dissenting:
A section 2 — 619(aX9) motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts, but does not admit conclusions of law or conclusions of fact unsupported by allegations of specific fact. (Austin View Civic Association v. City of Pahs Heights (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 89.) The plaintiff aBeged that Dr. Wolfe breached the contract he made with the plaintiff and that the breach was induced by White and the Carle Foundation Hospital. The defendants’ motion did not admit the facts as stated in the complaint, but instead, chaBenged them and asserted that because Dr. Wolfe testified at the earlier trial, there was no breach. The motion did not present “affirmative matter” warranting dismissal under section 2 — 619(a)(9). In fact, as the majority itself acknowledges, “the question remains whether the aBeged contractual obligation was satisfied by Dr. Wolfe when he testified at the earlier trial.” (160 Ill. App. 3d at 591.) That Dr. Wolfe testified and could have been impeached does not answer the question of whether the terms of this contract were breached. The defendants’ motion did not defeat the plaintiff’s claim, as the aBeged affirmative matter was nothing more than evidence offered to refute a well-pleaded fact. The plaintiff’s cause of action was incorrectly dismissed under section 2 — 619(a)(9). Therefore, I dissent.