Brennan v. Timmins

*467Blandin, J.,

dissenting: This case first came to this court upon an agreed statement of facts. Brennan v. Timmins, 104 N. H. 384. It was then briefed and argued by both parties upon the premise that all the facts were agreed upon. The sole question presented to our court was one of law, namely whether the defendant’s mere possession of the bank book at Alice’s death vested ownership in the defendant, ipso facto by virtue of RSA 384:28-31. There was no suggestion in the briefs or arguments at that time that all facts were not agreed upon. It was not until the first majority opinion misinterpreted the record to hold that the decisive questions of fact had not been agreed upon that the defendant took up this issue.

The majority of the court, upon the original transfer and in its present opinion, agrees that wrongful possession of the bank book does not vest ownership in the defendant under RSA 384: 28-31.

The majority, upon both the original transfer and its present decision, rests its opinion entirely upon the erroneous assumption that the vital questions of fact upon which the case wholly depends have been ignored by counsel and the Trial Court. The present opinion reiterates that “there is no evidence in the record establishing these issues in favor of the plaintiff.” Proceeding upon this ill-founded assumption, the majority now compounds its original error by again dispatching this case upon its wearisome, costly and what I believe to be totally unnecessary journey back to the Trial Justice who originally heard it.

The first majority opinion held that if the defendant Helen’s refusal to give up the bank book upon Alice’s demand was “wrongful” and but for this Alice could have withdrawn the account and used the proceeds, then there should be judgment for the plaintiff (Brennan v. Timmins, supra, 390). It added that the record shed no light upon whether these decisive facts had been agreed upon. In short, the majority treated them as ignored by counsel and Trial Court before the first transfer.

An examination of the record in its entirety clearly demonstrates that this is not so. The declaration in the writ, beginning this action, brought by Alice to establish her sole ownership to the fund, alleged that “In a plea for that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in that she is wrongfully withholding from the plaintiff Bank Book No. A73959 of Strafford Savings *468Bank, standing in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant jointly, but the proceeds of which bank account are wholly the property of the plaintiff, all to the damage of the plaintiff, as she says, in the sum of $15,000.00.”

It thus appears that the basic issues of fact upon which the entire case hinged and which the majority opinion says were not considered by anyone prior to the first transfer, were squarely presented to everyone then concerned before this transfer, including counsel and the Trial Court.

The majority opinion, as previously stated, upon the first transfer remanded the case to the Trial Court, and it did so with explicit instructions that if he found the defendant wrongfully withheld the bank book from Alice, who had a right to withdraw and use the proceeds of the deposit, there should be judgment for the plaintiff. In compliance with the mandate and instructions of the majority, which the Trial Court read and observed, as he stated in his ruling granting the plaintiff’s motion for judgment, he held another hearing and granted the motion for judgment. Although not requested to do so, he found certain facts, none of which are inconsistent with his final conclusion.

In view of the isolated portions of his findings seized upon by the majority opinion to support its present result, I believe it essential to quote them in toto as set forth in the Court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment: “This matter was submitted to this Court on defendant’s definite and unequivocal assertion that reliance was had on the statute and no issues of fact were in controversy. Counsel for plaintiff was reluctant to submit on an agreed statement, and would have gone to trial had any issue of fact as to the ownership or rights of Helen Timmins been raised. The sole questions at issue were centered on whether or not, as a matter of law, the actions of Alice in bringing suit operated to sever the joint account and whether or not the holding of the account until her death automatically passed the account to Helen. Defendant’s brief and requests filed in this Court so state. In view of the opinion of the Supreme Court, it is found that Helen Timmins never claimed ownership in the fund and never claimed that Alice had no right to withdraw the fund during her lifetime. Motion is granted. J. H. Leahy, P.J.”

Upon considering these, it will be noted that the majority opinion utterly ignores the unqualified and unequivocal finding *469that when the case first came before us “no issues of fact were in controversy.” Continuing this procedure, it also ignores our established and hitherto unquestioned rule that the Trial Court’s general finding embodied in his order of judgment for the plaintiff, included all the special findings necessary to sustain it. York v. Misiak, 95 N. H. 437. N. H. Savings Bank v. Bank, 93 N. H. 326, 328. Furthermore, instead of applying our equally settled rule that “all the presumptions are in favor of the judgment of the Trial Court” (Chabot v. Shiner, 95 N. H. 252, 255), that he observed the elementary rules of law (Chabot v. Shiner, supra, 255), and that if any valid reason can be found to uphold the Trial Court he will be sustained (Hall v. Insurance Co., 91 N. H. 6, 14), the majority establishes directly contrary rules.

In short, I believe that the majority refuses recognition of both facts and established law in reaching its present conclusion. It seems incredible to me to say that the Trial Court’s decision is without support in the record. In accordance with this conviction, I would affirm the Trial Court’s order granting judgment for the plaintiff.

In lieu of this, there is nothing in the majority opinion to prevent the plaintiff from petitioning the Trial Court to spell out his findings, already made, and to amend the agreed facts to express the true agreement and intent of the parties. Phillips Exeter Academy v. Gleason, 103 N. H. 197, 201; Vallee v. Company, 89 N. H. 285.