(concurring in result). I both agree and disagree in part with the opinions of Judges Kaufman and O’Hara. I agree with Judge O’Hara that there is no constitutional impediment to the temporary ex parte suspension of plaintiff’s driver’s license. It is true that Bell v Burson, 402 US 535; 91 S Ct 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971), Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67; 92 S Ct 1983; 32 L Ed 2d 556 (1972), and the most recent United States Supreme Court case, North Georgia Finishing, Inc v Di-Chem, Inc, 419 US 601; 95 S Ct 719; 42 L Ed 2d 751 (1975), held that an ex parte seizure of a property right without the opportunity for a prior hearing or other safeguards against mistaken repossession is violative of the 14th Amendment. But those decisions were predicated upon the absence of a fact which is present in the instant case. In the case before us, there was a hearing in the probate court of Kent County at which time plaintiff was found mentally ill and committed to the Kalamazoo State Hospital. This was a judicially conducted hearing in compliance with all of the "other safeguards” required by law. A judicial hearing having been completed and plaintiff having been determined to be mentally ill, the State is justified in summarily acting so as to deny, temporarily at least, the entrustment to her of a high speed motor vehicle. It is a well-known fact, of which we take judicial notice, that accidents are frequently caused by mental disturb*17anees far less serious than those requiring medical consultation or confinement in an institution.
Fuentes, supra, recognized that there are "extraordinary situations” which justify postponement of notice and hearing until after seizure of the property interest:
"Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food.” 407 US at 91-92; 92 S Ct at 2000; 32 L Ed 2d at 576.
The judicially recognized state concern of protecting the public from misbranded foods or contaminated foods is not, in my opinion, significantly different from the concern of protecting the public from the hazards of drivers adjudged mentally disturbed.
However, I cannot subscribe to Judge O’Hara’s innovative and constructive suggestion that, by judicial construction, § 303a is absorbed by § 322. This well-intended interpretation runs contrary to two well-recognized rules of statutory construction. Where two sections of a statute are mutually incompatible, one of which is enacted later than the other, it is presumed that the second enactment takes priority over the first. Southward v Wabash R Co, 331 Mich 138, 145-147; 49 NW2d 109 (1951), Locke v Macomb County, 31 Mich App 22, 25; 187 NW2d 500 (1971), aff'd, 387 Mich 634, 639; 199 NW2d 166 (1972). Section 322 was enacted by 1949 PA 300, effective September 23, 1949. Section 303a, relating to forfeiture of a driver’s license upon notice from the medical superintendent, first appeared in 1961 PA 123, effec*18tive September 8, 1961. By this subsequent act, the Legislature clearly removed from the license appeal board any latent power it might otherwise have then had to restore a mentally ill person’s driver’s license. It never has been the practice of the license appeal board to construe § 303a as falling within the license appeal board’s jurisdiction under § 322. The Department of State has consistently taken the position that, because of the specific language in § 303a, a license may not be restored until so authorized by the medical superintendent. Accordingly, bringing the matter before the license appeal board is an exercise in futility. Furthermore, § 303a is a specific provision. Specific provisions of a statute prevail over general provisions. Linski v MESC, 358 Mich 239, 244-245; 99 NW2d 582 (1959), People v Bachman, 50 Mich App 682, 687; 213 NW2d 800 (1973), lv den, 392 Mich 776 (1974).
In my view, the constitutional problem lies not in the taking of the driver’s license, but in the absence of provisions permitting an early determination as to its restoration. Nothing in § 303a states how, when or if the medical superintendent is to appear before the license appeal board, or how his determination may be modified, overruled or even disputed. Assuming that the aggrieved person appeared before the license appeal board with medical witnesses who would testify that the applicant had sufficiently recovered to be able to drive with safety, the appeal board lacks power to make a restoration. Thus, in effect, the statute fails to provide a post-restoration hearing.
Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974), and North Georgia Finishing, supra, come down hard on the necessity of statutory provisions permitting a speedy deter*19mination of the property right temporarily taken. In Mitchell, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute permitting an ex parte seizure of household appliances. In doing so, the Court pointed out that the statute "entitles the debtor immediately to seek dissolution of the writ, which must be ordered unless the creditor proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued, * * * ”. The Court then went on to distinguish Fuentes saying:
"Petitioner asserts that his right to a hearing before his possession is in any way disturbed is nonetheless mandated by a long line of cases in this Court, culminating in Sniadach v Family Finance Corp, 395 US 337 [89 S Ct 1820; 23 L Ed 2d 349] (1969), and Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67 [92 S Ct 1983; 32 L Ed 2d 556] (1972). The pre-Sniadach cases are said by petitioner to hold that 'the opportunity to be heard must precede any actual deprivation of private property.’ Their import, however, is not so clear as petitioner would have it: they merely stand for the proposition that a hearing must be had before one is finally deprived of his property and do not deal at all with the need for a pretermination hearing where a full and immediate post-termination hearing is provided.” 416 US at 611; 94 S Ct at 1902; 40 L Ed 2d at 415-416.
In North Georgia Finishing, supra, the Court struck down a Georgia ex parte garnishment statute, saying:
"Nor is the statute saved by the more recent decision in Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600 [94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406] (1974). That case upheld the Louisiana sequestration statute which permitted the seller-creditor holding a vendor’s lien to secure a writ of sequestration and, having filed a bond, to cause the sheriff to take possession of the property at issue. The writ, however, was issuable only by a judge upon the filing of *20an affidavit going beyond mere conclusory allegations and clearly setting out the facts entitling the creditor to sequestration. The Louisiana law also expressly entitled the debtor to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on which the writ was issued.
"The Georgia garnishment statute has none of the saving characteristics of the Louisiana statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) 419 US at 606-607; 95 S Ct at 722; 42 L Ed 2d at 757.
As noted before, § 303a has none of the saving characteristics in the nature of a post-termination hearing, determined to be so important in the cases mentioned above. True, § 322 of the statute permits a person aggrieved to ask for a hearing before the license appeal board. In fact, forms were furnished plaintiff so as to facilitate such an appeal. But this provision and administrative process become meaningless in view of the express language in § 303a that the license may only be restored upon the affirmative statement of the medical superintendent of the state hospital to which the applicant had been confined.
I therefore agree with Judge Kaufman that § 303a is violative of due process and suggest the matter be called to the attention of the Legislature so that appropriate amendments may be made to properly assure due process safeguards allowing a determination on the return of the license.
Affirmed.