(concurring) :
I think it may be worthwhile to add some comments as the problems here involved have now resulted in closely divided votes in several en banc cases.
The underlying issues here are: (a) whether interested persons (the petitioners) are entitled to trial-type procedures or quasi-legislative type procedures at a Zoning Commission public hearing on a proposed amendment to the city-wide zoning map and (b) depending upon the answer to that question, are petitioners entitled to direct review in this court. To find the answers, there are two statutes to be examined, as well as the body of administrative law. The first statute to be consulted, of course, is the organic act of the Zoning Commission (D.C.Code 1973, § 5-412 et seq.). There is found the nature of the administrative process involved and the type of agency hearing envisaged. If the organic act does not indicate the type of hearing involved, one may well then examine the DCAPA (D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1501 et seq.) to determine the applicable procedures contained therein and, absent' governing appellate provisions in the organic act, what appellate remedies are available. To put it another way, one would hardly expect to find the controlling answers on the nature of a zoning hearing in the DCAPA. Rather, this is found in the organic act of the Zoning Commission and pertinent decisional law.1
*304In construing the DCAPA, it is enlightening to look to the Uniform Law Commissioners’ Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act2 (Model State APA) and the Federal APA3 because the DCAPA was modelled largely upon the Model State APA4 which, in turn was, naturally enough, modelled upon the Federal APA.5
Examining the Zoning Commission statute, one finds that before a zoning regulation may be adopted there must be a public hearing, with notice published, thirty days in advance of the proposed amendment together with the time and place for the hearing. At the hearing the Commission must “afford any person present a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” 6 (Emphasis added.) This hardly bespeaks trial-type adjudication.7
The decision of the United States Circuit Court in this jurisdiction, Allen v. Zoning Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 24, 27, 449 F.2d 1100, 1103 (1971), cited by the dissent, states the nature of the usual zoning hearing:
. . . The zoning law contemplates situations that directly affect the interests of local property owners, singly and en masse, and a type of hearing that frequently involves (such as here) direct participation by the property owner themselves in local citizen protest-type appearances to demonstrate community sentiment. Such hearings could be char*305acterized as being of the grass roots type. One of their features is that they provide for a face-to-face encounter between the official who is to decide and the citizens whose rights are to be determined.
On the other hand, hearings in the federal agencies are more formal. They are usually fully transcribed and reported, involve the presentation of evidence in judicial type proceedings by counsel, and other representatives of the interested parties, who are in a large number of cases frequently corporations who in turn represent many thousands of shareholders. There are of course many federal hearings in which the individuals involved directly participate but their issues, formality, recording procedures, and the degree to which the interested parties are represented completely by counsel, distinguish them generally from the local grass roots-direct confrontation hearings. (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in the DCAPA changes or was intended to change the nature of a zoning hearing, which as the circuit court noted once again in Allen, supra, is a legislative-type proceeding. “The Act (DCAPA) does not confer any new substantive powers; it does not require hearings where hearings were not required before nor does it impose on the District agencies rule-making prerequisites that will be unduly difficult with which to comply.” District of Columbia Administrative Practice Manual, 5 (1969). For the nature of the usual zoning proceedings, see also Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, D.C.App., 291 A.2d 699 (1972); Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 477 F. 2d 402 (1973); Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F.Supp. 686 (D.D.C.1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1985, U.S.App.D.C., Aug. 6, 1973, and American University v. Prentiss, 113 F.Supp. 389 (1953), aff'd, 94 U.S. App.D.C. 204, 214 F.2d 282, cert denied, 348 U.S. 898, 75 S.Ct. 217, 99 L.Ed. 705 (1954). Consequently, it is evident that city-wide and area zoning are rulemaking in character.8 In this case, there does not appear to be any dispute on that proposition.
This leads to the specific problems on which this court has split not only here but in other en banc cases.9 The issues are: (a) what type of hearing were petitioners entitled to before the Zoning Commission and (b) do petitioners have a right of direct appeal to this court.
The dissenting opinion acknowledges that rulemaking is here involved but goes on to say “how the premise ever developed that such action [rulemaking] should be treated differently under the Administrative Procedure Act from the adjudicatory process remains shrouded in mystery.” What that seems to say is that under the DCAPA all rulemaking should be considered by the agency to be adjudicatory (trial-type) for hearing purposes, a rather novel concept in administrative law, especially since the DCAPA (and APA’s generally) provide vastly different procedures for rulemaking and adjudication (contested cases) ,10
*306To support this proposition, the dissent (a) notes that rulemaking is envisaged in .the DCAPA (§ 1-1502(7)) and (b) points out that § 1-1509 which sets forth the procedures in “contested cases”, covers rule-making as well as adjudication because § 1-1509 refers to the proponent of a “rule or order.” The conclusion is then somehow drawn that by “judicial fiat” the court is reading the word “rule” out of the Act.
While the DCAPA may be no model of clarity in some respects, for reasons I will later set forth, I see no reason to conclude that it has departed from the fundamentals of administrative law. Preliminarily, it is important to remain aware that the underlying issue on this aspect of the case is whether interested persons are entitled to a trial-type hearing or a quasi-legislative type hearing in a proceeding before the Zoning Commission involving a proposed amendment to the city-wide zoning map.11 Before reaching what I believe to be the principal error in the dissent, it might be well to lay some background.
As we know, there are principally two substantive functions in administrative law: rulemaking and adjudication. Agencies perform the functions in three ways: by formal rulemaking, informal rulemak-ing, and trial-type adjudication.12 In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303-04, 323 F.2d 306, 308-09 (1963), rulemaking which is quasi-legislative in nature was distinguished from adjudication which is by its nature quasi-judicial:
A legislative hearing relates to “the making of a rule for the future.” As distinguished from a judicial inquiry, it is a non-adversary proceeding which seeks to devise broad policy applicable to the public generally, or a substantial segment thereof, rather than to individual parties. . . . (Citation and footnote omitted.)
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act includes two types of rulemaking. “One, known as ‘formal’ rulemaking, borrowed heavily from the adjudicative model in that it was required to be ‘on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.’ The alternative rulemaking provision, ‘informal’ rulemaking, required notice of a proposed rule to a broad class of participants, the opportunity to comment upon the rule, and a contemporaneous statement by the agency when it enacted the rule.” Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va.L.Rev. 185, 186 (1974). (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the hearing procedures to be adopted depend essentially on the nature of the substantive administrative process involved. If informal rulemaking is involved, the hearing procedure to 'be followed is what is commonly referred to as “notice and comment” rulemaking.13 Ver-kuil, supra at 186-87. If formal rulemak-ing is required, the hearing procedures to be followed are essentially the same as those for adjudication:
In essence, the APA applies the same procedures to formal rulemaking as to *307adjudication, including a hearing with cross-examination before an administrative judge. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1970). Verkuil, supra at 186 n. 1.
See also Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., 119 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 125 n. 4, 337 F.2d 518, 521 n. 4 (1964).14
The trial-type procedures of the Federal APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 apply to adjudication and formal rulemaking, but they do not apply to informal rulemaking. Automotive Parts & Accessories Association v. Boyd, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 203 n. 4, 407 F.2d 330, 333 n. 4 (1968). This is informative as background for the issue here involved. It is necessary to appreciate the distinction in order to understand the issue.15
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-58, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), is instructive on this question. There, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a unanimous court, laid out the fundamentals in discussing the contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission should have granted a formal rule-making hearing (of the adjudicatory type) under 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 (the Federal APA) rather than an informal rulemak-ing hearing under 5 U.S.C. § 553. The opinion explains that the formal rulemak-ing procedures “govern a rule-making proceeding only when 5 U.S.C. § 553 so requires.”
The latter section, dealing generally with rulemaking, makes applicable the prov-sions of §§ 556 and 557 only “[wjhen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . .”16 The Esch Act, authorizing the Commission “after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, [to] establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service . . . ,” 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (a), does not require that such rules “be made on the record.” 5 U.S.C. § 553. That distinction is determinative for this case. “A good deal of significance lies in the fact that some statutes do expressly require determinations on the record.” 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.08, p. 225 (1958). Sections 556 and 557 need be applied “only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing, prescribes explicitly that it be ‘on the record’ ” Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 314, 400 F.2d 778, 785 (1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Dillon, 120 U. S.App.D.C. 112, 115 n. 9, 344 F.2d 497, 500 n. 9 (1965). Cf. First National Bank of McKeesport v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 96 U.S.App.D.C. 194, 225 F.2d 33 (1955). We do not suggest that only the precise words “on the record” in the applicable statute will suffice to make §§ 556 and 557 applicable to rulemaking proceedings, but we do hold *308that the language of the Esch Car Service Act is insufficient to invoke these sections.
Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of legislative rulemak-ing power rather than adjudicatory hearings as in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937), and because 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (a) does not require a determination “on the record,” the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 were inapplicable. (Emphasis added.) 17
In deciding cases raising the issue of the direct reviewability in this court of cases coming from administrative agencies this court has laid down two rules as the result of its interpretation of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA) and the organic acts of the particular agencies involved. This court has decided that in accordance with the express provisions of the DCAPA we have direct review powers 18 only over “contested cases”, those cases which determine the rights of specific parties and must be accompanied by “trial-type” proceedings.19 ■See D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1502(8) for description in the DCAPA of a “contested case” and § 1-1509 for the procedural requirements of a contested case. Where, however, an organic act of an agency authorizes this court to entertain a petition for review we have of course accepted direct review jurisdiction in such cases as directed by Congress.20 Needless to say, however, individuals considering themselves aggrieved, in a judicially cognizable sense, always have access to the trial court for review in an original proceeding (e. g., prohibitory injunction, mandatory injunction and declaratory judgment).21 If unsuccessful there, they later have access to this court to contend, for example, that the agency action was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise deprived them of statutory or constitutional rights. Typically, this procedure is available as a result of agency legislative type proceedings, usually referred to as the “informal rulemaking” type. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (declaratory judgment and injunction) and District of Columbia v. Green, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 848 (1973) (injunction). The ultimate issue here does not involve whether the petitioner is entitled to judicial review but, rather, whether under existing law a review lies by way of direct appeal to this court or by way of a proceeding filed initially in the trial court. There is nothing novel about the latter course.22 The Model State APA provides for review of all administrative agency proceedings, whether “contested cases" or rulemaking, to commence in the state trial court of general jurisdiction.23 In Maryland, for example, the state code provides for review of both rules and contested cases in the circuit court of the county, this being the trial court of general jurisdiction. Ann.Code of Md., art. 41, §§ 249 and 255 (1971).
*309On the national scene, the federal APA carries these review provisions :
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. . . . 5 U.S.C. §704 (1970).
The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. ... 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). (Emphasis added.)
Returning to the main thrust of the dissent, it focuses on the provision in the DCAPA which states that in “contested cases” the “proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof.” (§ 1-1509(b)).24 It goes on to say that since the DCAPA envisages rulemaking in §§ 1-1502(7) and 1 — 1509(b), the majority is reading the word “rule” out of the Act. As I understand it, the majority opinion is not doing this at all. It specifically classifies the action of the Zoning Commission as a legislative act by nature — which is another way of saying that, essentially, informal rulemaking is here involved {see, e. g., § 1-1505).
Turning to the dissent’s point concerning a reference to “rule or order” in § 1-1509(b), it is apparent that (a) this provision appears in the section of the DCAPA relating only to hearing procedures in “contested cases” (adjudication) and (b) it is modelled exactly upon the terminology of the section in the federal APA which sets forth the hearing procedures in formal rulemaking and adjudication (5 U.S.C. § 556(d)) both of which require trial-type hearing procedures.25 This reference to “rule or order” is consequently of no significance on the issues here involved. The reason it has no significance is that (a) it simply jumps the issue of what type hearing is required in a city-wide zoning hearing and (b) it refers to a provision in the section of the DCAPA setting forth hearing procedures where adjudication is involved. There is nothing startling about the reference to “rule or order” in this section as rulemaking requires such adjudicatory procedures if it is “formal rulemak-ing”, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., supra, though this type of rulemaking is seldom apt to be required in municipal administrative law, one exception being utility ratemaking. D.C.Code 1973, § 43-401 et seq.
It has occurred to me that the dissenting view in this case could be prompted in large part because of a gap in the DCAPA which may have resulted from the unusual jurisdictional situation which existed here when it was enacted in 1968. At that time, jurisdiction over local matters was divided between the United States District Court and the then Court of General Sessions (now the Superior Court) and, upon review, the United States Court of Appeals on the one hand and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals on the other hand, with jurisdiction in the Court of General Sessions being then limited to $10,000. Significantly, in the judicial review provi*310sions of the DCAPA as originally enacted (D.C.Code 1969 Supp., § 1-1510), which was the period of this dual jurisdiction in local matters, this court was barred from reviewing decisions and orders of the Zoning Commission and other agencies as well. Doubtless, this was due to the then preval-ing jurisdictional situation just related. Instead, judicial review was then left “in those courts which review orders and decisions of those agencies on the date before enactment” of the DCAPA. Transcribed, this left such review jurisdiction in the United States District Court initially (e. g., by prohibitory injunction or mandatory injunction) and, upon review, in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. When the Court Reorganization Act was later enacted in 1970, some sketchy amendments of a conforming nature were made in relation to the local administrative agencies but no major review of the local administrative law scene is apparent. For one thing, when the Reorganization Act was being considered it was yet too early for an accumulation of case law experience under the DCAPA. As a consequence, the DCAPA still does not contain a section specifically providing for a mode of review to contest the validity of a rulemaking proceeding, as is the case with the Model State APA, § 7 (1961), and Ann.Code of Md., art. 41, § 249 (1971). This gap may be a contributing factor to the division in this court in this area of the law. I certainly do not view this void as requiring adoption of the dissenting view because the DCAPA, as drawn, limits direct review in this court to “contested cases.” This leaves aggrieved persons in noncontested cases to the traditional mode of review by way of an equitable action in the trial court.26 It would be a relatively simple matter, however, for the legislature to rectify this omission in the interest of more clarity in the matter of informal rulemaking review.
To say that the legislature deliberately left out this procedure would be to construe it as abandoning informal rulemaking by the local agencies, since all hearings would become adjudicatory. This would be a horrendous departure from the essence of administrative law.27 This construction of the DCAPA would be open to the court only if the Act unmistakably so required. If Congress had intended in the DCAPA to change administrative law in its fundamentals, it would certainly have made this plain. Moreover, such a construction of the DCAPA would require that here we ignore the agency’s organic act which is controlling and, as demonstrated, clearly envisages a proceeding with the character of informal rulemaking.
As I have stated, it is elementary that one must examine the organic act of the agency to determine the nature of the administrative proceeding required. Furthermore, the DCAPA specifically states that it “shall supplement all other provisions of law establishing procedures to be observed by the . . . agencies . . . except that this chapter shall supersede any such law and procedure to the extent of any conflict therewith.” (§ 1-1501) (Emphasis added.) It does not repeal such “other provisions of law” it simply supplements them, that is to say, it adds to or fills any deficiencies, principally in the pertinent organic act.28 While it is specifically intended to “supersede” to the extent of any conflict with the DCAPA, I fail to *311see any such conflict in this case.29 Certainly, a reference to a “rule or order” in the section setting forth hearing procedures in “contested cases” does not establish a conflict with the Zoning Commission statute in the matter of the type of agency hearing there envisaged and as illuminated by the decisional law on the nature of a zoning hearing. And, once again, there is nothing in the DCAPA to require a construction which, realistically viewed, would effectively eliminate informal rulemaking in city-wide and area zoning cases and require instead adjudicative hearing.30 The effect of such a construction would be to decimate informal rulemaking in this jurisdiction and thereby negate the body of administrative law in one of its main essentials.
It is not at all the situation, as the dissent appears to say, that as a result of this court’s decisions, affected individuals are “not even entitled to have their grievance reviewed” in this court. Nor is it the case that the DCAPA is being ignored. The string of controversies in zoning cases has arisen in this court because interested individuals appearing before the Zoning Commission have contended that they are entitled to judicial (trial) type proceedings at those zoning hearings,31 a contention which the court’s opinion here should lay to rest. I think, in net effect, the dissenting opinion legislates the result it reaches. If the legislature wishes it otherwise, it is for that body to say and not this court.32
. The agency’s organic act or its legislative history may specify that either formal rule-making, informal rulemaking, or adjudication procedures are to be used and thus whether a trial-type hearing is to be afforded. See, e. g., International Harvester Company v. Ruchelshaus, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 411, 425-26, 478 F.2d 615, 629-30 (1973). Some agency organic acts are not that specific. Absent this specificity, the DOAPA requires one to determine whether the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are being determined. *304D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1502(8). If they are, then trial-type procedures must be afforded because it is a “contested case.” D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1509 (b).
. A copy of the 1961 version of the Act may be found in the Appendix to 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law (1965). The 1970 version of the Act may be found in Appendix B to Davis, Administrative Law (3rd ed. 1972).
. 5 Ü.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
. The DCAPA is said to have some modifications to fit the peculiar local jurisdictional scene. Rather than employ the section of the Federal APA relating to “adjudication” the Model State APA employed the section entitled “contested cases” for the stated reason that:
The term “contested case” is used in the Model Act, instead of the word “adjudication” as found in the Federal Act, to avoid the possible confusion in terminology that might result from the fact that ratemaking under the Federal Act is classified as “rule making” with special procedures applicable to it, whereas under the Model Act it is desired to apply the contested case procedures to ratemaking. [National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Handbook 207 (1961), cited in Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, D.C.App., 287 A.2d 101, 104 (1972).]
There is little difference essentially between a “contested case” and “adjudication.” In Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310, 313 (1974) (en banc), we stated:
The term [contested case] is taken from the definition in the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961 . and is intended to be synonymous with adjudication as defined by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act with the exception of ratemaking. . (Citations omitted.)
. Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, supra at 104.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 5-415.
. A recent article dealing with the federal APA warns against judicially requiring trial-type procedures unless they are specifically required.
In adopting the APA, Congress established the notice and comment procedure of section 553 as the normal pattern for agency rulemaking. Judicial requirement of further procedures for general rulemaking may impair administrative efficiency and conflict with the congressional purpose of prescribing uniform procedures. Therefore, courts should be reluctant to infer additional procedural requirements from regulatory statutes unless those procedures are clearly necessary to effectuate the statutory intent. . . . Note, The Judicial Role In Defining Procedural Requirements For Agency Rulemaking, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 782, 805 (1974). (Emphasis added.)
If this is true on the federal scene it should be even more evident on the local scene where formal rulemaking procedures are rare, except perhaps for utility ratemaking.
. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 1-1502(6) and 1-1505.
. In Paul v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, D.C.App. (No. 8185, Order entered May 2, 1975) this court announced an evenly divided vote on this same question; see also Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council, supra, and Hotel Ass'n of Washington v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage and Industrial Safety Board, D.C.App., 318 A.2d 294 (1974) (en banc).
.As has been authoritatively stated in reference to the parent federal APA, “[t]he Administrative Procedure Act prescribes radically different procedures for rule making and adjudication. Accordingly, the proper classification of agency proceedings as rule making or adjudication is of fundamental importance. . . . More broadly the entire Act is based upon a dichotomy between rule making and adjudication. . . . Not only were the draftsmen and proponents of the bill aware ■ of this realistic distinction between rule mak*306ing and adjudication, but they shaped the entire Act around it.” Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 12, 14, 15 (1047).
. As I understand it, there is nowhere involved here the validity of any specific action of the corrections department of the local government. We are here simply considering the procedural nature of the Zoning Commission proceeding involved.
. I am aware of the rather subdued controversy between some of the federal circuit courts concerning judicial review of informal rulemaking. Cf. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 407 F.2d 330 (1968), with Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2nd Cir. 1973). See also Wright, The Courts And The Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 Cornell L.Rev. 375 (1974). But these problems are nowhere involved here.
.The “comments” may be either written or oral (at the hearing), or both. See, D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1505.
.Adjudicative procedures in federal agencies are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 654(c) (2) which requires a hearing in accordance with 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557. Informal rulemaking procedures are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553. However, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) requires that “[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.” (Emphasis added.) When sections 556 and 557 apply, the process is called “formal rule-making.” United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972).
. There is nothing so peculiar about the local jurisdiction, as- far as I am aware, which should cause us to disregard appropriate guidance in the parent legislation in administrative law (the Federal APA) or the body of administrative law as it has developed over the decades.
. Over the years the phrase “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” in the agency’s organic act has become the watchword requiring an adjudicatory type hearing:
[T]he mere presence of statutory language like “hearing” unless made unmistakenly clear as by the addition of “on the record,” will not serve to define the required procedures. Verkuil, supra at 196.
. Tims, for the reasons there stated, the Court ruled out formal rulemaking (trial-type) procedures.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1510. See, e. g., Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, supra and Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, supra.
. As the majority opinion states, what is involved here is an amendment of the city-wide zoning map.
. Hotel Ass’n v. District of Columbia Minimum Wage and Safety Board, supra.
. See, e. g., Model State APA, § 7 (1961), Ann.Code of Md., art. 41, § 249 (1971), 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970), and Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, supra at 317 n. 18.
. Because of the nature of injunction proceedings they traditionally receive expedited treatment in the trial court and in this court. So the time factor may not be appreciably more, or may be less, than the period involved in a direct appeal to this court.
. Model State APA §§ 7 and 15 (1961).
. The dissent nowhere comes to grips with the underlying question of which avenue of review is open in a non “contested case”. It is not a question of whether an avenue of review is open but which review course, i. e., direct review in this court or review by an equity proceeding instituted in the trial court.
. See, e. g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, supra at 203 n. 4, 407 F.2d at 333 n. 4.
. As I have indicated earlier, there is nothing unusual in administrative law about this mode of review of rulemaking; See Model State APA, § 7 (1961) and Ann.Code of Md., art. 41, § 249 (1971).
. Cf. note 10, supra. The dissent seems to be saying that when a hearing is provided for by statute it follows from this fact alone that it must be a trial-type hearing. This is contrary to basic administrative law.
. Cf., e. g., PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 485 F.2d 718 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1992, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974).
. Contrary to the dissent, in Wallace v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 289 A.2d 885 (1972), we essentially held, in pertinent part, that the nature of the proceedings before the Board under its organic act met the definition of a “contested case” in the DCAPA (D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1501) and therefore the contested case procedures of the DCAPA must be observed by the Board. As we had indicated previously in Woodridge Nursery School v. Jessup, D.C.App., 269 A.2d 199 (1970) (also an unemployment compensation case), the proceeding required an agency determination of the “legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties” and was therefore a “contested case.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 201. In the instant ease, we hold that a city-wide map amendment proceeding before the Zoning Commission does not decide, primarily, the rights or privileges of specific parties and is therefore not a contested case.
. In an injunction proceeding in the United States District Court in this jurisdiction attacking an order of the Zoning Commission involving an area of the city known as Mount Vernon Square East, the court stated significantly “ . . . the proceedings are quasi-legislative in character, not adjudicative in nature. . . . Thus all the strictures of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C.Code § 1-1501 et seq., and the full range of due process protections necessary to an adversary adjudication are not applicable.” Ruppert v. Washington, supra at 688, (Gesell, J.). (Emphasis added.)
. In Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, supra, which involved a zoning hearing of a particular sort, i. e., on application for a planned unit development, this court held it to be a “contested case” for the reasons there stated. As a result, the Zoning Commission later adopted a rule for hearings in regard to planned unit developments and certain amendments of the zoning map. 20 D.C.C.B.., § 2.22. Assuming the rule is adequately drawn, a question not reached, I see no reason why the agency should not proceed in that manner when the specified conditions are met. That course is certainly open to the Commission.
. It does seem to me, however, that it is unnecessarily wasteful of the time and resources of all concerned to require an appellate ruling on whether each specific agency proceeding is a “contested case”. All participants, as well as the agency, should know to a certainty at the very outset the nature of the hearing procedures to be employed. It would be a relatively simple matter to legislate this artfully and sensibly in each organic act and end this cumbersome flow of appeals on the hearing procedures to be employed in specific agency proceedings. While this flow in the past few years has been centered for the most part around zoning cases it seems to me it would be just as well to settle the matter legislatively in all organic acts.