve as an additional deterrent; and increased knowledge of a child’s whereabouts will result through the broad scope of civil-case discovery.” Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1983) (citing P. Hoff, Interstate Child Custody Disputes and Parental Kidnapping: Policy, Practice and Law, at 14-1 (1982)). The majority does not consider this possibility, but claims the proper remedy lies in the contempt process. Maj op. at 46; see Minn. Stat. ch. 588 (1988). It is inconceivable how service of a contempt order could ever be accomplished when the noncustodial parent, like Dunn in this case, “disappears.” See Minn.Stat. §§ 588.04; 588.07 (contemplating the service of arrest warrant or order to show cause on contemptor). The majority decries further that “[i]t is clear that this tort would be used as a new weapon” in dissolution cases. Id. at 46. As the statistics and the present case confirm, it is parental child kidnappings and accusations of sexual abuse that have become the “new weapons” in dissolution cases.
There are and always have been remedies available to Dunn within the court system, yet she pursued none of them. Instead, Loree Dunn fled the ■ state with Jessica, brazenly defying a court determination of the child’s best interests. If one principle stands paramount in our system of jurisprudence, it is that no one person, mother, father, president or pauper stands *53above the law. In a case as this, the best interests of the child must be considered together with respect for our legal system.
I would affirm the court of appeals panel.
. See, e.g., DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir.1984) (applying New Jersey law); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.1982) (applying Maryland law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014, 103 S.Ct. 372, 74 L.Ed.2d 507 (1982); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.1980) (applying Texas law); Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F.Supp. 679 (N.D.Ill.1987) (applying Illinois law); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.Wis.1982), aff'd, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.1982) (applying Wisconsin law); Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y.1978) (applying New York law); D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo.1989); Surina v. Lucey, 168 Cal.App.3d 539, 214 Cal.Rptr. 509 (1985); Shields v. Martin, 109 Idaho 132, 706 P.2d 21 (1985); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123 (Iowa 1983); Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 469 A.2d 1299 (1983); McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 578 P.2d 1259 (1978); Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So.2d 200 (La.Ct.App.1979), writ denied, 376 So.2d 960 (La.1979); Mathews v. Murray, 101 Ga.App. 216, 113 S.E.2d 232 (1960); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hospital, 89 R.I. 195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959); Armstrong v. McDonald, 39 Ala.App. 485, 103 So.2d 818 (1958); Brown v. Brown, 338 Mich. 492, 61 N.W.2d 656 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 27, 99 L.Ed. 644 (1954); Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251 (1928) (by implication); Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299 (1877).