Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center as a narcotic addict, purportedly pursuant to the provisions of former Penal Code, section 6450. He was not served with a certified copy of the order fixing the time and place of the hearing culminating in the commitment, as was prescribed by former Welfare and Institutions Code, section 5353. At the time and place set for the hearing, petitioner and his counsel appeared; a hearing was conducted; the court found petitioner to be a narcotic addict; and the commitment order.followed.
It is settled that “jurisdiction to enter an order .of civil commitment to the narcotic addict rehabilitation program ‘depends on strict compliance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance of the proceeding” (.People v. Victor, 62 Cal.2d 280, 290 [398 P.2d 391]; In re Cruz, 62 Cal.2d 307, 313 [42 Cal.Rptr. 220, 398 P.2d 412] ; In re Raner, 59 Cal.2d 635, 639 [30 Cal.Rptr. 814, 381 P.2d 638]; In re Pizzo, 221 Cal.App.2d 597, 598 [34 Cal.Rptr. 576].) The requirements respecting notice of hearing fall within this category. (In re Jones, 61 Cal.2d 325, 328 [38 Cal.Rptr. 509, 392 P.2d 310]; In re Raner, supra, 59 Cal.2d 635, 642; In re Singh, 234 Cal.App.2d 455, 457 [44 Cal.Rptr. 474].) Under the rule heretofore stated, as there was not “strict compliance with each of the specific statutory prerequisites for maintenance of the proceeding” in the instant ease, the proceeding was fatally defective; the court did not have jurisdiction in the premises to commit; and the commitment order was void. (76id.)
Following rendition of the commitment order, pursuant to the right conferred by former Penal Code, section 6450, petitioner demanded a hearing by a jury; was accorded such; was present at that hearing with his attorney; and was found ■by the jury to be a narcotic addict. The Attorney General -contends the demand for a hearing by a jury constituted a waiver of any prior defects in the proceeding; afforded due *298process of law; and precludes assertion of lack of the prescribed notice as a jurisdictional defect. This contention is without merit. The exercise of the right to a further hearing conferred by the statute did not validate the proceeding culminating in the commitment order requiring the exercise of that right. The lack of notice invalidated all subsequent proceedings. The court had no jurisdiction in the premises. Petitioner’s subsequent conduct did not purport to reinstate jurisdiction. Granted the requirements of a hearing and notice thereof may be waived by voluntary submission to commitment (In re Cruz, supra, 62 Cal.2d 307, 312-313), the assertion of a right conferred by the statute resisting commitment does not constitute such a waiver. In substance, under “the principle of strict compliance with each of the statutory prerequisites for maintenance of these special proceedings,” the denial of procedural due process prescribed by the statute invalidates the proceeding in to to. (In re Cruz, supra, 62 Cal.2d 307, 313.)
The hearing before the judge was not analogous to a preliminary hearing in a criminal ease. (In re Raner, supra, 59 Cal.2d 635, 642.) It effected the commitment from which petitioner seeks release. The hearing before the jury was analogous to an appeal (In re Trummer, 60 Cal.2d 658, 665 [36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177].) The verdict of the jury afSrmed the factual determination in the commitment but did not remove the inherent defect caused by failure to comply with the statutory prerequisite.
We reluctantly reach the conclusions aforesaid, confident that a commitment order would have been made even though there had been strict compliance with the procedural prerequisites of service of a written copy of the order fixing the time and place of the hearing before the judge. Nevertheless, otir duty is dictated by the strict compliance rule decreeing loss of jurisdiction upon failure to heed any statutory procedural prerequisite. (See In re Cruz, supra, 62 Cal.2d 307, 313.) The issue is not one of denial of constitutional due process but denial of statutory procedural due process.
Petitioner’s certification for proceedings under former Penal Code, section 6450 followed his conviction of a misdemeanor by the Municipal Court of Whittier Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, in case No. M36165, and a stay of proceedings in that case.
The writ of habeas corpus is granted and petitioner is ordered discharged from custody insofar as he is detained *299under the narcotic addiction commitment hut, by virtue of the conviction as noted, he is remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County for such further proceedings before the Municipal Court of Whittier Judicial District as may be appropriate.
Brown, P. J., concurred.