(dissenting).
I do not agree with the majority opinion that the time within which to appeal in this case is governed by SDCL 15-6-5. Under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, service of notices and other instruments is governed by SDCL 62-7-30 which reads:
“All notices or orders provided for in this chapter may be served personally or by registered or certified mail. When served by registered or certified mail, proof by affidavit thereof must be accompanied by post-office return receipt. When, however, any party is represented by an attorney, such service must be made on such attorney, and may be-made either in the manner provided in this section, or in the manner provided by § 15-6-5.”
In my view, the statute must be construed as being in two parts. Part 1 provides for service upon a claimant or upon his attorney, if he be so represented, either by registered or certified mail, with postal return receipt requested. Under this part, proof of such *403service is made by affidavit showing the date of such mailing, with the United States mail receipt showing the actual date of receipt of such instrument. Thus under this part of the statute, it is readily apparent when the claimant or his representative actually receives the instrument. Part 2 of the statute is limited to service on a claimant’s attorney and permits service either by registered or certified mail or by SDCL 15-6-5, that is, by ordinary first-class mail.
The determination as to which method of service is to be used, when a claimant is represented by an attorney, is left to the discretion of the commissioner under SDCL 62-7-30. In this case the commissioner made service by certified mail, return receipt requested; executed an affidavit of mailing showing the notice was mailed at Pierre, South Dakota, on October 4th, and attached thereto the return receipt of the United States mail service showing receipt of such notice by the claimant’s attorney on October 11th. In my view, the time of service of such notice on the claimant’s attorney was the date of its actual receipt on October 11th, as indicated by the post-office record attached to the affidavit of service, and not the date computed under the Rules of Civil Procedure. I am further convinced that the commissioner, being an attorney as required by SDCL 62-7-12.1, knowingly and intentionally elected to make service under part 1 of SDCL 62-7-30 when he used the affidavit as proof of service, attaching the postal receipts as required by that portion of the statute, rather than using a certificate of service, which would normally be used under SDCL 15-6-5.
Moreover, as is required in SDCL 62-7-30, the commissioner frequently sends notices, under the statute, to parties not represented by attorneys. This service must be done under part 1 of SDCL 62-7-30. What method is such claimant to use in the computation of time when, in all likelihood, he is unaware of the provisions of SDCL 15-6-5? To me, logic dictates that the time of receipt of registered or certified mail would be the date upon which to commence the running of time when service is made in that manner.
I might add that it seems incredible that it took seven days for the United States mail service to transport a letter from *404Pierre, South Dakota to Lennox, South Dakota. In the light of such mail service, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the notice could be delivered after the time for appeal had expired under the holding of the majority opinion.
I cannot agree with the arbitrary rule laid down in the majority opinion that the time of service starts three days after mailing of the notice regardless of when the claimant or his attorney actually receives the notice. This technicality is not mandatory under the Workmen’s Compensation Act since there is an alternative procedure which meets with the spirit of the Act.
In view of the position taken in the majority opinion, the question of whether or not the commissioner has the authority to extend the time within which to appeal can be relegated to another day.