(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Precedent establishes the refusal to rent real property to an unmarried woman because she would be *12living with her fiance is a prima facie violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s (MHRA) prohibition of marital status discrimination. I believe the majority misconstrues legislative history, public policy and the facts presented to reach a result contrary to this court’s interpretation of the MHRA.
I.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice: (1) For an owner, lessee * * *
(a) to refuse to sell, rent, or lease * * * any real property because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or familial status.
Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2 (1988).1 The Act defines “marital status” as “whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse.” Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 40 (1988). The Minnesota Human Rights Act is to “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its] purposes,” Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1988), which include “securpng] for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination [i]n employment [and i]n housing.” Id., § 363.12.
With regard to marital status discrimination, states are split on whether “living together” falls within the definition of “marital status.” Minnesota has taken the position that it does. Our precedents are clear that discriminating against an individual because of the person that individual lives with constitutes marital status discrimination. In Sports & Health Club, we held that an employer discriminated on the basis of marital status when it refused to hire job applicants who were living with, but not married to, persons of the opposite sex. 370 N.W.2d at 847, 849-50; see also State ex rel. Cooper v. Mower County Social Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 498-99 (Minn.App.1989) (refusal to hire pregnant unmarried woman because she lives with her boyfriend is marital status discrimination); State ex rel. Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn.App.1986) (termination of employee because he lives with a person of the opposite sex is marital status discrimination).
The conduct at issue here, the refusal to rent to an unmarried woman because she was single and living with a person of the opposite sex, constitutes marital discrimination and a prima facie violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. After agreeing to rent the property to Parsons, French not only decided Parsons had a romantic relationship with her fiance, but he also decided Parsons and her fiance likely would engage in sexual relations outside of marriage while living on the property. Despite being questioned by French, neither Parsons nor Jenson told French whether they were planning to have sexual relations on the subject property. Thus, when he refused to rent to Parsons, French had no knowledge of Parsons’ actual or intended sexual activity. French, as owner and lessor, admits that had Parsons been married when she sought to rent the property, he would not have objected to renting to her. There is no “dispute,” as the majority claims, regarding whether French had knowledge of Parsons’ intended sexual activity with her fiance. The administrative law judge did not find that Parsons was going to live with her fiancee in a sexual relationship, and could not make such a finding on this record. The administrative law judge’s findings of fact include, “Parsons * * * intended to reside on the property with her fiancee. * * * [French ] informed her that he could not rent the property to her because cohabitation by two unmarried adults of the opposite sex was not in accord with his religious beliefs.” (Emphasis added). “Cohabitation” *13was the reason French gave for refusing to rent to Parsons. Use of the word “cohabitation” does not necessarily assume a sexual relationship, and it is often used interchangeably with “living together.” See Webster’s New International Dictionary 520 (2nd ed.) and Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 218 (1976). Thus, French’s conduct in refusing to rent to Parsons because she was single and living with a person of the opposite sex constituted marital discrimination, a prima facie violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
The majority ignores the holdings in Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), Sports & Health Club, Mower County, and Porter Farms, relying instead on Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill.App.3d 105, 143 Ill.Dec. 166, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (1990), an Illinois appellate court decision which disagrees with Sports & Health Club and the court of appeals’ decision in this case. Mister is not controlling over this court and apparently represents a minority point of view. See, e.g., Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., Assoc. Inc., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C.Cir.1979) (marital status discrimination to refuse housing financing to fiancees living together); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Alaska 1989) (prohibition of marital status discrimination includes unmarried couples of the opposite sex); Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm’n, 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 235, 187 Cal.Rptr. 712, 714 (1982) (Fair Housing Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination includes unmarried couples of the opposite sex living together); Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Auth., 59 Gal. App.3d 89, 99, 130 CaLRptr. 375, 381 (1976) (marital status discrimination to evict tenant for living with person of the opposite sex); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 405, 301 A.2d 754, 757 (1973) (marital status discrimination includes refusal to rent to young, unmarried women who desire to live together); Munroe v. 344 East 76th Realty Corp., 113 Misc.2d 155, 157, 448 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1982) (marital status discrimination to evict unmarried couple of the opposite sex because they are living together); Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc.2d 40, 44, 450 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (N.Y.Civ.Ct.1982) (same); Loveland v. Leslie, 21 Wash.App. 84, 583 P.2d 664 (1978) (marital status discrimination for landlord to rent to only married couples). Until the holdings in Kraft, Sports & Health Club, Mower County, and Porter Farms are overruled, we are obliged to follow clear, established precedent in this state that discriminating against an individual because of the person that individual lives with constitutes marital status discrimination. See Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 387-88.
II.
Once a prima facie discrimination case is established, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to appellant to prove his conduct was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory defense. Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn.1986); Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 849. The remaining question is whether there was a “legitimate nondiscriminatory” defense for French’s violation. French asserts two defenses: free exercise of religion and due process/equal protection.
Is appellant’s first amendment right to free exercise of religion violated by enforcement of this provision of the Human Rights Act against him? While there is an absolute right to hold religious beliefs, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 219, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), religiously grounded conduct is not absolutely protected. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2151-52, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220, 92 S.Ct. at 1535-36; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1145-46, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961). Although the free exercise clause may provide an individual an exemption from the enforcement of an applicable government regulation, see Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1796-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 *14(1963), the clause does not automatically override a conflict with a state statute. Instead, a burden on an individual’s practice of religious beliefs must be balanced against the state’s interest in the burdensome regulation, Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 92 S.Ct. at 1532-33, with the burden permitted whenever the state interest is overriding or compelling and the interest cannot be achieved by alternative means. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055-56, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533.
Our leading ease establishes a four-part test for analyzing a request for an exemption from a statute based on the free exercise of religion under both the federal and state constitutions:
1. whether the objector’s religious belief is sincerely held;
2. whether the state regulation burdens the exercise of this religious belief;
3. whether the state interest in this regulation is overriding or compelling; and’
4. whether the state regulation uses the least restrictive means.
Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 851. An individual claiming an exemption must prove the first two parts, but the state can successfully defend its statute by proving the third and fourth requirements. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988). The majority’s attempt to interpret the Minnesota Constitution’s Freedom of Conscience provision more broadly is not supported by a single decision of this court.
1. Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs.
The first requirement is the individual must have a sincerely held religious belief with regard to the contested matter. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1430-31; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16, 92 S.Ct. at 1533-34. This is a subjective, personal test, and we are not to question the propriety or correctness of this belief or religious doctrine. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 1055; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1430-31. According to French, he believes “sex outside of marriage is sinful [and] living together * * * constitutes the ‘appearance of evil’ to which I am also opposed.” The sincerity of these beliefs is undisputed, and French has satisfied this requirement.
2. Burden on Religious Belief.
Second, an individual claiming an exemption must show the applicable government regulation burdens this sincerely held religious belief. A leading treatise summarizes:
[Bjurden looks to the degree that the government’s requirement will, directly or indirectly, make the believer’s religious duties more difficult or more costly-
L. Tribe, supra, § 14-12 at 1247, and
[A] conflict that threatens the very survival of the religion or the core values of a faith poses more serious free exercise problems than does a conflict that merely inconveniences the faithful.
Id. at 1246. An affirmative obligation or prohibition combined with sanctions is more burdensome than a denial of benefits. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 704, 106 S.Ct. at 2154; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218, 92 S.Ct. at 1534. The burden on appellant’s religious beliefs is the choice French was required to make between adhering to his religious beliefs— that living together outside of marriage is immoral — by refusing to rent to unmarried couples living together, or modifying his behavior to comply with the Human Rights Act. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. at 1057; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18, 101 S.Ct. at 1431-32.
The distinction between public and private activities underlies freedom of religion cases. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Minnesota Human Rights Act properly “adopted a functional definition of public accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3254, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In Lee, the Supreme Court stated: “When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of *15conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.” 455 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. at 1057. We also recognized this distinction in Sports & Health Club:
[T]he government has a responsibility to afford its citizens equal access to all accommodations open to the general public. * * * Sports and Health * * * is not a religious corporation — it is a Minnesota business corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in this secular endeavor, appellants have passed over the line that affords them absolute freedom to exercise religious beliefs. * * * when appellants entered into the economic arena and began trafficking in the market place [sic], they have subjected themselves to the standards the legislature has prescribed not only for the benefit of prospective and existing employees, but also for the benefit of the citizens of the state as a whole in an effort to eliminate pernicious discrimination.
370 N.W.2d at 853.
While the scale of the public activity here is not as large as in Sports & Health Club, the legislature has drawn the line distinguishing public and private activity as it relates to rental housing by excepting “the rental by a resident owner or occupier of a one-family accommodation of a room or rooms in the accommodation” from several of the Human Rights Act’s prohibitions, including marital status discrimination. Minn.Stat. § 363.02, subd. 2(1)(b) (Supp. 1989). We are not in a position to question or redraw this line since the legislature in its wisdom determined the exemption. The private activity exemption from the Human Rights Act does not extend to someone, such as French, renting property where he does not live.
French contends this distinction says constitutional liberties do not apply in the public arena, but in reality by entering the public marketplace one is subjecting oneself to laws concerning public behavior, including anti-discrimination laws, that must be balanced against first amendment interests. There is no first amendment right to yell “fire” in a crowded theater. Upon entering the public marketplace appellant could no longer consider just his rights and beliefs, but became subject to certain state laws and the rights of potential tenants. The legislature has not exempted an isolated sale or rental of property other than the property where the landlord resides. As respondent states “the First Amendment does not bestow upon the individual an absolute right to require others in the marketplace to adopt those values as a precondition to doing business with him or her.” Appellant is free, in his private life, to not associate with anyone whom he feels has the “appearance of evil,” but when someone voluntarily enters the public marketplace he may encounter laws that are inconsistent with his religious beliefs. While the Act imposes a burden on French’s sincerely held religious belief that living together is sinful, such a burden is greatly lessened because it occurred only when French voluntarily entered into the rental marketplace — by crossing over the line drawn by the legislature — and thus subjecting himself to potentially burdensome regulations such as the Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination.
3. State’s Overriding or Compelling Interest.
If the state shows it has a compelling or overriding interest for the burdensome regulation it can prevent a religious-based exemption from that regulation. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58, 102 S.Ct. at 1055-56; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. at 1793-94. If the state interest is compelling, it will overbalance any burden on religious beliefs.2 The question thus is whether the *16State of Minnesota has a compelling or overriding interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination in rental housing. Relying on very old cases from other jurisdictions, appellant contends the only possible state interest is promoting public health, safety, or morality, but this completely ignores the Human Rights Act and controlling precedent from both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Courts have repeatedly recognized there is a compelling state interest in eradicating invidious discrimination. E.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, 104 S.Ct. at 3254 (gender); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (race); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38 (D.C.App.1987) (sexual orientation); see also EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir.1982) (“elimination of all forms of discrimination [is a] ‘highest priority.’ * * * [the] purpose to end discrimination is equally if not more compelling than other interests that have been held to justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious convictions.”) (citations omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court case most similar to the present case is Bob Jones University, where discriminatory practices were defended on a free exercise of religion basis. The University claimed the IRS Commissioner’s “policy cannot constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs.” 461 U.S. at 602, 103 S.Ct. at 2034. Despite finding sincerely held religious beliefs and a burden on these beliefs, id. at 602-04 & n. 28, 103 S.Ct. at 2034-35 & n. 28, the Court held that preventing discrimination clearly is a compelling state interest using the least restric-five means, and thus held that invidious discrimination cannot be justified by religious beliefs. Id. at 604, 103 S.Ct. at 2035.
Providing equal access to housing in Minnesota by eliminating pernicious discrimination, including marital status discrimination, is an overriding compelling state interest. The majority outlines numerous situations where the state, not private individuals, treats people differently because of their marital status. The facts of this case involve one individual discriminating against another individual because of marital status. Housing is a basic human need regardless of a person’s personal characteristics, and the legislature has properly determined that it should be available without regard to “race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or familial status.” Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(a). “[A] court cannot lightly dispute a determination by the political branches that the * 4 * interests at stake are compelling.” ' Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1986), aff'd sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). An individual’s marital or familial status, just like the other prohibited classifications, is irrelevant to holding a job or renting a house, because it “bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976).
The Human Rights Act is to “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its] purposes,” Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1988), which include “securing] for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination [i]n employment [and i]n housing.” Id. § 363.12. In interpreting the Minnesota *17Human Rights Act, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
[A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent — wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. * * * such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 104 S.Ct. at 3255. The Act “reflects [Minnesota’s] strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services.” Id. at 624, 104 S.Ct. at 3253. The Roberts Court found Minnesota, under the Act, had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens. Id. at 626, 104 S.Ct. at 3254. In Sports & Health Club, where one of the Human Rights Act violations was a refusal to hire people living together, we stated the government clearly has
an overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodation. * * * In a pluralistic and democratic society, government has a responsibility to insure that all its citizens have equal opportunity for employment, promotion, and job retention without having to overcome artificial and largely irrelevant barriers occurring from gender, status, or beliefs to the main decision of competence to perform the work. * * * The [state has an] overriding compelling interest [in] eliminating discrimination based upon sex, race, marital status, or religion * * *.
370 N.W.2d at 853. The majority ignores the Sports & Health Club’s holding. Since it is not overruled, we are obliged to follow its precedent.
The Supreme Court has emphasized, “Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2813, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (emphasis added). “This is not to say, however, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2236 n. 4, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). “The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984). Both our court’s and the Supreme Court’s precedents support an affirmance. The majority fails to point to a single discrimination case that has been successfully defended on free exercise of religion grounds or a single case holding that the state’s interest in eradicating any type of invidious discrimination is less than compelling. Preventing marital status discrimination is a compelling state interest, Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853, and discrimination in rental housing is not permitted by the Human Rights Act or the first amendment.
Religious and moral values include not discriminating against others solely because of their color, sex, or whom they live with, avoiding unnecessary emotional suffering, showing tolerance for nontraditional lifestyles, and treating others as one would wish to be treated. This supposedly immoral couple were married by the time of the AU hearing, furthering the values the majority promotes. It may be difficult for some individuals to recognize invidious discrimination, but one must not lose sight of the continuing fight of minorities to be protected from a “probable majority” point of view. It was not long ago that blacks and women were widely viewed as second-class citizens. Discrimination usually comes in less obvious forms — such as against single parents, those with AIDS, homosexuals, the elderly, and those living together — but no less invidious forms. The majority, in effect, would have us return to the day of “separate but equal” where individuals such as French would be permitted to keep their neighborhoods free of “undesirables” and “nonbelievers.” See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-13, 68 *18S.Ct. 836, 840-42, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) (“Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers * * * as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties * * *.»’).
Although French admits his conduct constituted marital status discrimination in violation of the Human Rights Act, he would have us completely ignore the Act, instead contending the central question of this case is: “what compelling interest does the State of Minnesota have in promoting cohabitation and/or fornication?” French contends the state’s interest should be Minnesota’s fornication statute, which makes it a misdemeanor for “any man and single women [to] have sexual intercourse with each other.” Minn.Stat. § 609.34 (1988). While we rejected this argument in Sports & Health Club, the majority decision rests upon it.
A refusal to rent based solely on a prospective tenant’s clear violation of a criminal statute is not prohibited by the Human Rights Act. This is not the situation here, however. The Department is not applying the fornication statute, there was absolutely no evidence of fornication, and fornication is not the prima facie discrimination case proven. French admits he did not know whether Parsons and Jenson were going to have sexual relations on the property when he refused to rent, but he states “even if Ms. Parsons and Mr. Jenson were not planning to have sex on the premises * * * their * * * living together on the premises constitutes the ‘appearance of evil’ to which I am also opposed.” There was only speculation about sexual relations, no facts, but “[djiscriminations are not to be supported by mere fanciful conjecture.” Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 462, 57 S.Ct. 838, 840, 81 L.Ed. 1223 (1937).
The appearance of evil argument is without merit. The Act prohibits marital status discrimination, here French concludes living together status assumes certain conduct, which he can then use to discriminate. There is nothing, however, in the fornication statute outlawing unmarried couples from living together or saying only couples living together are capable of fornication. French had previously rented to married couples and single people; people equally capable of fornicating on his property. There is nothing inherently suspect about two unmarried people of the opposite or same sex living together. While we do not choose between competing moral values, the majority equates the recent proliferation of unmarried couples living together with a loosening' of our social fabric. Surely the legislature intended this group to also be deserving of protection from invidious discrimination. The decision to marry is a fundamental right, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 680, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), and the right to privacy includes “personal decisions ‘relating to marriage.’ ” Carey v. Population Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015-16, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977).
The Human Rights Act prohibited appellant from even inquiring about Parsons’ marital status, Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2(l)(c) (1988), and Parsons and Jenson had absolutely no duty to protest their innocence when illegally questioned. In addition, enforcement of Minnesota’s criminal statutes is not left up to the suspicions of individual landlords, as appellant admits “[t]he Human Rights Act in no way prevents the State from prosecuting charges of fornication.” Had Parsons told French she planned to have sexual relations on the property this may be a different case, but those are not the facts before us. This is not a case involving discrimination against fornicators, rather it is a case involving discrimination against single people living together.
Because Minn.Stat. § 609.34 makes fornication a misdemeanor, French also contends he would be aiding and abetting the commission of fornication and thus subjecting himself to criminal liability if he rented to Parsons and Jenson. The majority somehow believes the state is enforcing or promoting the fornication statute in this case, but it has failed to point to what facts in the record make the fornication statute applicable here. The enforcement of criminal laws, such as fornication, by the state, *19should occur only in a court of law, where defendants have constitutional protections such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right of a defense, the right to a jury trial, and the right to challenge the constitutionality of such statutes. Moreover, to be liable as an aider or abettor, one must encourage another person “to take a course of action which he might not otherwise have taken.” State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.1981); see also Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1988). Leasing property to a tenant does not create criminal liability for aiding and abetting. People of Kane County v. Midway Landfill, Inc., 23 Ill.App.3d 1080, 1083, 321 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1974); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 10 (1970).
Although the legislature has refused to repeal Minnesota’s fornication statute, and it may be of questionable constitutionality, it has fallen into disuse. Not only are there just two reported convictions for fornication in Minnesota, the last in 1927, see State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 222, 213 N.W. 920 (1927); State v. Gieseke, 125 Minn. 497, 147 N.W. 663 (1914), and no reported convictions for aiding and abetting fornication, we recently noted that police and prosecutors generally consider the fornication statute unenforceable. In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Minn.1984). The majority cites one case, State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.1986), to suggest the fornication statute remains sound. That the defendant in Ford ultimately pleaded guilty to other offenses does little to bolster the majority’s position. While a challenge to the fornication statute is not before us, other states have struck down their fornication statutes under equal protection. E.g., Purvis v. State, 377 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla.1979); Commonwealth v. Staub, 461 Pa. 486, 491-92, 337 A.2d 258, 261 (1975).
Appellant also would have us distinguish between “bad” types of discrimination, such as based upon race, gender, or handicap, and “good discrimination,” such as against drug dealers, child abusers, and fornicators (people living together). French cites no cases breaking up an anti-discrimination statute into discrete parts and finding the interest in eradicating certain types of discrimination to be less than compelling. In fact, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals refused to single out its prohibition of sexual preference discrimination as less than compelling. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38. We should reaffirm that the prevention of invidious discrimination in Minnesota, including on the basis of marital status, is a compelling state interest.
4. Least Restrictive Means.
The last requirement is that the state regulation use the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s goals. Although the government has a compelling interest that justifies a burden on religious activity, the state must also show the regulation is no more burdensome than necessary to promote the secular interest. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. at 1432. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407, 83 S.Ct. at 1795-96. Courts have found some alternatives to be less restrictive and less burdensome on an individual’s free exercise rights. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225, 92 S.Ct. at 1538.
French contends a less restrictive means is for the state simply to not enforce the Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination. That is not a less restrictive means; it would be a complete abrogation of the state’s goal of preventing invidious discrimination. See Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 39 (refusing to abrogate state interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination). Previous cases have refused to abolish the goals behind preventing marital status discrimination. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 847, 853-54; Porter Farms, 382 N.W.2d at 548. The. recent Gender Fairness Report recognized the problem of discrimination against unmarried couples living together. See Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, 15 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 825, 876 (1989). In fact, the 1990 census now being undertaken also recognizes this phenomenon and will determine the number of unmarried couples living together. Appellant’s contention that the Act’s prohibition of marital status dis*20crimination is unworthy of enforcement must be rejected.
The only possible less restrictive means is to grant those individuals with sincerely held religious beliefs an exemption from the Human Rights Act. We refused to grant such an exemption in Sports & Health Club, stating:
The state’s overriding compelling interest of eliminating discrimination based upon sex, race, marital status, or religion could be substantially frustrated if employers, professing as deep and sincere religious beliefs as those held by [the Sports & Health Club] could discriminate against the protected classes.
370 N.W.2d at 853. Federal courts have also consistently refused to allow religious exemptions from anti-discrimination statutes. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 604, 103 S.Ct. at 2035 (free exercise exemption “cannot be accommodated” with prevention of discrimination); EEOC v. Missisr sippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980) (“creation of [a free exercise] exemption greater than that provided by [Title VII] would seriously undermine the means chosen by Congress to combat discrimination * * *.”), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981). Granting exemptions from an anti-discrimination statute defeats its effectiveness in preventing discrimination. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 39. The legislature, in Minn.Stat. § 363.02, subd. 2(1)(b), has already drawn a line that grants an exemption from the Human Rights Act to small-scale landlords renting out a room in the home in which they live. The majority ignores our Sports & Health Club holding and the fact the legislature has already drawn a line for granting religiously based exemptions in the case of small-scale landlords. The majority’s arguments properly should be left to the legislature. If the legislature wishes to redraw this line so as to exclude individuals like French from the Human Rights Act, it is perfectly free to do so. But until the legislature changes the statute it should be enforced as written, since it is within the permissible parameters of constitutional principles. Appellant’s request for an exemption from the Human Rights Act would substantially hinder the fulfillment of the state’s goal of preventing invidious discrimination. No alternative means appear available.
III.
Enforcement of this provision of the Human Rights Act against French violates neither the federal due process or equal protection clauses. Appellant argues “due process/equal protection rights will protect any landlord” who objects to people of the opposite sex living together. (Emphasis added). French summarily asks us to find a violation of these provisions because the Act “seeks to penalize an individual who is seeking only to exercise a fundamental right.” In substance, appellant argues even if it is not against your religious beliefs for persons of the opposite sex to live together, you can still discriminate against these people if you personally disagree with them living together. This basically amounts to a facial attack on the Act’s prohibition of marital status discrimination.
Not only has appellant failed to identify what fundamental right is violated, but he was provided a full administrative hearing prior to being assessed a penalty. Preventing discrimination certainly is a legitimate government purpose necessary to survive a facial due process or equal protection challenge. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853 (compelling state interest in preventing marital status discrimination); AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 574 (Minn.1983) (rational basis needed to satisfy due process or equal protection challenge). French’s equal protection and due process challenges lack merit.
IV.
Discriminating against unmarried individuals living with members of the opposite sex is neither the cause or the solution to societal woes. The majority’s decision rejects the reasoned precedents of this court. Unless the legislature acts differently or until those cases are overruled, we are *21obliged to follow clear, established precedent in this state.
WAHL, Justice.I join the dissent of Chief Justice Popo-vich.
KEITH, Justice.I join the dissent of Chief Justice Popo-vich.
. The legislative history indicates that “marital status" was meant to include unmarried couples living together. Hearing on S.F. 419, Sen. Jud. Comm., Subcomm. on Jud. Admin., 66th Minn. Leg., April 20, 1973 (audio tape) (comments of Sen. Tennessen, co-author of the bill, and Phyllis Janey, President of League of Human Rights Commissions, concerning housing discrimination, during public testimony on the bill); Hearing on H.F. 377, Sen. Jud. Comm., 66th Minn. Leg., May 5, 1973 (audio tape of Sen. Coleman, chief author of the bill).
. On April 17, 1990, the Supreme Court abandoned the need for a compelling state interest when interpreting a generally applicable criminal statute in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Scalia, who said:
Precisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable preference, * * * and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot affirm the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to *16the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. To rule in respondent’s favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemption from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind * * *. The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does not require this.
It reversed the Oregon Supreme Court and held that while it is constitutionally permissible to exempt sacramental peyote use from operations of drug laws, it is not constitutionally required. Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon, et at, v. Alfred Smith et at, (U.S.1990).
Arguably, the same analysis would apply to a generally applicable anti-discrimination statute, but such analysis is not necessary since the government interest in this case meets the compelling state interest standard.