delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying plaintiff’s petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring the clerk to accept the filing of a complaint for process without the requisite affidavit of compliance mandated by circuit court Rule 0.7. By this appeal plaintiff challenges the validity of Rule 0.7 on the basis that the court was without the statutory or constitutional authority to promulgate such rule.
. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions.
Plaintiff, a licensed attorney in the State of Illinois, sought to file a petition for dissolution of marriage on behalf of a client with the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County. The clerk refused to accept the filing because plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 0.7 of the circuit court requiring attorneys representing clients in personal injury and domestic relations cases to submit an affidavit of compliance indicating the factual circumstances under which they obtained their employment.
Rule 0.7 states:
“(a) The unethical solicitation of employment by or on behalf of any attorney and the payment of commissions, living expenses or other gratuities.in connection with such employment, is prohibited.
(b) The Affidavit of Compliance with this rule is required in personal injury and domestic relations actions shall be in the form furnished by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Attorneys representing governmental bodies shall not be required to file the affidavit.
(c) The affidavit shall be filed by counsel when commencing personal injury and domestic relations actions and by other counsel when an appearance or initial pleading is filed in those actions.
(d) Pleadings unaccompanied by such an affidavit shall not be accepted by the Clerk.”
The affidavit of compliance at issue provides:
“AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 0.7 _on oath states: [Affiant]
(1) He is (a member of the law firm which is) the attorney of record for_and
(here insert all parties represented by affiant) has knowledge of the matters covered by this affidavit and has read Rule 0.7 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
(2) He has not directly or indirectly solicited employment by the above-named party or parties, and knows of no solicitation of said party or parties by any person that has resulted in the employment of the affiant, (or his firm), except (here state all exceptions, OR IF NONE, STATE ‘NO EXCEPTIONS’):__
(3) He has not paid, nor promised to pay, the medical, living or other expenses of any party, and knows of no payment or promise of payment on his behalf or on behalf of his firm to the above-named party or parties, except, (here state all exceptions, OR IF NONE, STATE ‘NO EXCEPTIONS’):__
(4) No part of any attorney’s fee or any portion of recovery by suit or settlement here has been paid or promised to be paid to any person whatever, other than the above-named party or parties and the attorneys of record herein, except, (here state all exceptions, OR IF NONE STATE ‘NO EXCEPTIONS’)__
AFFIANT [Notary].”
On August 10, 1984, plaintiff filed his complaint against Morgan Finley, clerk of the circuit court and Douglas Curtis, one of Finley’s employees, challenging the validity of Rule 0.7. Plaintiff’s complaint prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering the clerk of the circuit court to accept the divorce suit for process without the mandatory affidavit of compliance.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Rule 0.7 was a valid exercise of the State’s police power to shield the public from unethical solicitation by overreaching attorneys. Plaintiff responded to defendants’ motion by arguing that the subject rule violated the first amendment by infringing upon the right of an attorney to advertise. In answer to plaintiff’s contention, defendants argued that Rule 0.7 did not address attorney advertising, but rather that the rule is directed to eliminating the unethical solicitation of business.
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court concluded that Rule 0.7 related to the business of the court and the unethical solicitation of clients by attorneys and that it was reasonable and not illegal or unconstitutional. Thereafter, the court sustained defendants’ motion and dismissed plaintiff’s mandamus action. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the rule is invalid because it is (1) contrary to the limitations imposed by constitutional and statutory law; and (2) inconsistent with case law.
Opinion
We agree with plaintiff’s contention that article VI, section 7(c), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 7(c)) cannot form the basis of the circuit court’s power to enact the rule at issue. That article confers on the chief judge of the circuit court general administrative powers including the authority to provide for court divisions and to designate times and places for holding court. The rule at issue here, which concerns enforcement of ethical behavior by attorneys, cannot be said to be derived from this constitutional grant of limited administrative authority over the workings of the circuit court.
In addition plaintiff contends that Rule 0.7 is in direct conflict with the provisions of section 1 — 104(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 — 104(a)) and Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 21(a)). Section 1 — 104(a), inter alia, grants our supreme court the power to “make rules of pleading, practice and procedure for the circuit [court] *** for the purpose of making [the Code of Civil Procedure] effective for the convenient administration of justice, and otherwise simplifying judicial procedure.” Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 21(a)), adopted pursuant to this authority, empowers a majority of circuit court judges in each circuit to adopt rules governing civil and criminal cases consistent with supreme court rules and Illinois statutes.
Plaintiff argues that that Rule 0.7 does not relate to procedural matters involving the business of the court, as contemplated by the legislature in enacting section 1 — 104(a). Rather, he contends the rule impermissibly regulates matters of substance, effectively barring practicing attorneys from appearing in personal injury and domestic relations cases in circuit court unless they file the prescribed affidavit of ethical conduct.
Defendants not only contend that Rule 21(a) confers authority on the circuit court to adopt Rule 0.7, but also argue that such regulation relates to the business of the court since it seeks to improve the administration of justice by monitoring the unethical conduct of those who, by virtue of their trusted position, stand to inflict great harm on litigants. We disagree with their contentions. Supreme Court Rule 21(a) authorizes the circuit court to adopt rules governing matters of pleading, practice and procedure. But Rule 0.7 ranges far beyond this authority by purporting to monitor attorney-client employment arrangements and by requiring disclosure of an attorney’s compliance with ethical obligations as a condition of access to the courts.
Manifestly, Rule 0.7 and the affidavit of compliance constitute an attempt to enforce compliance with Rules 2 — 103 and 5 — 103 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (87 Ill. 2d Rules 2 — 103, 5 — 103) which bar attorneys from private communications soliciting employment and from providing financial assistance to clients, with certain limited exceptions. But our supreme court in its rules has already established a comprehensive scheme for investigating and disciplining attorneys who may have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Those tasks are under the administrative supervision of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. (87 Ill. 2d R. 751.) Accordingly, this area has been preempted by the Illinois Supreme Court’s regulatory scheme. Rule 0.7, by introducing the circuit court into that scheme, violates the requirement of Supreme Court Rule 21(a) that the circuit court rules it authorizes be consistent with supreme court rules and Illinois statutes. Plaintiff aptly cites the holding of Schnack v. Crumley (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1007, 431 N.E.2d 1364, 1369:
“Disciplinary proceedings and sanctions are strictly within the province of the supreme court which has stated that the disciplining of attorneys is in the nature of an original proceeding in which the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission and its various officers, as well as the inquiry board, the hearing panel, and the review board, serve as agents of the supreme court in administering the disciplinary functions that have been delegated to them. [Citation.] Any sanctions based on alleged professional misconduct must be addressed to the Disciplinary Commission which is vested with the authority to consider such matters and which is the proper forum for such actions rather than this court.”
The rule at issue here also represents an attempt to improperly intrude on the forum created by our supreme court. This conclusion is bolstered by the holding of Wayland v. City of Chicago (1938), 369 Ill. 43, also cited by plaintiff. There the court struck down a circuit court rule purporting to empower judges, with the approval of a court executive committee, to suspend lawyers. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court’s statutory authority to make rules concerning dockets, calendars, and the business of the court did not include making rules concerning attorney disciplinary proceedings, nor did the circuit court possess any inherent power to create such rules.
Plaintiff also correctly notes that Kinsley v. Kinsley (1944), 388 Ill. 194, 57 N.E.2d 449, supports a finding of the invalidity of this rule. There the court voided a court rule requiring a plaintiff’s appearance in open court prior to granting a divorce decree. The court held that because there was no statutory basis for this additional requirement, the rule was invalid as limiting the power of the divorce court to enter a decree. Similarly, Rule 0.7 provides an improper additional nonstatutory requirement for those seeking to file personal injury and domestic relations actions.
Defendants’ citation of People v. Adams (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 315, 451 N.E.2d 1351, in support of Rule 0.7 is unavailing. In Adams a criminal defendant attacked the validity of a circuit court rule requiring that motions founded upon facts not appearing of record be supported by an affidavit reciting those facts. Defendant was barred from presenting a motion to suppress identification testimony because the motion was unsupported by such an affidavit. In addressing and rejecting defendants’ substantive claims concerning the constitutional invalidity of the rule, this court found, inter alia, that the rule constituted a valid exercise of the State’s police power, enacted pursuant to the legislative authority of section 1 — 104(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 1 — 104(a).) However, in this cause we do not reach the issue of whether Rule 0.7 could ever be justified as a valid exercise of police power for we have already found that the rule improperly encroaches on a comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by the Illinois Supreme Court.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to issue the writ of mandamus and for any other relief to which plaintiff may be entitled.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
SULLIVAN, P.J., concurs.