Appellant was found guilty of discrimination by an administrative law judge to whom a complaint filed with the Department of Human Rights was referred for hearing. Appellant had refused to rent his property to one Susan Parsons because she planned to live there with her fiancé. A trial de novo before the district court was denied, and the court of appeals affirmed the action of the administrative law judge. French was ordered to pay $368.50 in compensatory damages to Parsons, $400 for mental anguish and suffering, and $300 civil penalties. We reverse the administrative law judge and the court of appeals.
A summary of the facts are as follows:
French owned and occupied a two-bedroom house (“subject property”) in Marshall, Minnesota, until moving to a house he purchased in the country. While attempting to sell the subject property, French rented it to both single individuals and married couples. From January to March 1988, French advertised the subject property as being available for rent. On February 22, 1988, French agreed to rent the property to Parsons and accepted a $250 check as a security deposit.
Shortly thereafter, French decided that Parsons had a romantic relationship with her fiancé, Wesley Jenson, and that the two would likely engage in sexual relations outside of marriage on the subject property. On February 24, 1988, French told Parsons that he had changed his mind and would not rent the property to her because unmarried adults of the opposite sex living together were inconsistent with his religious beliefs. French is a member of the Evangelical Free Church in Marshall, and his beliefs include that an unmarried couple *4living together or having sexual relations outside of marriage is sinful. Despite being questioned by French, neither Parsons nor Jenson told French whether they were planning to have sexual relations on the subject property. The record is in dispute as to whether appellant had knowledge of Parsons’ intended sexual activity with her fiancé, but Parsons did not deny such an intent when queried by French. Even if they would not have had sexual relations on the property, French believes that living together constitutes the “appearance of evil” and would not have rented to them on that basis. French admits that if Parsons had been married to Jenson, he would not have objected renting to them.
Parsons filed a charge of discrimination against French with respondent department alleging that French committed marital status discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) when he refused to rent the subject property to her because she planned to live there with her fiancé. Following an investigation, the department issued a complaint against French.
An administrative law judge granted the department partial summary judgment on the issue of liability), ruling that French violated the act’s (Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(a) (1986)) prohibition of marital status discrimination by refusing to rent the subject property to Parsons because she was single and living with her fiancé and rejected French’s defenses. Following a hearing on damages, the judge found French liable to Parsons for $368.60 in compensatory damages and $400.00 in mental anguish and suffering. In addition, the judge assessed a civil penalty of $300 to be paid to the State of Minnesota by French, but declined to award punitive damages. French's motion for a trial de novo in district court was denied.
After issuing French a writ of certiorari, a court of appeals panel affirmed that French discriminated against Parsons because of her marital status in violation of the Human Rights Act and that neither the free exercise of religion nor any of French’s other arguments provided a defense. We granted French's petition for further review.
On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the lower courts erred in their application of the law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn. Hosp. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn.1988).
Initially, the department must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn.1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 3315, 92 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). We must examine whether appellant’s refusal to rent to Parsons constituted a prima facie violation of the Human Rights Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination. The act provides in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
(1) For an owner, lessee * * *
(a) to refuse to sell, rent, or léase * * * any real property because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or familial status.
Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2. As applied to this case, French was the owner and lessee of the subject property, and Parsons attempted to rent the property from him.
I. The Definition of “Marital Status”
The administrative law judge (AU) found that appellant refused to rent to Parsons because she “was single and planned to cohabit1 with another person of the opposite sex.” The version of the MHRA in effect at the time the alleged discrimination occurred and when the charge was filed did not contain a definition of the term “marital status.”2 See Minn.Stat. § 363.01 (1987 Supp.).
*5It is well settled that, in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes, this court is required to discover and effectuate legislative intent. State on Behalf of Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn.1981). The term “marital status” is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one meaning, namely, a meaning which includes cohabiting couples and one which does not. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill.App.3d 105, 143 Ill.Dec. 166, 170, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (1990); see Alley, Marital Status Discrimination: An Amorphous Prohibition, 54 Fla.B.J. 217 (1980), cited with approval in Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 261 n. 4 (Minn.1984). In order to show that construing “marital status” to include unmarried cohabiting couples is inconsistent with public policy, legislative intent, and previous decisions of this court, it is necessary to examine the history of the MHRA and our cases interpreting it.
The MHRA was amended in 1973 to add the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of “marital status.” Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn.Laws 2158, 2162 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2 (1988)). This court, in construing the term “marital status” has consistently looked to the legislature’s policy of discouraging the practice of fornication and protecting the institution of marriage. See Kraft, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wilson, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn.1979) (8-0 decision). Kraft presented the question of whether an employer’s anti-nepotism policy constituted marital status discrimination within the meaning of the MHRA. Id. at 387-88. In answering this question in the affirmative, Chief Justice Sheran stated:
Endorsing a narrow definition of marital status and uncritically upholding an employment policy such as respondent’s could discourage similarly situated employees from marrying. In a locale where a predominant employer enforced such a policy, economic pressures might lead two similarly situated individuals to forsake the marital union and live together in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.34 [fornication statute]. Such an employment policy would thus undermine the preferred status enjoyed by the institution of marriage.
In view of these considerations, we hold the employment policy of respondent presumptively invalid under Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1.
Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Kraft court unanimously concluded that the fornication statute was a valid expression of Minnesota public policy. Moreover, the Kraft court did not ignore the destructive practical effect of a contrary ruling simply because there was no direct evidence of fornication. It is easy to see that, but for these important public policies, the Kraft decision would have been different.
The respondent cites State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Minn.1985), as binding precedent as to the definition of “marital status” in the context of cohabitation. A careful reading of Sports & Health Club, however, reveals that this reliance is misplaced. In Sports & Health Club, this court said:
Justice Peterson, in dissent, argues that the discrimination claim predicated upon questioning of employees and applicants on cohabitation of unmarried persons is not a ground under the statute for finding discrimination. Even though we agree with his contention, yet the record appears clear to us that Sports and Health went far beyond permissible bounds in questioning employees and applicants in areas clearly prohibited by the act.
Id. at 850 n. 10 (emphasis added). The contention the Sports & Health Club majority was agreeing with was Justice Peterson’s observation that the hearing examiner acknowledged “a clear inference of sexual relations between cohabiting couples” and his conclusion that “[i]t is preposterous to impose sanctions upon an employer, par*6ticularly this employer, who refused to employ persons whose conduct constitutes criminal misbehavior.” Id. at 872 (Peterson, J., dissenting). Thus, the Sports & Health Club court unanimously agreed that direct evidence of fornication is not necessary and that unequal treatment based on cohabitation was not “marital status” discrimination. Accordingly, if respondent truly feels “obliged to follow clear established precedent,” it must conclude that there was no marital status discrimination in the present case.
Respondent makes the surprising suggestion that the fornication statute no longer expresses this state's public policy because “it has fallen into complete disuse.” Not only is such a notion of implied repeal unprecedented, it is factually mistaken. See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.1986). In Ford, an educator was charged with fornication in connection with consensual sex acts with 16-year-old students. Id. at 876-77. Although the educator entered into a plea bargain agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to different charges, there was no suggestion by anyone that the fornication statute was a nullity-
The Kraft approach of defining the scope of the term “marital status” in light of legislative intent was followed in Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.1984) (5-2 decision). In Cybyske, however, this court declined to extend the definition of “marital status” discrimination to encompass distinctions by an employer based on the conduct of a prospective employee’s spouse. See id. at 261. In reaching this conclusion, this court stated:
The legislature did not intend to proscribe a particular political posture, whether of an employee or of the employee’s spouse, in the Human Rights Act. Nor do we think the term marital status should be construed to include what the legislature excluded. Here the alleged immediate reason for the discrimination is not directed at the institution of marriage itself.
Id. (emphasis added). Read together, Kraft, Cybyske, and Sports & Health Club stand for the proposition that, absent express legislative guidance, the term “marital status” will not be construed in a manner inconsistent with this state’s policy against fornication and in favor of the institution of marriage.
The legislative response to the Cybyske decision also demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to expand the definition of “marital status” in order to penalize landlords for refusing to rent to unmarried, cohabiting couples. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 40 (1988) defines “marital status” as follows:
“Marital status” means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of this new definition shows that, in non-employment cases, the legislature intended to address only the status of an individual, not an individual’s relationship with a spouse, fiancé, fiancée, or other domestic partner. The extremely broad language following the phrase “and, in employment cases” constitutes legislative recognition that employment cases are fundamentally different from housing cases such as the case at bar.
The legislative history of this subdivision indicates that the legislature did not intend to extend the protection of the MHRA to unmarried, cohabiting couples in the area of housing. In a legislative hearing on a bill for an act to clarify the definition of “marital status,” State Human Rights Commissioner Cooper explained the bill as being a response to the Cybyske case. See Hearing on H.F. 2054, H. Civil Law Subcomm. of Jud. Comm., 75th Minn.Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape). Representative Quist, objecting to the broad language of the bill, referred to a hypothetical scenario in which a landlord would be forced to rent to a person whose spouse was a polygamist. Id. Representative Quist indicated that employment and housing were differ*7ent situations and that the bill’s language was much too broad, at least as to housing. Id. Commissioner Cooper stated that he would reconsider the impact of the bill in the housing area and report back to the subcommittee. Id. At the next hearing on the bill, an amendment to the bill was offered that confined the extremely broad language to employment cases only. Hearing on H.F. 2054, H. Civil Law Subcomm. of Jud. Comm., 75th Minn.Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape). The amendment limiting the broad definition of “marital status” to employment cases was ultimately enacted into law. Finally, it is worth noting that subsequent attempts to expand the definition of marital status also failed. For example, at one point, the proposed definition included “single, married, divorced, widowed, separated, or other like status * * *. See 4 Journal of the House of Representatives 8696 (75th Minn.Leg., Mar. 14, 1988). This “or other like status” did not survive in the final bill.
It is obvious that the legislature did not intend to extend the protection of the MHRA to include unmarried, cohabiting couples in housing cases. It is the duty of this court to follow Cybyske and decline to construe the term “marital status” “to include what the legislature excluded.” See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261.
Other courts which have addressed the same issue have considered their state’s policy with respect to fornication as expressed in statutory law. See Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 779 P.2d 1199,1201-02 (Alaska 1989); Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill.App.3d 105, 113-14, 143 Ill.Dec. 166, 171, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (1990). The facts in Mister were virtually identical to the instant case except the record was silent as to the defendants’ alleged religious beliefs. See Mister, 197 Ill.App.3d at 107-10, 143 Ill. Dec. at 167-68, 553 N.E.2d at 1153-54 (1990). In Mister, the court held that the Illinois Human Rights Act’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status3 does not include a landlord’s refusal to rent an apartment to unmarried persons of the opposite sex. Mister, 197 Ill.App.3d at 116-17, 143 Ill.Dec. at 173, 553 N.E.2d at 1159. In ascertaining legislative intent, the court observed that:
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Act would have us conclude that the legislature intended to protect from discrimination those individuals who choose to cohabit with a person of the opposite sex without entering into marriage. The fornication statute, as it existed when plaintiffs attempted to rent the apartments, evidenced this State’s policy against such a practice. We believe plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Act is in conflict with the longstanding policy reflected by the fornication statute. Statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously where possible. * * *
Such a stance [by this court] expresses neither approval nor disapproval of discreet cohabitation; couples who wish to live together without being married can certainly still do so, but they must find a landlord who does not object to the arrangement. The Act’s failure to protect such couples from ’‘discrimination” merely evidences the legislature’s hesitancy to require landlords to acquiesce.
197 Ill.App.3d at 114-15, 143 Ill.Dec. at 171-72, 553 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Foreman, the Alaska Supreme Court, in ascertaining its legislature’s intent as to the meaning of “marital status,” relied entirely on the fact that Alaska’s fornication statute had been repealed 11 years earlier in concluding that protection for unmarried, cohabiting couples was included. Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 779 P.2d at 1201-02. At the very least, before the state imposes sanctions on French, it must repeal the fornication statute.
Respondent cites Sports & Health Club in support of its argument that French gave up his constitutional rights “by enter*8ing the public marketplace.” As outlined above, employment cases are distinguishable from housing cases. In addition, the Sports & Health Club court made it clear that the discrimination in that case was “pernicious” because it was practiced by a Minnesota business corporation engaged in' business for profit and the discrimination was irrelevant to “the main decision of competence to perform the work.” Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853.
It is one thing to prohibit an entity which has availed itself of the privilege of doing business for profit in the corporate form from denying Minnesota residents the basic right to earn a living. An employer is entitled to less control over what an employee does away from the place of employment, but, here, French was renting his former residence while it was for sale in a depressed real estate market. It is unreasonably cynical to say that his choice is simple: that he need not rent at all. Economic necessity may require him to seek rental income and this may be as critical to him as the need for wage income underlying the Sports & Health Club decision.4 On the other hand, what burden is imposed on Parsons to enable her to rent, but not live with her fiancé on the premises?
It is simply astonishing to me that the argument is made that the legislature intended to protect fornication and promote a lifestyle which corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civilization, namely, marriage and family life. If the legislature intended to protect cohabiting couples and other types of domestic partners, it would have said so. The legislative history of this statute indicates that an attempt to do this was defeated by a substantial majority of the Minnesota House of Representatives. It is not the role of this court, especially in light of the foregoing analysis, to read such protections into the MHRA.
II. Minnesota Constitution
Although, in arguments to this court, appellant emphasized the United States Constitution, the issue of protection of religious liberty under the Minnesota Constitution was properly preserved for appeal. In light of the unforeseeable changes in established first amendment law set forth in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, justice demands that we analyze the present case in light of the protections found in the Minnesota Constitution. See Employment Din, Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Minnesota v. Hershberger, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1918, 109 L.Ed.2d 282 (1990) (vacating this court’s judgment in State v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn.1989) and remanding the case for further consideration).
As we said in State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722 (Minn.1985):
It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution. Indeed, as the highest court of this state, we are “independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens. ” State courts are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist system.
Id. at 726 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The people of the State of Minnesota have always cherished religious liberty. The Preamble to the Constitution of the State of Minnesota provides:
We, the people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God for our civil and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.
(Emphasis added.) The Minnesota Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, treats religious liberty as more important than the formation of government. See Preamble, U.S. Const. (“[I]n order to form a more perfect union * * *.”).
*9The pertinent language in the Minnesota Constitution addressing religious liberty is as follows:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed * * * nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state * *. *.
Minn. Const, art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). The plain language of this section commands this court to weigh the competing interests at stake whenever rights of conscience are burdened. Under this section, the state may interfere with the rights of conscience only if it can show that the religious practice in question is “licentious” or “inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.” In the present case, the state has simply failed to make such a showing. Moreover, the state contends that it has a compelling interest in protecting licentious practices which is sufficient to override French’s religious freedom.
The broad protection of religious liberty required by the Minnesota Constitution is not surprising given the background of the people who adopted this constitution. This special history, shared by the people who adopted the Minnesota Constitution, was eloquently described by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as follows:
The early settlers of Wisconsin came chiefly from New England and the Middle States. They represented the best religious, intellectual, and moral culture, and the business enterprise and sagacity, of the people of the states from whence they came. They found here a territory possessing all the elements essential to the development of a great state. They were intensely desirous that the future state should be settled and developed as rapidly as possible. They chose from their number wise, sagacious, Christian men, imbued with the sentiments common to all, to frame their constitution. The convention assembled at a time when immigration had become very large and was constantly increasing. The immigrants came from nearly all the countries of Europe, but most largely from Germany and Ireland. As a class, they were industrious, intelligent, honest, and thrifty — just the material for the development of a new state. Besides, they brought with them, collectively, much wealth. They were also religious and sectarian. Among them were Catholics, Jews, and adherents of many Protestant sects. These immigrants were cordially welcomed, and it is manifest the convention framed the constitution with reference to attracting them to Wisconsin. Many, perhaps most, of these immigrants came from countries in which a state religion was maintained and enforced, while some of them were non-conformists and had suffered under the disabilities resulting from their rejection of the established religion. * * * such were the circumstances surrounding the convention which framed the constitution. In the light of them, and with a lively appreciation by its members of the horrors of sectarian intolerance and the priceless value of perfect religious and sectarian freedom and equality, is it unreasonable to say that sectarian instruction was thus excluded * * * <7
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. Eight, 76 Wis. 177, 197-98, 44 N.W. 967, 974-75 (1890) (emphasis added).
In view of the above considerations and the history our state shares with the State of Wisconsin, we are compelled to conclude that French must be granted an exemption from the MHRA unless the state can demonstrate compelling and overriding state interest, not only in the state’s general statutory purpose, but in refusing to grant an exemption to French.
In short, we interpret the Minnesota Constitution as requiring a more stringent burden on the state; it grants far more protection of religious freedom than the broad language of the United States Constitution. *10Pursuant to this analysis, we conclude that the state has failed to sustain its burden in demonstrating a sufficiently compelling interest.
It appears that we have now reached the stage in Minnesota constitutional law where the religious views of a probable majority of the Minnesota citizens are being alleged by a state agency to violate state law. Today we have a department of state government proposing that, while French has sincere religious beliefs and those beliefs are being infringed upon by the Human Rights Act, the state, nevertheless, has an interest in promoting access to housing for cohabiting couples which overrides French’s right to exercise his religion.
Respondent characterizes the state’s interest as “eliminating pernicious discrimination, including marital status discrimination.” We are not told what is so pernicious about refusing to treat unmarried, cohabiting couples as if they were legally married. The state does not even attempt to reconcile this notion with this court’s express recognition of the “preferred status” of the institution of marriage in Kraft. The court in Mister offered the following analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court on this point:
There are major public policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage. Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages can be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly referred to as “illicit” or “meretricious” relationships encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society?
Mister, 197 Ill.App.3d at 114-16, 143 Ill. Dec. at 172, 553 N.E.2d at 1158 (quoting Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.2d 49, 58, 31 Ill. Dec. 827, 830, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979)). There are numerous other contexts in which cohabiting couples are not legally entitled to the same treatment as married couples. A prime example is found in the area of employee life and health insurance benefits, a subject which is also regulated by the MHRA. See Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (1989 Supp.). Other examples are found in the laws governing intestate succession and the rules of evidence governing the privilege for marital communications. Is the argument now being made that these too are “pernicious ” discrimination? If they are, surely it is the role of the legislature to make whatever changes are necessary.
How can there be a compelling state interest in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on the books prohibiting it? See Minn.Stat. § 609.34 (1988). Moreover, if the state has a duty to enforce a statute in the least restrictive way to accommodate religious beliefs, surely it is less restrictive to require Parsons to abide by the law prohibiting fornication than to compel French to cooperate in breaking it. Rather than grant French an exemption from the MHRA, the state would rather grant everyone an exemption from the fornication statute. Such a result is absurd.
The state argues that, if French is granted an exemption, landlords would be able to discriminate against single people with children or even a divorced person who has remarried. We believe the response to this argument is self-evident. Here we are punishing French for refusing to disregard a statute prohibiting fornication as well as his religious beliefs.5 The state clouds an *11already murky analysis by referring to cases involving discrimination against constitutionally recognized suspect classes.
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western civilization well for eons. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211, 8 S.Ct. 723, 729-30, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888) (characterizing marriage as “the foundation of family and society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress”), cited with approval in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 680, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978). This generation does not have a monopoly on either knowledge or wisdom. Before abandoning fundamental values and institutions, we must pause and take stock of our present social order: millions of drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising underclass without marketable job skills; children roaming the streets; children with only one parent or no parent at all; and children growing up with no one to guide them in developing any set of values.6 How can we expect anything else when the state itself contributes, by arguments of this kind, to further erosion of fundamental institutions that have formed the foundation of our civilization for centuries? 7
Since our decision is based entirely on interpretation of our state statutes and on the Minnesota Constitution, we need not address respondent’s arguments as to the application of the United States Constitution, and we decline to do so. We find that, on statutory grounds and on the grounds of the Minnesota Constitution, French was within his rights in refusing to rent to Parsons.
In summary, because the state should not be able to force a person to break one statute to obey another, because there is a less restrictive means to reconcile the statutes in question, and because of the state’s paramount need under our constitution to protect religious freedom, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
. "Cohabit” means to live together in a sexual relationship when not legally married. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 259 (1980) (New College Dictionary).
. In 1988, the legislature amended the MHRA for the purpose of "clarifying the definition of marital status discrimination.” Act of Apr. 26, 1988, ch. 660, § 1, 1988 Minn.Laws 917, 918 *5(codified at Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 40 (1988)). This definition, however, does not apply in the instant case because it did not become effective until August 1, 1988. See Minn.Stat. § 645.02 (1988); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1988) (presumption against retroactive effect).
. Illinois law defined "marital status” as "the legal status of being married, single, separated. divorced or widowed." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, ¶ 1-103(J) (1987).
. The administrative law judge found that French had a net income of $3,851 in 1986, $5,481 in 1987, and $6,470 in 1988.
. The state argues that there is no evidence here that fornication would take place and indicates that the "appearance of evil" belief is without merit. We find that position utterly specious. The Sports & Health Club court rejected this notion, and none of the other courts that have confronted this issue have even bothered to comment on this point. The AU concluded that the couple intended to "cohabit,” that is, live together in a sexual relationship. When French told Parsons why he would not rent to her, she did not deny that she intended to fornicate in the home. French specifically asked Parsons’ fiancé if he planned to use this home *11for purposes of having sex and he refused to answer. Failure to deny a material fact such as this when it would have been natural to deny it if it were not true permits an inference that it was true. See Erickson v. Erickson & Co., 212 Minn. 119, 125, 2 N.W.2d 824, 827 (1942). That Parsons would insist on renting only if she could reside there with her fiance and suggest that no sexual intercourse would take place is difficult to believe to say the least. Even if we accept that fairy tale, it misses the point: French’s religious beliefs prohibit the living together of an unmarried man and woman regardless of whether sexual intercourse takes place.
. In a recent press interview, United States Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), a leading Congressional expert on family and children's issues, stated:
We [the United States] are number one in divorce, domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse and adolescent everything. * * *
If we are number one in families falling apart and at the bottom in supporting families, do you suppose there is a correlation?
The Minnesota Women’s Press, March 28, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
. In a recent thought-provoking magazine article, the author discussed the phenomenon of family breakdown and accompanying social problems and made the following observation:
Given family integrity’s essential importance, one might have expected society-wide efforts to support and encourage two-parent families when signs of rot were first detected, in the 1960s. That didn’t happen. For the past quarter century American public policy has shied away from the idea that certain family forms are more desirable than others. There is no attempt to promote childbearing within wedlock. There is little penalty attached to child abandonment. There is scant recognition of the social benefits of marriage, or of the social contributions of those who devote themselves to conscientious childrear-ing. There is no reward from our public programs for standing by kith and kin.
Zimmerman, Growing Up Scared, The Atlantic Monthly, June 1990, at 52. Elsewhere in the article, the author noted that support is growing for incentives in favor of intact families in public housing programs. See id. at 53-56.