OPINION
HUSPENI, Judge.Appellant challenges the trial court’s determination that respondent was alighting from a vehicle when injured and is entitled to No-Fault insurance benefits. We reverse.
FACTS
Respondent Pearl Christensen was injured after she slipped and fell on an icy street shortly after leaving her automobile. Respondent attempted to collect No-Fault insurance benefits from her insurance carrier appellant General Accident Insurance Company. Appellant refused to provide No-Fault benefits, and respondent brought this suit to compel payment.
The parties do not dispute the facts as found by the trial court. On the day of the accident, respondent’s brother-in-law drove respondent to the house of a relative. He parked the car on the street, and respondent exited from the rear passenger side door. The streets were icy, and respondent placed her hand on the car to steady herself as she walked toward the front of the car. Respondent kept her hand on the car as she rounded the front of the car. As she approached the middle of the front of the car, respondent slipped and fell.
The trial court found that respondent was alighting from the car at the time of her fall, and awarded summary judgment to her on the issue of coverage under Minnesota’s No-Fault Insurance Act. Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1 (1988). The parties stipulated to entry of judgment for $20,000 in lieu of trial on any remaining fact issues, and this appeal followed.
ISSUE
Is respondent entitled to No-Fault insurance benefits?
ANALYSIS
The parties in this case
dispute only the district court’s conclusions about the scope of coverage and its application of the law. Accordingly, this court need not defer to the district court *512and may determine whether the court “properly interpreted and applied the law to the facts presented.”
Huynh v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 421 N.W.2d 390, 391 (Minn.App.1988) (quoting Associated Indep. Dealers, Inc. v. Mutual Serv. Ins. Cos., 304 Minn. 179, 183-84, 229 N.W.2d 516, 519 (1975)), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 1988).
Minnesota’s No-Fault Insurance Act provides:
If the accident causing injury occurs in this state, every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * * has a right to basic economic loss benefits.
Minn.Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 1 (1988) (emphasis added). The term “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” is defined as
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, and alighting from it.
Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (1988) (emphasis added).
The trial court found that respondent was alighting from the vehicle at the time of her fall. In a memorandum incorporated into its order, the trial court reasoned, in part:
There is really only one live issue presented under these facts. Was the plaintiff still in the process of “alighting” from her brother-in-law’s automobile at the moment she fell? Or were her actions too attenuated from the vehicle in space and time to justify that characterization ?
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The legislature’s decision to extend no-fault coverage to alighting accidents means that sometimes the costs of injuries caused by a misstep on icy terrain will be allocated to the activity of motoring. That allocation seems appropriate under the facts of this ease.
The issue before us is whether respondent was “alighting from” the vehicle at the time she was injured. We agree with the trial court’s observation that “sometimes the costs of injuries caused by a misstep on icy terrain will be allocated to the activity of motoring.” We disagree only with the trial court’s ultimate determination that appellant was, in fact, “alighting from” a vehicle when she was injured.
This court first addressed the meaning of the term “alighting from” in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Levinson, 438 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn.App.1989):
[T]he. determination of whether a person is “alighting from” a vehicle is a question of degree to be determined based on all the evidence.
In Levinson, this court cited with approval the Florida Court of Appeals which held that:
[A] rational limit to the activity that may be said to be encompassed within the term “alighting from” is the time and place at which the insured shows an intention, evidenced by an overt act based on that intention, to undertake a new direction or activity.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Garcia, 368 So.2d 1313, 1315 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979), pet. for rev. denied, 378 So.2d 344 (Fla.1979), cited in Levinson, 438 N.W.2d at 114.
In Levinson, this court rejected the notion that “physical contact” is the operative test for coverage. Id. at 113. While rejection of this test would often result in a determination of coverage despite there being no physical contact with the vehicle, it is equally as possible that rejection of the “physical contact” test could result in a determination of no coverage despite there being physical contact with the vehicle. Therefore, the fact that respondent was in physical contact with the vehicle at the time of her fall is not dispositive. Rather, it is her intent which controls. Id. at 114.
Upon exiting the car, respondent clearly intended to leave the car and proceed toward her ultimate destination. It was only because the car was in the direction of her destination that she chose to use the car for support. Had her destination been across the street from the car, respondent would have walked away from the car immediately after exiting. We conclude that *513at the time she fell, respondent had completed “alighting from” the car. Her intent upon exiting the car, and at the time of her fall, was to move toward her destination; toward the home of her relative. It was fortuitous that the physical presence of the vehicle served as an aid to her in reaching her destination. A fence, wall, or other stationary object would have served as efficiently.
This case is distinguishable from Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Neuville, 465 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn.App.1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1991). Neuville’s disabled car was struck from behind by another motorist. Id. at 433. Prior to the accident, Neuville’s car had broken down, and he had pushed it to an intersection where he waited outside the car for help. Id. This court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Neuville was “alighting” from his vehicle when the injury occurred, and concluded:
The relationship between appellant and his car in driving it, steering it when disabled, and staying close by until help came was a continuous and uninterrupted relationship.
Id. at 434.
In contrast to Neuville, respondent here clearly did not intend to remain with the car. It was during her new activity of proceeding to her destination that respondent was injured.
Neuville is also distinguishable because of the overriding policy concerns which supported this court’s decision in that case. The injured party in Neuville had failed to insure his vehicle, and could collect No-Fault insurance benefits only if found to be neither alighting from nor occupying his vehicle at the time of his injury. Id. at 433. By finding that Neuville was, in fact, “alighting from” his uninsured vehicle at the time he was injured, the court prevented payment of benefits from a second policy under which Neuville was an insured. Id. at 434. This court noted that “the Minnesota Supreme Court has exhibited considerable reluctance to allow any recovery by uninsured drivers or uninsured vehicles.” Id.
To the extent that appellant attempts to rely on an analysis of the factors set forth in Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1987), we believe that attempt is misplaced. In Klug, this court addressed only “[t]he legal issue of whether an accident [arose] out of the use or maintenance of an automobile,” id. at 877, and not whether an injured party was “alighting from” a vehicle.1
The Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that No-Fault benefits are to be limited to “those risks the policy was intended to insure against, that is, against risks associated with ‘motoring.’ ” Classified Ins. Corp. v. Vodinelich, 368 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn.1985). At the time of her fall, respondent was not exposed to the risks associated with alighting from a vehicle. Rather, her fall was due to a premises hazard unrelated to the “risks associated with ‘motoring.’ ” Id.
DECISION
Because respondent was not “alighting from” her vehicle at the time of her fall, she is not entitled to No-Fault insurance benefits.
Reversed.
. Similarly, Marklund v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 400 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.1987) and Brehm v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 390 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. App.1986) are not relevant to this case. We recognize that the factual circumstances of these cases bear a superficial similarity to the case at bar: Marklund, 400 N.W.2d at 338 (plaintiff injured after slipping on ice after filling his automobile’s gas tank); Brehm, 390 N.W.2d at 476 (plaintiff injured after slipping on ice while washing his truck’s windows at filling station). However, these cases dealt exclusively with the issue of whether the injury arose from the "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and did not address the issue of whether the injured party was "alighting from” a vehicle. Marklund, 400 N.W.2d at 339; Brehm, 390 N.W.2d at 476.