(dissenting). The majority concludes that under Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. *5272d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), we need not determine whether Schultz has a private cause of action for violation of his “free speech” rights under art. I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution.1 The majority asserts that Schultz’s rights — even if proved — do not implicate “fundamental well-defined and compelling public policy.” I. do not agree.
The public policies recognized in Brockmeyer are reflected in the constitution and statutes of Wisconsin. Id. at 578, 335 N.W.2d at 842. Brockmeyer also holds that “[t]hese declarations of public policy are inherently incorporated into every employment at will relationship.” Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840. Because our state constitution is an expression of fundamental public policy, Schultz’s allegations must implicate that policy.
Schultz also argues that, because Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3 contains no express state action requirement, his “free speech” rights are constitutionally protected from private as well as governmental invasions. No Wisconsin court has confronted this issue directly. However in State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210, 215 (1977), the supreme court said “Certainly, it is the prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford greater protection to the liberties of persons within its boundaries under the Wisconsin Constitution than is mandated by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Citation omitted.)2 More specifically, the court said in McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1963). “[A] *528state may permit greater freedom of speech and press than the Fourteenth Amendment would require, although it may not permit less.”
Courts of other jurisdictions have interpreted state constitution provisions virtually identical to Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3 as not requiring state action prerequisite to invocation of “free speech” guarantees. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1979), aff’d 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (interpreting Cal. Const, art. I, sec. 2) ; State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (interpreting N.J. Const, art. I, para. 6); and Alder-wood Assoc, v. Wash. Envir. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (interpreting Wash. Const, art. I, sec. 5). In each of those cases a constitutional cause of action against private restraints on free speech was identified. We should consider whether we should follow those cases.
Schultz’s claim for wrongful discharge is recognizable under Brockmeyer, and may be independently actionable under Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3.3 I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Wis. Const, art. I, see. 3 reads in part:
Every person may freely speak, write and pnblish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
See also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980), which holds that states may adopt in their own constitutions protections of individual rights more expansive than those embodied in the United States Constitution.
The elevation of every dispute involving speech to constitutional status could open Pandora’s box. The courts in Schmid and Alderwood Assoc., supra, attempted to avoid chaos by balancing the free speech interests against the protections accorded private property rights. A similar balancing test would not apply here, however, because Brockmeyer neither provides nor suggests such a mechanism. Instead, Brockmeyer says that a fundamental public policy interest is always paramount to the private interests of an employer. Brockmeyer at 572-78, 335 N.W.2d at 840.