dissenting:
With the greatest deference to my colleagues, I must dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case.
*577This is an appeal from an order denying Appellant’s petition to amend his complaint which sought to include a count for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
The procedural history of this case is complex. The underlying action was initiated by Appellant’s filing a complaint containing claims for conspiracy, abuse of process and malicous prosecution against Appellees. These claims were precipitated by Appellee, Sandra Robinson’s earlier commencement of action against Appellant in a New Jersey state court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District in Pennsylvania. The Appellee filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s complaint arguing that the dismissal of the Federal Court action without prejudice to Sandra Robinson’s right to renew her claims in the New Jersey action did not satisfy the prerequisites for Appellant’s claim of wrongful use of civil proceedings arising out of the Federal Court action. Accepting this argument, the court granted the preliminary objections and also ruled that Appellant was to be granted the right to amend his complaint with respect to the causes of action for defamation and conversion. Appropriate amendments were made by Appellant and the court dismissed Appellee’s preliminary objections to the amended complaint. Thereafter, the New Jersey action was ultimately concluded. Appellant again sought to amend his complaint to include a count for wrongful use of civil proceedings. The trial court again ruled that there was no termination in Appellant’s favor, a prerequisite to the claim he wished to make, and denied his petition to amend. This appeal followed.
I dissent from the majority because I believe that an order denying leave to amend complaint is interlocutory and not appealable and for that reason the appeal must be quashed.
First, I believe that the majority opinion confuses the difference between the denial of a petition to amend a complaint and the granting of preliminary objections dismissing certain counts of a plaintiff’s complaint. Generally, such dismissal is not appealable but in some rare cases an appeal lies.
*578The majority’s analysis in relying on Cloverleaf Development v. Horizon Financial, 347 Pa.Super. 75, 80-81, 500 A.2d 163, 166-167 (1985) when considered in light of the factual background of this case, serves to defeat the argument advanced.
On November 29, 1982, the trial court entered an order which states as follows.1
And now, this 29th day of November, 1982, it is hereby ordered and decreed that:
(1) Plaintiff’s petition for reconsideration of this court’s January 29, 1982 order is denied;
(2) Count I of the defendant’s preliminary objections is granted, and the plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy and malicious prosecution is dismissed;
(3) Count II of defendant’s preliminary objections is granted and plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy and abuse of process is dismissed; and
(4) Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from notice hereof to file an amended complaint regarding his claims of defamation and conversion.
Obviously, paragraphs (2) and (3) finally dismissed certain counts of the plaintiff’s complaint. The majority in its opinion (page 571) states:
“Initially, we agree with the court in the present action which stated that the order and opinion of November 29, 1982, ‘did not foreclose plaintiff [appellant] from filing a petition to amend after the conclusion of the New Jersey action.’ ”
The difficulty with this analysis is twofold.
First, the trial judge entered the order of November 29, 1982 specifically and categorically dismissing the counts for conspiracy and malicious prosecution and for conspiracy *579and abuse of process. The trial court did not grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint for those counts. Further, the trial judge’s opinion accompanying the November 29, 1982 order confirms the fact that leave to amend dealt only with defamation and conversion. In a detailed analysis, the Honorable Abraham J. Gafni concluded in November of 1982 that the allowance of a voluntary non-suit in a prior action did not constitute a judgment in favor of the plaintiff nor represented a termination consistent with Appellant’s innocence. These are the same issues that are now being raised and already decided.
If the majority’s analysis is correct, the order of November 29, 1982 would have been a “final order” and should have been appealed. There is nothing in the order or opinion accompanying the order which granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on the counts dismissed. Conversely, the analysis of the trial court was such that no amendment could be made that would satisfy the pleading requirements since the claim has been voluntarily dismissed.
Our appellate courts have held that once a final order is entered, it must be appealed or the right of review is lost. Mineo v. Tancini, 349 Pa.Super. 115, 502 A.2d 1300 (1986). Here the dismissal of counts I and II of the Appellant’s complaint on November 29, 1982 was a final appealable order. Failing to appeal ends the matter.2
More importantly, however, the action of the trial judge in this case in his order and opinion dated December 17, 1985 denying the petition to amend, does not preclude the Appellant from filing a separate action. It merely prevents him from including the matter in this case.
*580The procedural morass that is created by allowing appeals from orders dismissing counts of complaints or appeals from orders denying leave to amend complaints or answers does nothing but frustrate the orderly movement of litigation through the courts.
Certainly, review of the order appealed from in this case could be postponed until the remaining matters have been terminated at the trial level. The failure to allow an amendment to a complaint alleging a “new cause of action” does not put a litigant out of court but merely holds that it cannot be brought in the existing case.
If the majority’s analysis is correct in that the cause of action arose with the voluntarily dismissal of the New Jersey lawsuit, then, a new suit could have been filed. The Appellant is not out of court by denying his petition to amend.
If the majority’s analysis of appealability is correct, then the November 29, 1982 order dismissing the counts without leave to amend was final and appealable and no appeal having been filed it is too late to relitigate the issues at this time.
For these reasons I dissent and would quash the appeal.
. Actually, the trial court entered its order dismissing the counts of conspiracy and malicious prosecution on January 29, 1982, almost 10 months before the November order which the majority dismissed in its opinion and to which I have responded. That order also did not allow for amendment, therefore, the analysis of finality is the same as dealing with the order of November 29, 1982.
. I believe that the entire area of “final and appealable orders” which do not end the litigation between the parties should be reviewed. Allowing and reviewing appeals during the course of litigation serves only to delay the matters. In light of Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985) I believe where an order in entered in a lawsuit, that does not end all litigation between the parties, it should only be reviewed on immediate appeal if the postponement of review would cause an issue to be irrevocably lost. See PINES Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: Procedural Requirements and the Vagaries of Jurisdiction (Part 1), 91 Dickenson L.R. 88-91 (1986).