I agree with the majority that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the restrictive covenant and that appellants had standing to institute suit against appellees. I also agree with the majority that the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing appellants’ request for relief to enforce their right of first refusal, as appellees never requested dismissal on this basis in their preliminary objections. Further, I agree that appellants have set forth sufficient facts establishing an agency relationship between the Kurtzes and the other appellees. I accordingly join in the majority’s disposition of these matters. However, I find it unnecessary to discuss the terms of the addendum to the parties’ agreement of sale and any ambiguities created thereby. Hence, I write separately with respect to this issue.
The majority correctly recognizes that appellants’ deed specifically references the subdivision plan, thereby incorporating the covenant into the deed even though it is not specifically set forth therein. See Majority opinion, ante at 40. The plan notes expressly provide that Lot 4, which is otherwise described therein as the residue, is “to remain farm use,” *45and that it “will be use[d] for agricultural use only.” As noted by the majority, this statement thus appears to create an unambiguous restrictive covenant regarding the use of lot 4.1 Majority opinion, ante at 40. A review of appellant’s complaint further reveals that appellants are seeking to enforce the covenant, as incorporated into their deed, rather than the terms of a prior separate agreement. See Second Amended Complaint at paragraphs 33, 34, 65 and 68. Under these circumstances, appellants were not required to raise the merger doctrine with respect to the restrictive covenant, because the merger rule does not affect their right to enforce the covenants incorporated into or contained in their deed. See Elderkin v. Caster, 447 Pa. 118, 124 n. 11, 288 A.2d 771, 774 n. 11 (1972) (merger doctrine holds that all warranties and representations in connection with a sale or other transaction made prior to or contemporaneous with a deed are merged into the deed and that unless therein expressly provided for, they are forever lost); Valvano v. Galardi, 363 Pa.Super. 584, 592 n. 2, 526 A.2d 1216, 1220 n. 2 (merger doctrine provides that as a general rule an agreement of sale merges into the deed and no recovery may be had based upon an earlier agreement; the merger rule does not apply where the expressed intention of the parties is to the contrary nor does it apply as to matters intended not to be consummated by the deed issued pursuant to it and which are collateral to the deed).
Despite its discussion of the restrictive covenant issue and cognizance of the merger doctrine, the majority nonetheless proceeds to discuss paragraph d of the addendum to the parties’ agreement of sale and an alleged ambiguity created by the removal of paragraph f therefrom. Majority opinion, ante *46at 40-41. In support of its decision to consider the addendum, the majority cites Valvano v. Galardi, supra 363 Pa.Super. at 584, 526 A.2d 1216, and Shawnee Lake Association v. Uhler, 131 Pa.Super. 146, 198 A. 910 (1938) for the proposition that the merger rule does not preclude enforcement of matters which the parties intended not to be consummated by the deed or which are collateral thereto. See Majority opinion, ante at 40 n. 5. Although the proposition of law is correctly stated, these decisions are distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the provisions of the addendum, insofar as they relate to the restrictive covenant, cannot be construed as being collateral to the deed because the deed has incorporated the terms of the restrictive covenant by reference. Compare Valvano v. Galardi, 363 Pa.Super. at 592 n. 2, 526 A.2d at 1220 n. 2 (easement set forth in addendum to agreement of sale did not merge with the deed because the parties expressed an intent to the contrary and the terms of the easement disclosed that it was clearly collateral to the deed); Shawnee Lake Association v. Uhler, 131 Pa.Super. at 152-153, 198 A. at 913 (parties did not intend restrictive covenant contained in a separate agreement to merge with and be superseded by the deed, where none of the lot owners’ deeds contained the restrictive covenant). Because those provisions of the addendum concerning the restrictive covenant merged with and are not collateral to the deed, consideration of paragraphs d and f of the addendum is unnecessary, and any alleged ambiguities created thereby are irrelevant. I therefore am unable to join in the majority’s discussion of this matter.
. The only issue before this court is whether the chancellor erred in sustaining appellees’ demurrer and dismissing appellants' complaint. Consequently, nothing in this court’s disposition should be construed as a final adjudication on the merits of the case. Rather, resolution of the issues regarding the existence of an unambiguous and enforceable restrictive covenant are for the chancellor to determine in light of the evidence presented by the parties and the applicable law.