concurring in result.
Because the trial judge made clear that David Salazar’s conviction rested only on the default administrative order and that he did not conclude that David Salazar was *648the child’s biological father, I concur in the reversal of his conviction for failing to support this child.
The Missouri legislature has rightly enacted a law making it a crime for a parent to fail to provide adequate support for his or her child.1 The legislature has provided that for purposes of the criminal nonsupport statute, a “child” means:
... any biological or adoptive child, or any child legitimated by legal process, or any child whose relationship to the defendant has been determined, by a court of law in a proceeding for dissolution or legal separation, to be that of child to parent.
Section 568.040.2(1), RSMo 2000. Courts have held, I believe erroneously, that once the prosecution demonstrates a defendant’s paternity in any one of these four forms, the actual paternity of the father is no longer in dispute. State ex rel. Sanders v. Sauer, 183 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Mo. banc 2006); see also, State ex rel. Dally v. Copeland, 986 S.W.2d 943 (Mo.App.1999); State ex rel. State v. Campbell, 936 S.W.2d 585 (Mo.App.1996). Thus a court might hold that a prior legitimation or adjudication conclusively establishes paternity for purposes of a criminal nonsupport prosecution. For three reasons, I believe this interpretation is in error.
First, this reading of the statute renders it unconstitutional. In effect, a defendant is collaterally estopped from presenting his defense of a lack of paternity. And the law holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply if the burden of proof is greater in a later proceeding. Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 28 at 273 (1982); see also, State v. Yelli, 247 Neb. 785, 530 N.W.2d 250, 254-5 (1995) (holding that previous judgments in civil paternity actions were not binding under doctrine of collateral estoppel in a later criminal nonsupport prosecution). Making a “judgment in a civil action conclusive of an element in a criminal action denies a defendant due process because his guilt is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and because he is not allowed to present relevant evidence negating an element of the crime.” State v. Hoy, 742 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Mo.App.1987) (other holdings noted to be superseded by statute). Because this Court is to interpret statutes in a way that renders them constitutional, the Sauer court’s interpretation is erroneous.
Second, this interpretation of the statute produces absurd results. The Sauer court reads the “child” provision as establishing four distinct “types” of “childhood.” Consider the ramifications of this for Mr. Salazar. David Salazar has not yet divorced his wife because of his financial straits. If he does so, a court of law might yet decree that he is not the biological father of the child because the dissolution court is not precluded from relitigating the issue of paternity by virtue of the administrative order. Smith v. Smith, 985 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo.App.1998). If that were to occur and David Salazar would persist in failing to support the child, a prosecutor could charge him with criminal nonsupport, advancing any one of three theories. In the first instance, the prosecutor could claim that the child was David Salazar’s biological child, in which case paternity would likely be litigated by way of testimony and blood tests. Or the prosecutor might *649charge David Salazar on the theory that the child was his due to legitimation by legal process, in which circumstance the State could conclusively prove paternity by the prior legitimation and David Salazar would be precluded from offering evidence of his lack of paternity or the dissolution court’s judgment finding him not be the father. Note here that a defendant can be precluded by a prior legitimation and a contrary judgment of a court of law is not even admissible. Finally, the prosecutor might assert that the child was David Salazar’s offspring by operation of the dissolution judgment, in which case David Salazar would be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal based on the prior dissolution judgment finding him not to be the father. In sum, the Sauer court’s interpretation allows for three wildly disparate outcomes on the contested issue of paternity-a trial on the merits, conclusive proof of guilt, or conclusive proof of innocence-as to the same parent and the same child depending on the “theory” of childhood the prosecutor advanced. But the existence of a parent-child relationship should not depend on the theory advanced by the prosecution. Rather it should be determined whether one is actually the parent of the child.
Third and most critically, this is not what the legislature intended. I simply do not believe it was the legislature’s intent to punish a defendant who was not the actual parent of the child. What then does the “child” provision mean? The Court obviously must give effect to the legislature’s intent, but it must construe the statute in such a way as to render it constitutional and avoid absurd results. I propose an interpretation that, at this juncture in Missouri law, may seem novel: the legislature intended to prosecute persons for failing to support their children when and only when they are actually the parents of the child, whether biological or adoptive. I do not believe that the legislature intended to establish two new species of childhood- — childhood by legitimation and childhood by adjudication. In its opening clause, the statute identifies two alternative ultimate facts, which may prove the parent-child relationship — biological childhood or adoptive childhood. The statute then merely denominates two new avenues of proof of paternity, which are normally unavailable in criminal cases. But these new avenues of proof are not conclusive. They do not preclude a defendant from presenting his defense that he is not the actual father. Instead these legitimations or adjudications merely constitute prima facie proof of paternity, just like the presumption that exists for a child born in wedlock. Although this reading of the statute facilitates proof of paternity for the prosecution, it does not deny a defendant an opportunity to present his defense. Further, it avoids the absurd results that flow from the Sauer court’s interpretation. Finally, I believe it carries out the legislature’s intent: to provide children with the care and support they are due from their actual parents.
. The criminal nonsupport statute, section 568.040, provides in pertinent part, as follows:
1. ... a parent commits the crime of nonsupport if such parent knowingly fails to provide, without good cause, adequate support which such parent is legally obligated to provide for his child or stepchild who is not otherwise emancipated by operation of law.