with whom GLASSMAN, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The Court misperceives the remedy that Karen seeks. She does not seek to change the 1988 divorce judgment. She seeks a judicial division of marital property not divided by that judgment. I would find that Title 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(6) (Supp.1994) authorizes her motion notwithstanding the fact that the statute took effect after her divorce judgment became final.
Marital property remains marital property even if a divorce court fails to set it apart, see Sheldon v. Sheldon, 423 A.2d 943, 947 (Me.1980) (even though parties have agreed to possession and use, marital property remains “legally marital property” pursuant to section 722-A(2) and (3) until it is divided by a court order). The second sentence of section 722-A(6) merely provides a procedure for the equitable division of omitted marital property and does not “alter substantive rights.” Michaud v. Northern Maine Medical Ctr., 436 A.2d 398, 400 (Me.1981); see Riley v. Bath Iron Works, 639 A.2d 626, 628 (Me.1994) (“absent any pending action or proceeding and absent any legislative statement to the contrary, the Legislature intends that procedural changes apply to preexisting, inchoate interests and that substantive changes do not”); see also Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100, 102 (Me.1977) (“Statutes providing *431procedures for the division of property upon divorce are remedial in nature, and the legislature may change those procedures without offending constitutional principles.”).
The Court declares that permitting Karen to employ section 722-A(6) to obtain relief for a failure to divide marital property prior to the effective date of the statute is to give the statute retroactive application not authorized by the Legislature. It is wrong on two counts. First, to the extent that section 722-A(6) provides a new remedy, it operates prospectively, not retroactively. Second, to the extent that section 722-A(6) provides a remedy for an old wrong, it is what the Legislature intended. During the legislative debate, this question was asked and answered.
Representative MELENDY: [Section 725-A] dealt with spouses who, prior to 1983, if they went through the divorce process, many of them did not realize that retirement benefits were also joint property that they could work into the divorce agreement. So, back in 1983, the federal government passed a law saying that as of 1983, that could be something that could be argued for and that the federal government would be the one sending out the cheeks. The spouses, prior to 1983, sort of had no recourse. What this is saying, and the only reason the title has changed is because the way it was written, it seemed unconstitutional. This was just a matter of clarification so if the divorce decree didn’t say that it had considered the retirement benefits the spouse would be able to petition the courts and ask to have it reopened. It would be up to the court to grant or not grant it..
Representative MARSANO: Was it the intent then, as a result of the change of the title and the change of law in this bill, that those pensions would become subject to future determinations of the court? ...
Representative MELENDY: If I understand the question right, yes. If the retirement benefits were not spelled out in the divorce agreement, then yes the spouse could go back and petition the court that that particular segment of their joint property could again be reopened but for that segment only....
Leg.Rec. H-416 (1989).
Karen’s motion is brought pursuant to the second sentence of § 722-A(6) (“On the motion of either party, which may be made at anytime, the court may set aside or divide the omitted property between the parties, as justice may require.”). Although the phrase “as justice may require” would allow the Court to consider the provisions of the divorce judgment relating to property division, the statute in no way contemplates any amendment or alteration of the divorce judgment. The Court’s analysis seeks to defeat this patently remedial provision by exaggerating the “dramatic” consequences of the first sentence (“If a final divorce decree fails to set apart or divide marital property over which the court had jurisdiction, the omitted property is deemed held by both parties as tenants in common.”). The first sentence has no application to the current dispute.
Contrary to the Court’s contention, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata would not serve as a bar to Karen’s action to divide unadjudicated marital property. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 264 at 606 (1986) (divorce judgment is “not conclusive as to questions which might have been but were not litigated in the original action”).1
I would vacate the judgment.
. Several jurisdictions have adopted this view. See, e.g., Williams v. Waldman, 108 Nev. 466, 836 P.2d 614, 619 (1992) ("Unadjudicated marital property may be subject to partition in an independent action in equity."); Cooper v. Cooper, 167 Ariz. 482, 808 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct.App.1990) (wife may bring action to divide ex-husband’s pension, even though both parties were aware of the pension at the time of the original divorce decree); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 597 A.2d 856, 859 (Del.Fam.Ct.1990) (ex-spouse may bring action for partition of unadjudicated marital property); Buhrmann v. Buhrmann, 231 Neb. 831, 438 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb.1989) ("a decree of dissolution which does not contain a complete adjudication of property rights of the parties *432does not operate as an absolute bar to the maintenance of an independent action by either of the parties involving such rights”): Chrun v. Chrun, 751 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Mo.1988) (enbanc) ("post-final-judgment efforts to divide marital property not previously divided in a dissolution action require an independent suit in equity”); Searles v. Searles, 420 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn.1988) (where divorce decree fails to dispose of parties' property, the matter of ownership remains to be determined); In re Marriage of Graves, 198 Cal.App.3d 1047, 244 Cal.Rptr. 110, 113 (1988) (spouse may bring separate action for division of unadjudicated property); Koepke v. Koepke, 732 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex.1987) (ex-spouse may bring action for partition of unadjudicated military retirement benefits); In re marriage of Bishop, 46 Wash.App. 198, 729 P.2d 647, 648 (1986) (unad-judicated pension rights are subject to partition).