dissenting:
The majority concludes “with some reluctance” (113 Ill. 2d at 162) that the statute at issue here requires not only the filing of a motion to reduce or modify a sentence within 30 days, but also a ruling on that motion in the same time period. The rationale offered is the oft-repeated maxim that clear statutory language must be given effect. However, the majority chooses to ignore its opposite number (see K. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 403 (1950)), which is also frequently relied upon by this court, that the court is obligated to interpret a statute so that it will not yield an absurd or unjust result. See, e.g., People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310; Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 306, 312.
I cannot believe that the legislature intended the exercise of the statutory right to seek reduction or modification of a sentence to be subject to forces wholly beyond the defendant’s control. What the majority’s interpretation gives us is a kind of roulette justice under which a defendant who moves promptly to modify or reduce the sentence may or may not have his motion considered depending on the vagaries of the court’s docket, the administrative efficiency of court personnel, “the need for taking additional evidence, illness, involvement in trial, and vacations” (see 113 Ill. 2d at 162-63), and whether or not the sentencing judge gets around to ruling on the motion. If any of these variables results in a ruling by the court more than 30 days after sentencing, the majority’s view is that the defendant is simply out of luck. This is plainly arbitrary and unjust, and such a reading of the statute should be avoided.
The court hypothesizes two legitimate interests served by its reading of the statute: “finality of sentencing and [protection of] the courts from the filing of repetitive motions or motions which require the review of stale records.” (113 Ill. 2d at 162.) As to finality, the legislature obviously recognized the existence of competing values by enacting a procedure for challenging a sentence in the first place. Moreover, the command that the trial judge rule on such a motion within 30 days can hardly be said to advance finality materially when the defendant has an appeal as of right which stays the finality of the sentence. The second asserted interest, protecting the courts from filing of repetitive or stale motions, would be served just as well if the statute were interpreted to mean that filing a motion within 30 days of sentencing tolls the running of the time period for the purpose of decision. Under this construction, any action by the defendant would have to come within 30 days of sentencing, obviating the possibility of repetitive or stale motions.
Although referred to by the majority, the Federal courts’ experience with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 actually undercuts the majority’s reading of section 5 — 8—1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(c)). Under the previous version of the Federal rule, it provided in pertinent part that “[t]he court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.” (18 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (1976).) The literal language of prior Rule 35, like that of section 5 — 8—1(c) here, thus appeared to impose a time limit on the court instead of on the defendant. In interpreting this rule, however, the Federal courts held that it required only filing of the defendant’s motion within the period. (See, e.g., United States v. DeMier (8th Cir. 1982), 671 F.2d 1200; United States v. Smith (9th Cir. 1981), 650 F.2d 206; United States v. Mendoza (5th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 89; United States v. Braasch (7th Cir. 1976), 542 F.2d 442; United States v. Stollings (4th Cir. 1975), 516 F.2d 1287; cf. United States v. Kajevic (7th Cir. 1983), 711 F.2d 767 (dictum expressing doubts about this line of authority).) In 1985 the rule was amended to provide that a “motion to reduce a sentence may be made *** within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.” (Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).) This change “was deemed desirable to remove any doubt” that the time limit was one on filing a motion for reduction and was not jurisdictional. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b), Advisory Committee Note to 1985 Amendment.
While legislative action to amend the statute, suggested by the majority, might be similarly desirable in order to expunge any doubt about the meaning of section 5 — 8—1(c), the great weight of Federal authority under the prior version of Rule 35 demonstrates that it is quite appropriate for the court to read the 30-day time limit here as a deadline for filing the motion.
Finally, the court’s interpretation of the statute may raise a substantial constitutional problem. Where the legislature has created a liberty or property interest, a person may not be arbitrarily deprived of that interest. (Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982), 455 U.S. 422, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 102 S. Ct. 1148.) In Logan, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission dismissed the petitioner’s timely filed employment-discrimination claim because the Commission had inadvertently failed to convene a hearing on the complaint within the 120-day period mandated by the statute. Noting that the petitioner was deprived of his claim in a “random manner” (455 U.S. 422, 434, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 277, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1157) for reasons beyond his control (455 U.S. 422, 424, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 270, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1151), the Supreme Court held that he had been denied due process. Under the court’s decision in this case a similar denial of due process would occur: persons with a statutorily created liberty interest in seeking reduction or modification of their sentences may be arbitrarily deprived of this right for reasons also beyond their control. Our duty to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional infirmities (People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161) leads me to conclude that the majority’s reading of this statute is not acceptable.